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For over two thousand years, Plato’s superiority to Thucydides was taken as an 
article of faith in Western philosophy.  Nietzsche was the first to challenge this verdict by 
asserting his view—on philosophical grounds—that Thucydides was the more 
penetrating analyst of the human condition.  Other than Nietzsche’s consideration of the 
two thinkers, surprisingly little has been done to investigate the connections between the 
two greatest Greek prose writers.  My purpose in this dissertation is to rekindle this 
debate in light of new evidence to see what—if anything—can be gained by examining 
the relationship between how Plato and Thucydides treat the problem of Athenian 
imperialism.  More specifically, I believe and attempt to show that: (1) Plato silently but 
explicitly directs his readers to different parts of the History through the use of textual 
references and thematic patterns; (2) Plato uses these textual allusions to highlight the 
common ground between the two thinkers, and that Plato understands Thucydides to be 
an ally to his philosophic aims; (3) Plato and Thucydides agree that the underlying cause 
of Athenian imperialism can be attributed to a combination of greed (pleonexia) and the 
internalization of specific sophistic teachings that, whether intended by the sophists or 
not, support unbridled appetitiveness as the best way of life; and (4) Plato and 
Thucydides largely agree on the solution to the problem—that pleonexia must be 
extirpated from the ruling order.   
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For over two thousand years, Plato’s superiority to Thucydides was taken as an 
article of faith in Western philosophy.  It is not terribly difficult to understand why this 
was the case.  The majesty of Plato’s corpus is nearly impossible to deny.1  Plato’s 
dialogues are littered with insights about such weighty things as the human soul and its 
composition, the nature of knowledge and reality, and the relationship between virtue and 
community.  Unlike Thucydides, whose work appears at first blush to focus only on a 
particular, historically situated event, Plato is the avatar for what it means to be a 
philosopher.  Through his dialogues, Plato weaves a comprehensive and interconnected 
web of ideas that take in the whole of human life.2   
Nietzsche was the first to challenge this verdict by asserting his view—on 
philosophical grounds—that Thucydides was the more penetrating analyst of the human 
condition.  For Nietzsche, Thucydides’ analytic superiority is due to his more astute and 
synoptic presentation of human motivation and his clear-eyed “scientific” method, in 
contrast to Plato’s moralism.3  Other than Nietzsche’s consideration of the two thinkers, 
surprisingly little has been done to investigate the connections between the two greatest 
Greek prose writers.  As R. B. Rutherford observes, it is “astounding that more has not 
                                                
1 Even Nietzsche testifies to Plato’s greatness in the frequency, vehemence, and often outlandishness with 
which he attacks Plato.  Among other things, Nietzsche criticizes Plato’s ability as a prose stylist in 
2 It is this comprehensiveness that led Whitehead to make his famous quip that the “safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality  (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 39. 
3 Nietzsche conveniently ignores the moral character of Thucydides’ judgments.  For example, Thucydides 
says of the Athenian general Nicias that: “of all the Greeks in my time he was the one who least deserved 
such a misfortune, since he had regulated his whole life in the cultivation of virtue” (8.86).  Translation 
from: Thucydides, On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides' History of the 
Peloponnesian War, trans. Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).  References to Thucydides are 
cited by book and chapter number. 
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been done to examine their [Plato and Thucydides’] relationship.”4  Writing in 2009, 
Simon Hornblower writes that the relation of Thucydides and “the Socratic corpus, has 
not been much studied since…the early part of the twentieth century.”5  While it is true 
that Plato does not mention Thucydides in his works, neither do any other fourth-century 
writers.6  And, though we remain uncertain as to both when Thucydides died and when 
his work was publically available, we do know that it was accepted as sufficiently 
authoritative for Socrates’ second most famous student, Xenophon, to begin his history 
(Hellenica) at 411, the point where Thucydides—in all likelihood involuntarily—breaks 
off mid-sentence.7   
The most detailed comparison between Plato and Thucydides was done by Max 
Pohlenz nearly a century ago.8  Pohlenz highlights connections between Plato’s analysis 
of democracy in the Republic and Pericles’ Funeral Oration.9  Leo Strauss mentions, but 
does not thoroughly analyze, the similarity between Plato and Thucydides’ accounts of 
early history in Book III of the Laws and the beginning chapters of the History.10  
However, as many commentators have observed in passing, there are many themes to 
                                                
4 R. B. Rutherford, The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 66. 
5 Simon Hornblower, "Intellectual Affinities," in Thucydides, ed. Jeffrey S. Rusten (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 63. 
6 This very peculiar fact has yet to be adequately explained. 
7 Thucydides certainly survived the end of the war (2.65), but we have no evidence that requires a date later 
than this.   
8 Max Pohlenz, Aus Platos Werdezeit  (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1913). 
9 Pohlenz also connects Pericles’ address with the Menexenus.  In the past thirty years, the Menexenus is 
the only work that has generated much research on the relationship between the two thinkers.  Stephen G. 
Salkever, "Socrates' Aspasian Oration: The Play of Philosophy and Politics in Plato's Menexenus," The 
American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (1993). S. Sara Monoson, "Remembering Pericles: The 
Political and Theoretical Import of Plato's Menexenus," Political Theory 26, no. 4 (1998).   
10 Leo Strauss, The City and Man  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 237. As many have 
noticed, Thucydides’ work bears no official title and Thucydides himself never refers to his work as a 
history.  Even if he did, in Greek the word history (historia) means “investigation” or “inquiry.” However, I 
follow standard convention and will refer to his work as the History.  
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which Plato and Thucydides both attend, including: the problem of demagoguery, the 
puzzle of Alcibiades, the analogy between cities and individuals, the analysis of Athenian 
imperialism and moral dissolution, the problem of civil strife (stasis), and the ethos of 
power politics.  Perhaps the reason why so little comparative work has been done is that 
it is ultimately impossible to prove a relationship between the two thinkers beyond 
doubt—a problem compounded by the fact that many of the same themes are taken up by 
other fifth and early fourth-century writers.  To take merely one example, the agon in 
Euripides’ Phoenician Women considers the conflict between moderation and power 
politics in a manner akin to Plato’s Gorgias.  Taking all this into account, it is not terribly 
surprising that most commentators have responded negatively to Pohlenz’s argument.11 
My purpose in this dissertation is to rekindle this debate in light of new evidence 
to see what—if anything—can be gained by carefully examining the relationship between 
how Plato and Thucydides treat the problem of Athenian imperialism.  More specifically, 
I believe and will attempt to show that: (1) Plato silently but explicitly directs his readers 
to different parts of the History through the use of textual references and thematic 
patterns; (2) Plato uses these textual allusions to highlight the common ground between 
the two thinkers and that Plato understands Thucydides to be an ally to his philosophic 
aims; (3) Plato and Thucydides agree that the underlying cause of Athenian imperialism 
can be attributed to a combination of greed (pleonexia) and the internalization by the 
Athenians of specific sophistic teachings that, whether intended by the sophists or not, 
support unbridled appetitiveness as the best way of life; and (4) Plato and Thucydides 
largely agree on the solution to the problem—that pleonexia must be extirpated from the 
ruling order.   
                                                
11 For the classic statement rejecting Pohlenz’s argument see Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydides and 
Athenian Imperialism, trans. Philip Thody (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963), 362-68. 
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Apart from its interest to students of ancient political philosophy, the topics of 
imperialism and greed resonate with many of the dilemmas currently facing the world, 
and the United States in particular.  Let us take greed as an example.  In the last decade, 
Americans have seen a conflagration of corporate scandals—Enron, WorldCom, A.I.G., 
Bernard Madoff, the list goes on—that paint the picture of a corporate class seemingly 
run amok, ignoring their ethical and legal obligations while at the same time ransacking 
their own investors.  The principal responses to these events have been attempts to put in 
place better institutional checks and balances to govern corporations.12  This approach to 
addressing the problem of greed is entirely consistent with the modern philosophic 
tradition’s general acceptance of selfish motives.  Rather than attempt to reform these 
motives by reforming individual souls, moderns consider the more promising avenue to 
be structuring rules such that they channel or align people’s selfish interests to produce 
outcomes similar to the ones that would come about if individuals were brimming with 
virtue.13  However, empirical evidence suggests that using structural reforms to deal with 
the problem of greed and prevent future scandals is usually ineffective.14      
Plato and Thucydides understand greed in a fundamentally different way.  For 
them, greed (pleonexia) is a habit of soul characterized by a grasping acquisitiveness or a 
disproportionate desire to get more.  For both thinkers, the most common expression of 
greed is materialism, or the attempt to satisfy bodily desires through wealth, power or 
                                                
12 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 designed to more tightly govern securities regulations. 
13 Since the analysis of corporate activity tends to be done by economists, we should not be too surprised 
by this.  And, politically speaking, it is substantially easier to propose regulatory or legal changes than soul 
craft. 
14 L. Bebchuk and J. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). Q. Cheng and T.D. Warfield, "Equity Incentives and 
Earnings Management," Accounting Review 80, no. 2 (2005). P. M. Healy and K. G. Palepu, "The Fall of 
Enron," Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 2 (2003). S. Bhagat and B. S. Black, "The Non-
Correlation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance," Journal of Corporation Law 
27, no. 2 (2002). 
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other goods.  However, Plato and Thucydides recognize that under specific conditions, 
this kind of ordinary greed can morph from mere materialism into a rapacious desire to 
get power for its own sake.  Their response to our corporate scandals would likely include 
reforming the souls of businessmen and women such that they internalize the idea that 
wealth is not the summum bonum, but instead that there are other moral principles to 
which acquisitiveness must be subordinate to.  Interestingly, there is some empirical 
evidence that this approach can be effective.15  Without belaboring the point, I believe, 
given America’s current position in the world, that Plato and Thucydides have more to 
say to us right now than perhaps any other two thinkers from the canon of political 
philosophy, and I will try to show that reading them in relation to each other deepens our 
understanding of both thinkers.  Though I believe they have important things to say about 
our current circumstances, my chief concern in this dissertation is examining the 
relationship between the two thinkers.  Therefore, while I will not be pausing to directly 
link Plato and Thucydides’ teachings to current political debates, it should be fairly 
obvious to the reader where and how they might come into play.16   
Let us begin, then, by investigating commonalities between the two thinkers in 
method and approach.  In thinking about the causes of things, or the nature of motivation, 
or the nature of justice, or how one should live, we find ourselves in the same 
predicament Plato describes in the Meno (86e) and that Thucydides posits as the problem 
of history (1.20-23).  Namely, we are led to inquire into things whose natures we do not 
                                                
15 D. Moberg, "Role Models and Moral Exemplars: How do Employees Acquire Virtues by Observing 
Others?," Business Ethics Quarterly 10, no. 3 (2000). 
16 For an outstanding example of how Plato and Thucydides can be used to illuminate current political 
debates, see Gerald M. Mara, The Civic Conversations of Thucydides and Plato: Classical Political 
Philosophy and the Limits of Democracy  (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008).  Mara 
applies the thought of Plato and Thucydides to: rational choice theory, deliberative democracy, John Rawls 
and Clifford Geetz’ conceptions of shared cultural meaning, and postmodern democratic theory.  However, 
given his project of showing classical political theory’s relevance to contemporary debates over democracy, 
Mara largely ignores the question of the relationship between Plato and Thucydides. 
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yet know, but that nevertheless stand as a goal for our understanding these things.  
Thucydides and Plato not only recognized this problem, they both attempted to overcome 
it by writing in such a way that readers are not merely passive recipients of descriptions, 
propositions, or theories, but themselves participate in fleshing out various political, 
ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological teachings.  While scholars frequently remark 
on the participatory nature of Plato’s dialogues, we would do well to remember what 
used to be a similar opinion about Thucydides.  Plutarch observed that: “Thucydides is 
always striving for this vividness in his writing, since it is his desire to make the reader a 
spectator, as it were, and to produce vividly in the minds of those who peruse his 
narrative the emotions of amazement and consternation which were experienced by those 
who beheld them.”17 
For both Plato and Thucydides, the “vividness” of their works is not exclusively 
the result of the dramatic elements or techniques each use.   As any reader of the Laws is 
aware, more than a few of Plato’s dialogues lack the beautiful staging of the Protagoras, 
Symposium, Phaedrus, and Phaedo, or the passionate intensity of the Gorgias.  Similarly, 
Thucydides cautions his readers that his abstaining from patriotic storytelling will make 
listening to him less enjoyable (1.22).  I think both authors’ “vividness” results from a 
combination of shrewdly employed dramatic techniques and the frequent use of 
antilogy—the balancing of opposed accounts.  Put together, these devices serve to make 
the reader a strange kind of participant who is encouraged to consider each account from 
its own perspective (the importance of which is almost always underscored by the 
dramatic elements in the History and the dialogues).  Indeed, Socrates frequently cautions 
his interlocutors that they must continually investigate the matter at hand as well as their 
                                                
17 Plutarch, De Gloria Atheniensium, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (Cambridge: Loeb-Harvard University 
Press, 1936), 3.346-3.47. 
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previous agreements, lest they succumb to the error of believing to know something that 
they do not.   
In both Plato and Thucydides, then, there are many voices at work, each 
presenting a perspective that is held up to scrutiny and, when held under that light, is 
nearly always rendered problematic.  Both Thucydides’ History and Plato’s dialogues 
educate their readers through the tensions created between various elements of each text 
that generate perplexity or wonder when set alongside one another.  For example, in a 
Platonic dialogue, the tensions that develop in the various accounts of the interlocutors 
often demonstrate that the merely having a basic formula or definition is insufficient to 
create understanding.  This problem becomes particularly acute when it comes to settling 
normative questions.18  Just as the Platonic dialogues encourage their readers to 
participate in the search for an account alongside the interlocutors, the History 
encourages its readers to make sense of the world alongside the participants.  And both 
encourage the reader to come to similar conclusions: to take merely one example, that the 
growth of power and the fear of imperialism inevitably corrupt cities and individuals. 
As we’ve noted, though scholars have identified areas of convergence and 
disagreement between the two thinkers, there is surprisingly little work done which 
imagines any relationship between the two.  This is perhaps partly because Plato never 
speaks in his own name and Thucydides is remarkably reticent when it comes to inserting 
his own personal judgments into the History.  However, I think a deeper reason for the 
neglect is a prejudice among commentators that Thucydides’ genius, while substantial, is 
primarily historical—or rather non-philosophic.19  Since Thucydides writes about a single 
                                                
18 See T.K. Seung’s discussion of the Euthyphro in T. K. Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and 
Social Order  (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 17-18. 
19 Bernard Williams is the most famous exception.  Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity  (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1993).  Though he does not consider whether Plato is aiming at 
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political event, and does so in a manner somewhat akin to what we typically call 
“history,” it is not terribly surprising that the general perception is that, though his work 
is extraordinarily thoughtful, it is not philosophy.20  As a result, though Thucydides’ work 
is frequently used as a source to paint the historical/cultural milieu in which Plato’s 
dialogues take place, the History is seldom used as a genuine counterpart or contribution 
to political thought which can and should be considered alongside Plato’s.     
Instead, the typical view is that, while Thucydides can and should be turned to for 
instruction about power politics, ancient democracy, the role of deliberation in decision-
making, and the causes of war, we should not look to him for any systematic philosophy 
or approach to political thought.  As we’ve observed, those inclined to view his thought 
in this way frequently point out that the History is concerned with a specific or singular 
event and conclude from this that Thucydides’ thought is too contextual to be anything 
other than captive to the prevailing intellectual environment.  Given that the sophists and 
dramatists played prominent intellectual and cultural roles in classical Athens, it’s 
unsurprising to read scholarly accounts that interpret Thucydides from the perspectives of 
classical drama or sophism.21        
                                                                                                                                            
Thucydides, Raymond Geuss observes: “Williams’s later work is…inspired by the ideal of what one might 
call a ‘Thucydides who philosophizes.’”  Raymond Geuss, Outside Ethics  (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 233. 
20 This understanding of history derives from Aristotle’s distinction in the Poetics (1451a36-b11) between 
universals (which belong to poetry and philosophy) and particulars (which belong to history).  Notice, 
however, that Aristotle refers here to what is studied, not how it is studied.  Thucydides, I think, would 
place himself in the universals camp. 
21 See, for example: F. E. Adcock, Thucydides and His History  (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973); 
Francis Macdonald Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus  (London: E. Arnold, 1907); Lowell Edmunds, 
Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Cynthia Farrar, The 
Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); John H. Finley, Thucydides  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942); Simon 
Hornblower, Thucydides  (London: Duckworth, 1987); Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism; H. 
D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Pentekontaetia," The Classical Quarterly 5, no. 1/2 (1955).  Scholars 
rarely make such a claim about Plato. 
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Thucydides certainly did not view himself or his work in this way.  In fact, he 
made what at the time must have seemed an incredible boast but that has indeed come to 
pass, that the History is “a possession for all time” (1.22).22  For Thucydides to claim that 
his work will have lasting value so long as “men have the same nature,” he must believe 
that something universal rests at its core—for example, an understanding of human 
nature that gives shape and structure to his thinking (3.82).23  I believe that when 
Thucydides suggests that the History’s ultimate usefulness is not its account of the war, 
but its promise to contain an underlying truth applicable to the future, he is explicitly 
challenging his readers to seek a philosophic core at the heart of the History (1.22).  This 
dissertation, then, may be considered a thought-experiment that takes Thucydides’ claim 
to universality as a point of departure. 
I believe Plato and Thucydides are much more similar than is often appreciated.  
To the charge that Thucydides’ thought is more contextual than Plato’s because his 
subject is a singular event, we would do well to keep in mind Leo Strauss’ wonderful 
observation that: “Plato too can be said to have discovered in a singular event—in the 
singular life of Socrates—the universal and thus to have become able to present the 
universal through presenting a singular.”24  Both Thucydides and Plato approach their 
                                                
22 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1998). 
Unless otherwise specified, all references to Thucydides are from this edition. 
23 Marc Cogan interestingly distinguishes “that which is human” (to anthropinon) from “human nature” 
(anthropeia phusis). Marc Cogan, The Human Thing: The Speeches and Principles of Thucydides' History  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). It is indeed true that at 1.22 Thucydides does not use the 
words “human nature.”  He uses to anthropinon, “the human” instead—thereby failing to give us much 
guidance on exactly what we are supposed to learn from recurrent or similar actions as well as precisely 
how such an understanding would be “useful” (1.22).  As I see it, there are at least two reasonable 
possibilities.  Thucydides might mean that we can obtain knowledge that would help predict future events.  
However, given the importance of chance (tuche) in Thucydides’ narrative, I am skeptical that Thucydides 
has in mind any robust predictive understanding.  On the other hand, he might mean that by understanding 
the events in the History, we can better understand future events once they have occurred.  To take a 
current example, perhaps if we sufficiently understood the History, we might be in a better position to make 
sense of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.        
24 Strauss, The City and Man: 143. 
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audience primarily through the lens of singular events: the Peloponnesian War on the one 
hand, and the life of Socrates on the other.  The two authors use similar narrative devices 
in their writing, most notably the rhetorical device of weaving speeches and events to 
raise philosophical arguments.  Plato embeds the events of the war and its consequences 
inside philosophical dramas made up of speeches.  Thucydides embeds speeches within 
the larger historical drama or narrative of the war.  And both Plato and Thucydides use 
characters to embody various forms of sophistic rhetoric that lead directly to the hunger 
for power and a world of deeds without justice.  This is a world in which only the power 
of the strong counts, as personified by the figures of Callicles in the Gorgias, 
Thrasymachus in the Republic, Cleon in the History, and Alcibiades, who figures in both 
Plato and Thucydides’ works.25    
Furthermore, both authors are painstaking in their shaping of context.  This is 
perhaps more obvious in the case of Plato, since his dialogues are always, to one degree 
or another, dramas.  However, Thucydides’ History is no less artfully dramatic and 
context plays an equally important interpretive role, one that is often overlooked by 
commentators.  In particular, the speeches—which comprise roughly half of the 
History—are placed with special care and not always at the most natural or expected 
points in the narrative.  In my view, the best illustration of this is the Mytilenean Debate 
in Book III of the History, which Thucydides decides to place during a second assembly 
session that reconsiders the original vote to put all Mytilenean men to death.  By placing 
the debate here rather than during the original vote—and Thucydides tells us that there 
were contrary opinions raised during the original vote as well—it allows Thucydides to 
offer a more subtle thematic debate (since the original vote was taken in a mood of 
                                                
25 Alcibiades is particularly ambiguous for Plato—for Socrates is in love with him even though his desire 
for power is proof positive of the polis’ decay. 
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anger).  The outcomes of such context-shaping decisions are important as well; had 
Thucydides staged the debate during the original vote over the relative merits of 
enslavement or execution, Cleon would have emerged as the victor rather than Diodotus. 
An examination of how each thinker approaches his audience leads to an 
examination of what can be gained from imagining a relationship between the two 
thinkers.  This is especially so because they write against the shared socio-political 
backdrop of the Peloponnesian War.  If I do not find it rash to draw a parallel between 
Thucydides and Plato, it is because the works of both men came into existence during a 
period of crisis and strife.  Both contain a critique of the status quo and direct us to a 
better world, which we can define on the basis of justice and peace.26  Importantly, both 
men, to one degree or another, participated in the political world that they criticize.  As 
Athenian citizens, both Thucydides and Plato had rights and duties to the city.  This was 
no small matter in ancient Greece, where a man’s identity was determined by his 
patronymic—who his father was and from which polis he came.  Thucydides was elected 
as a general in 424 and was exiled for 20 years by the Athenians for his failure to keep 
Amphipolis from falling into Spartan hands.  For his part, Plato’s family was deeply 
involved in Athenian politics and likely encouraged him to take an active part.  Critias, 
the most important and politically ruthless of the Thirty Tyrants, was his mother’s cousin.  
If we are to believe the genuineness of Plato’s letters, after witnessing the “unholy deeds” 
during the reign of terror by the Thirty, Plato withdrew from politics.27  He supposedly 
                                                
26 In the Republic, for example, Plato sets out his Kallipolis as a countermeasure to the prevailing social, 
political, cultural, and spiritual confusion through an analogy between the formation of a new state and an 
individual’s spiritual development.  Interestingly, Plato does not pursue this analogy in his other dialogues.  
Indeed, if any single thing may be said to define the telos in Plato’s work, it is Socrates and the virtue 
(arête) he personifies.  He is the nearest it is possible to come to an individual fulfilling the philosopher-
king ideal that Plato establishes in the Republic as a counterweight to the decline of the moral status quo.   
27 Letters 325a. 
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re-entered politics after the fall of the Thirty only to see the Athenians condemn Socrates, 
“the most just of men then living,” to death.28 
While there have been few works that investigate in detail the relationship 
between Plato and Thucydides, commentators have made brief or parenthetical 
comparisons that typically highlight the incompatibility or conflictual relationship 
between the two.  Generally speaking, comparisons fall into two camps that, for 
convenience, we will call Nietzschean or Periclean.  As we’ve seen, the Nietzschean view 
sees Plato and Thucydides as essentially different and incompatible thinkers who concern 
themselves with separate planes of existence—Plato with the ephemeral world of thought 
or ideas in contradistinction to Thucydides’ concern with the empirical.  For 
Nietzscheans, the conflict between the two is one of Plato’s idealism versus Thucydides’ 
realism.  The Periclean view sees the relationship between Plato and Thucydides to be 
equally conflictual, but sees the conflict as primarily one of politics.  Pericleans read the 
History as Thucydides’ lionization of Pericles.29  Scholars persuaded by the Periclean 
view understand Thucydides primarily from the perspective of democratic statesmanship, 
a statesmanship where the ambition to rule is balanced by care for democratic practices.  
Naturally, such a perspective almost inevitably leads to viewing Plato in direct opposition 
to Thucydides.  For, if Thucydides truly believes that Pericles is the ideal democratic 
ruler, then Socrates’ remarks about Pericles in the Gorgias seem to directly oppose the 
Thucydidean view.30  Let us briefly examine each perspective. 
                                                
28 Letters 324e. 
29 I disagree with this understanding of Thucydides.  As I will show in Chapter Three, Thucydides’ 
assessment of Pericles is substantially more nuanced than many commentators believe.  
30 Indeed, Socrates attacks Pericles on three occasions in the dialogue—once in his encounter with Gorgias 
(455e-456a), and twice during his debate with Callicles (503c-d, 515d-519a) where Socrates accuses 
Pericles of being merely a flatterer of the Athenians—a gifted pastry-cook whose primary ability is the 
gratification of appetites. Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald Zeyl in Plato Complete Works, eds. John M. 
Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 791-869.  Unless otherwise specified, all 
references to Plato are from this edition. 
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In the chapter of Twilight of the Idols entitled “What I Owe the Ancients,” 
Nietzsche praises Thucydides and characterizes the relationship between Thucydides and 
Plato as one of sickness and cure: 
My vacation, my preference, my cure for all things Platonic has always been 
Thucydides.  Thucydides, and perhaps Machiavelli’s Principe, are most closely 
related to me in terms of their unconditional will not to be fooled and to see 
reason in reality, --not in ‘reason’, and even less in ‘morality’…Thucydides is the 
best cure for the ‘classically educated’ young man who has carried away a 
horrible, whitewashed image of the ‘ideal’ Greeks as the reward for his 
secondary-school training.31  
The Platonic sickness which Nietzsche believes Thucydides can cure is, of course, 
idealism.  Specifically, Nietzsche objects that Plato “already has ‘good’ as the highest 
concept.”32  By contrast, Thucydides:  
represents the most perfect expression of the sophists’ culture, by which I mean 
the realists’ culture; this invaluable movement right in the middle of the hoax of 
morals and ideals that was being perpetrated on all sides by the Socratic 
schools…Thucydides as the great summation, the final manifestation of that 
strong, severe, harsh objectivity that lay in the instincts of the more ancient 
Hellenes.33   
Thus, Nietzsche sums up his view of the difference between Thucydides and Plato as 
primarily one of courage as opposed to self-deception, that “what divides natures like 
Thucydides from natures like Plato is courage in the face of reality: Plato is a coward in 
the face of reality,--consequently, he escapes into the ideal; Thucydides has self-control, 
and consequently he has control over things as well…”34  Many commentators—
particularly political scientists who study international relations—are persuaded by 
                                                
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Aaron 
Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 225. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 225-26. 
34 Ibid., 226. For a more complete picture of how Nietzsche understands Thucydides, see John 
Zumbrunnen, "'Courage in the Face of Reality': Nietzsche's Admiration for Thucydides," Polity 35, no. 2 
(2002). 
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Nietzsche’s perspective.  They are undoubtedly attracted by the darker aspects of 
Thucydides’ History; for example, his pessimism about human nature and his frequent 
highlighting of the moral tragedy in international politics, as well as his sober assessment 
of fear, ambition, and advantage as prime motivators for action.35  And they embrace the 
view that by focusing on political reality, Thucydides necessarily limits his capacity to 
present any meaningful philosophy.  Let us briefly examine some of the most prominent 
Nietzscheans.       
Lowell Edmunds argues that Thucydides is skeptical about the power of reason to 
govern human affairs.36  The basic antithesis of the Athenian and Spartan perspectives 
gives rise to the central Thucydidean truth that there are limits to reason’s capacity to 
foresee and overcome the unavoidable power of chance.  He concludes that, contra Plato, 
“Thucydides never separated from its temporal manifestations what he believed was the 
eternal clarity he had attained, and he did not give his principles an existence independent 
of this world.”37  Thucydides concern with actual political life—which is always subject 
to chance—makes a Thucydidean philosophy essentially impossible.  As Edmunds puts 
it, Thucydides is resigned to “a certain irrationality.”38   
Peter Pouncey views Thucydides’ History as conveying a pessimism about human 
nature which he thinks “carries within itself drives that are destructive of its own 
achievement, that are in fact the same drives as those that build historical achievements in 
the first place, so that in a sense the way up and the way down are the same.”39  In this 
                                                
35 Notice that many of these scholars take the Athenian theory of motivation—ambition, fear, and 
advantage—as Thucydides’ own (1.76). 
36 Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides. 
37 Ibid., 169. 
38 Ibid., 209. Of course, it is unclear why philosophy must be wholly separate from the empirical—that is 
to say political—world.   
39 Peter R. Pouncey, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980), xiii. 
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limited and perhaps dogmatic sense, Pouncey views Thucydides philosophically—
Thucydides articulates an understanding of human nature, and the purpose of the History 
is to convey that understanding to the reader.  However, Pouncey distinguishes 
Thucydides from philosophers like Plato because the orbit of Thucydides’ concern is 
limited to “the causes of the events he describes,” which is to say a view of human nature 
applicable only to the practical conduct of war.40  Like Nietzsche, Pouncey is convinced 
that Thucydides remains unconcerned with morality and evaluative judgments as such. 
Gregory Crane is perhaps the best-known exponent of the Nietzschean view.41  
For Crane, Thucydides sees through deceptive justifications and appearances to unearth 
the naked power politics that lies beneath.  The History is a realist classic because it 
reveals how the strong dominate the weak and how interest trumps justice.  Yet, 
Thucydides considered such behavior a fundamental departure from traditional Greek 
practice, in which foreign policy was an extension of aristocratic family connections that 
enmeshed leaders and their poleis in a web of mutual obligations.  The Corinthian plea to 
the Athenian assembly not to ally with Corcyra because of Corinth’s prior restraint 
during the Samian rebellion reflects this approach and uses the time-honored language 
and arguments of reciprocity.  The Athenians reject the appeal because they formulate 
their interests and foreign policy on the basis of immediate interests.  They act as if 
alliances are market transactions: short-term exchanges unaffected by past dealings.  
Thucydides considered this approach to politics destructive of the relationships that are 
the true source of security and prosperity.  Pericles, who speaks on this question in his 
Funeral Oration, insists that the individual is nothing without the state, but at the time of 
                                                
40 Ibid., x. 
41 Gregory Crane, The Blinded Eye: Thucydides and the New Written Word  (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996); Gregory Crane, Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political 
Realism  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
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the Sicilian debate Alcibiades reverses this formula, asserting that the state counts for 
nothing if it does not support him as an individual.  Like Nietzsche, Crane also considers 
Plato’s project to be qualitatively different from Thucydides:    
Plato, if he has achieved an even more prominent position in the Western canon 
[than Thucydides], did so by leaving the "real world'' behind. Thucydides, more 
than any extant Greek thinker before him, balanced the general and the particular, 
following the phenomena wherever they led and refusing to give in to one side or 
the other. Thucydides never achieved a stable balance—for intellectual closure in 
human affairs is, of course, an impossibility—but he participated in, and indeed 
helped fashion, a practice of observation and analysis that we still pursue to this 
day.42 
As we’ve seen, in The City and Man, Leo Strauss argues that Plato and 
Thucydides “may supplement one another.”43  For Strauss, Thucydides’ History is “the 
quest for the ‘common sense’ understanding of political things which led us first to 
Aristotle’s Politics lead us eventually to Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians.”44  Like Nietzsche, Strauss views Thucydides’ realism, his ability to see “man 
as completely immersed in political life…in an unsurpassable, nay, unrivalled manner” as 
his most important attribute.45  It is his realistic account of political life that makes 
Thucydides an important supplement to Plato.  However, on the matter of which author is 
the more trenchant political thinker Strauss parts company with Nietzsche, saying of his 
brief analysis that: “All this amounts to saying that Thucydides’ thought is inferior to 
Plato’s thought.”46      
                                                
42 Crane, Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political Realism: 19. 
43 Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 140. 
44 Strauss, The City and Man: 240. 
45 Ibid.  It is interesting to note that in The City and Man, Strauss inverts the chronological order of 
composition, beginning with Aristotle and concluding with Thucydides, suggesting that Thucydides is 
perhaps the culmination of classical political philosophy, which teaches the recognition of the limits of 
politics.  However, if this is Strauss’ point, he makes it only elliptically or, to borrow his own famous 
distinction, esoterically.   
46 Ibid., 237. 
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Steven Forde argues that Thucydides is primarily interested in providing practical 
political instruction.47  He suggests that the History instructs by illustrating the 
inconsistency and perhaps incoherence of moral conventions.  For Forde, this is revealed 
most clearly by the relationship between Athens and Alcibiades.  Alcibiades is the most 
daring man in Athens, and reflects the ambition that lies at the root of Athenian 
imperialism—he is the embodiment of the drivers of imperialism.  However, Alcibiades’ 
leadership is dangerous to Athens because his ambition—specifically, his feelings about 
what he deserves—often places his own interest above the city's.  Forde concludes that it 
is Thucydides’ treatment of political reality, the political world as it is not as it ought, that 
distinguishes his approach from Plato’s.48 
The Periclean view also understands the relationship between Plato and 
Thucydides as one of conflict.  Pericleans believe that Thucydides’ purpose in the History 
is to celebrate and idealize Pericles’ rule—a view that Plato challenges.  Pericleans note 
that Pericles represents Athens at the height of her power, and pay particular attention to 
Thucydides’ opinion that, with Pericles at the helm, the Athenians may have prevailed in 
their war with Sparta.49  In one of the rare moments where Thucydides speaks in his own 
voice, he describes Pericles’ wisdom and foresight: 
                                                
47 Steven Forde, The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides  (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989); Steven Forde, "Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli," The 
Journal of Politics 54, no. 2 (1992). 
48 Clifford Orwin is perhaps the most sophisticated Nietzschean, claiming that Thucydides does indeed 
have a philosophical purpose in the History. As he puts it, “Thucydides seeks to articulate an understanding 
of human affairs that transcends that fostered by any regime.  This study is comparable to that of Plato or 
Aristotle, or any other of the greatest political thinkers.” Clifford Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 11. Orwin therefore considers Thucydides to understand 
practical politics from a viewpoint outside of or greater than the specific conditions brought about by the 
Peloponnesian War itself.  However, while accepting Thucydides into the ranks of political philosophers, 
Orwin never details exactly how, if at all, Thucydides relates to Plato or Aristotle.   
49 Thucydides, 2.65. 
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For as long as he presided over the city in peacetime he led it with moderation and 
preserved it in safety and it became greatest in his hands, and when war broke out 
it is clear that he foresaw the power it had at this time…and after he died his 
foresight regarding the war was even more widely recognized…The reason was 
that he, influential through both reputation and judgment and notable for being 
most resistant to bribery, exercised free control over the people and was not led 
by them instead of leading them, because he did not speak to please in order to 
acquire power by improper means but, since he had this through his prestige, even 
contradicted them in their anger…And what was in name a democracy became in 
actuality rule by the first man. (2.65) 
Pericles, then, should be understood as embodying the characteristics of the ideal 
democratic leader, and the purpose of the History is to train future statesmen to bring into 
being the ideal Athenian polity envisioned, but not realized, by Pericles.  This is the 
general approach of two of the most famous commentators on Thucydides, John Finley 
and Jacqueline de Romilly.50  For Finley, the History shows how human nature combines 
with general historical principles to create systematic or recognizable patterns in human 
affairs.51  He argues that Thucydides is decisively influenced by the sophists, which 
explains Thucydides’ belief in the power of reason, his use of arguments from likelihood 
(eikos), and his rhetorical use of antithesis.  Given Plato’s well-known hostility to the 
sophists, Finley concludes that the two thinkers are deeply at odds.  Romilly takes a 
slightly different tack, arguing that Thucydides uncovers universal political laws from the 
specific events of the Peloponnesian War.52  For Romilly, the subject that binds the 
History together is Athenian imperialism.  Indeed, she correctly notes that the theme of 
Athenian imperialism is found in nearly every part of the History.  However, what 
Romilly draws from this is Thucydides’ desire to remedy Pericles’ failures.  According to 
Romilly, the Periclean ideal serves as Thucydides’ normative standard and its failure 
simultaneously highlights inherent political limits.  For Romilly, the lesson is that the 
                                                
50 Finley, Thucydides; Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism. 
51 Finley, Thucydides: 292-94. 
52 Note that for both authors Thucydides’ essential contribution is practical rather than philosophical. 
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Periclean ideal will always—in the long run—be undercut by power politics, or the “law 
of the stronger.” Plato’s rejection of this thesis and his indictment of Pericles 
characterizes the essential disagreement between Thucydides and Plato. 
Harvey Yunis argues that Thucydides presents Pericles as the exemplar of 
democratic statesmanship because he combined the ability and moral fortitude to 
persuade and instruct the Athenians as he led them.53  The leaders who arose after 
Pericles lacked his abilities and his character, pandering to the Athenians' worst impulses 
and leading the city to ruin.  Yunis argues that the Gorgias is Plato’s response to 
Thucydides’ Pericles.  Opposing Thucydides’ glorification of Athenian power, Plato 
highlights the inherently corrosive influence of her imperial ambitions.  Hence, the 
argument between the two thinkers is not one of realism or idealism, but of politics. 
Most recently, Sara Monoson describes Pericles’ Funeral Oration as an attempt 
“to articulate an idealization of democratic citizenship.”54  Monoson argues that Pericles’ 
insistence that Athenians gaze upon their city as lovers is a simulacrum of actual cultural 
understandings of the proper relationship of adult male lovers to their younger male 
beloveds.  In particular, she notes that the unique, culturally praiseworthy character of 
that relationship did not involve the presence of domination but the mutual enrichment 
that stems from equal reciprocal exchanges.  By virtue of his use of this metaphor, 
Pericles infuses his ideal of democratic citizenship with images of equal, reciprocal 
relations among citizens that are open to progressive reform.  To make this point, 
Monoson draws on the abundant recent scholarship on ancient Greek sexual practices that 
shows how their particular erotic character was itself governed by criteria of social 
                                                
53 Harvey Yunis, Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996). 
54 S. Sara Monoson, "Citizen as Erastes: Erotic Imagery and the Idea of Reciprocity in the Periclean 
Funeral Oration," Political Theory 22, no. 2 (1994): 266. 
 20 
propriety and status.  This allowed references to erotic activity to be used metaphorically 
by rhetoricians in politically specific ways.  Monoson, therefore, reads Pericles’ Funeral 
Oration as a genuine encomium to an attractive democratic ideal.  Naturally, given 
Plato’s less than sanguine views on democracy, Monoson turns to Plato to raise concerns 
over the Periclean account.55 
The Nietzschean and Periclean perspectives, then, view the relationship between 
Thucydides and Plato as one of either incompatibility or conflict.  Plato and Thucydides 
either live in wholly different worlds or else their disagreements are so fundamental as to 
make engagement a futile exercise.  In this dissertation, I contest these long-standing 
views by taking seriously the idea that the relationship between Plato and Thucydides is 
one of compatibility and congruence.  In keeping with the authors’ spirits, I use an 
expositional strategy they both employed to help bring their ideas into the same orbit: 
antilogy.  In doing so, I recognize that this is not Socrates’ preferred method of 
argumentation.  Early in the Republic, Socrates highlights the difference between his 
dialectical elenchus and the typical antilogical approach when asking Glaucon how they 
might persuade Thrasymachus that the just life is more profitable than the life of 
injustice: 
If we oppose him with a parallel speech about the blessings of the just life, and 
then he replies, and then we do, we’d have to count and measure the good things 
mentioned on each side, and we’d need a jury to decide the case.  But if, on the 
other hand, we investigate the question, as we’ve been doing, by seeking 
agreement with each other, we ourselves can be both jury and advocates at once. 
(347e-348b) 56 
                                                
55 Susan Sara Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of 
Philosophy  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
56 Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche draws a different conclusion: “One choses dialectic only when one has no 
other means.  One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive.  Nothing is easier 
to erase than a dialectical effect; the experience of every meeting at which there are speeches proves this.  It 
can only be self-defense for those who no longer have other weapons.” Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce 
Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings. 
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To add insult to injury, from Plato’s perspective at least, most of the arguments I make 
are grounded in eikos—the likely, probable, or reasonable.  Given the subject matter 
under investigation, I am comfortable using eikos as an evaluative standard, though this is 
not meant to signal any favoritism on my part for sophist epistemology.   As an example 
of how I rely on eikos as a standard, Chapters Two, Three, and Four each discuss specific 
textual allusions that link Plato and Thucydides in order to establish Plato’s familiarity 
with Thucydides’ History.  Given the availability of the evidence, I am surprised that this 
remains a controversial suggestion.  I want to emphasize that I do not consider my 
interpretations of the textual allusions to be original at every point.  Many of the riddles 
that link the History to Plato’s dialogues have either been hinted at or explicitly made by 
one or more commentators.57  Nevertheless, these answers have generally gone unnoticed 
and, so far as I can tell, there is no single treatment that contains them all.   
Let us briefly examine the two most obvious pieces of evidence that Plato had 
read Thucydides: their similar accounts of the introduction of athletic nudity in Greece, 
and the textual allusions in the Menexenus that refer to Pericles’ Funeral Oration in the 
History.  In attempting to settle the issue of when Greek athletes began to exercise nude, 
Myles McDonnell argues that Plato must have read Thucydides, based on both authors’ 
accounts of the practice’s history.58  Thucydides and Plato both report that it was only 
just before their own time that Greeks stopped wearing the zoma59 and began competing 
in the nude.  Thucydides’ discussion of athletic nudity occurs in his discussion of early 
                                                
57 I would be remiss not to point out Simon Hornblower’s interesting speculation that Thucydides and Plato 
are linked because they both knew Socrates.  As Hornblower puts it: “The link might be Thucydidean 
borrowing from Socrates, or Thucydidean desire to reply to Socrates, rather than Platonic echoing of 
Thucydides.” Hornblower, Thucydides: 126. 
58 Myles McDonnell, "The Introduction of Athletic Nudity: Thucydides, Plato, and the Vases," The Journal 
of Hellenic Studies 111(1991). 
59 A leather or felt cloth. 
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Greek history in the so-called Archaeology (1.1-1.18).  In a digression on social customs, 
Thucydides remarks that:  
[The Lacedaemonians] were also the first to strip publicly for athletics and anoint 
themselves with oil afterward; the old way was for athletes to compete with their 
genitals covered, even in the Olympic games, and this ended quite recently. (1.6, 
italics mine) 
In Book V of the Republic, Socrates, arguing in support of women exercising in the nude, 
concedes that the idea might seem ridiculous, but tells his interlocutors that: 
it was not very long ago that the Greeks themselves thought it shameful and 
ridiculous (as the majority of the barbarians still do) for even men to be seen 
naked and that when the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians began the 
gymnasiums, the wits of those times could also have ridiculed it all. (452c, italics 
mine) 
McDonnell examines a litany of archaeological and other evidence that indicate 
both an early innovation of athletic nudity and its prevalence in Athens from 550 B.C. (at 
the latest) that is difficult to square with Thucydides’ and Plato’s accounts.  Though 
Plato’s reliability on historical matters is suspect, his references almost always serve a 
pedagogical purpose.  McDonnell notes that the veracity of Plato’s account in the 
Republic is different from what he writes elsewhere about distinctive Cretan and Spartan 
social customs.  In a number of places,60 Plato states that it was the Cretan and Spartan 
lawgivers who established gymnasia as defining practices for their poleis.  And in the 
Laws, Plato makes clear that the exercise was conducted in the nude “by making an 
explicit causal connection between the institution of the gymnasion and homosexual 
behavior.  For it was the nudity practiced at the gymnasion which made it the natural and 
normal place to observe, admire, and make advances to handsome youths.”61  Of course, 
                                                
60 See Laws 633a, 636a, 636b-c; Protagoras 342c-e; Republic 548b. 
61 McDonnell, "The Introduction of Athletic Nudity: Thucydides, Plato, and the Vases," 191.  See Laws 
636c. 
 23 
if the Cretan and Spartan lawgivers established gymnasia, then it could not properly be 
described as being established “not very long ago.”   
McDonnell argues that Plato was familiar with Thucydides’ work “and took the 
information about the recent introduction of athletic nudity directly from his history”62 on 
several grounds: (1) the diction in the respective passages is almost identical, (2) Plato 
uses a distinctively Thucydidean analogy in comparing the customs of early Greeks with 
contemporary barbarians,63 (3) Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that Plato modeled 
Socrates’ mock funeral oration in the Menexenus after Pericles’ in Thucydides’ History64 
and, therefore, was familiar with it, (4) the two speeches contain too many similarities to 
be plausibly due to chance, and (5) Plato’s identification of Aspasia as the supposed 
author of Socrates’ oration is difficult to explain if Plato were unaware of Thucydides’ 
account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration.  To this we might add a sixth reason for believing 
the connection.  In the Menexenus’ frame scene, Socrates remarks to Menexenus that one 
of the problems with funeral orations is that “even if he [the dead man] was of little 
account, he gets a eulogy too from the lips of experts” simply because he died in battle 
(234c).  Linda Coventry notes that of all the funeral speeches that have come down to us 
from antiquity, only Pericles’ Funeral Oration in Thucydides shares this admission (at 
2.42).65   
Since the Menexenus is relevant to establishing a strong circumstantial case for 
Plato’s familiarity with Thucydides, let us briefly examine the connection.  Harvey Yunis 
                                                
62 Ibid., 192. 
63 Indeed, McDonnell states that “[the German classicist] Junther was probably right to claim that Plato 
learned this historian’s method of analogy from Thucydides.” Ibid. 
64 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Critical Essays, trans. Stephen Usher (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1974), 30. 
65 Lucinda Coventry, "Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Menexenus," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 
109(1989).  Strangely, after identifying this rather startling fact, Coventry then goes on to conclude that the 
Menexenus is aimed at Athens itself. 
 24 
points out that Thucydides was “the only useful source for Periclean rhetoric available to 
Plato.”66  Since Pericles left no written record of his various speeches, any attempt to 
study him as a rhetorician would have suffered the potentially fatal blow of lacking any 
primary evidence.67  Though Plato would likely have had access to some older 
individuals who heard Pericles speak, the relatively few recollected lines would have 
been of little use for his interest in Periclean rhetoric.  Since Plato investigated Periclean 
rhetoric as a way of understanding Athens’ greatest leader and rhetor, Yunis argues that: 
“Plato and his contemporaries would have encountered the same lack of direct access that 
we do, and they too would have naturally turned to Thucydides to supply the 
deficiency.”68   
 In the Menexenus, Socrates says that Pericles’ consort Aspasia “produced—
among with a multitude of other good ones—the one outstanding orator among the 
Greeks, Pericles” (235e).  Socrates further insists that he was himself taught by Aspasia 
and that the funeral oration he will deliver to Menexenus is made up of “bits and pieces… 
[Aspasia] thought up before, at the time when she was composing the funeral oration 
which Pericles delivered” (236b).  Several passages in Socrates’ oration imitate that of 
Thucydides’ Pericles such that we are directed to Thucydides’ account when Socrates 
refers to “the funeral oration which Pericles delivered.”  Charles Kahn notes that both 
Socrates and Pericles begin their orations with the same double antithesis of speech and 
                                                
66 Yunis, Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens: 136. 
67 Yunis remarks that the lack of primary source material “was no less true for Plato, one generation after 
Pericles, than it is for us.” Ibid., 137. 
68 Ibid.  It would not be unusual for Plato—or any Greek writer—to not acknowledge a contemporary, as 
we would today.  As Yunis observes: “Ancient Greek writers are frequently reticent about their 
sources…Plato had no interest in advertising his differences with a recently dead historian; he wanted to 
keep his reader’s mind focused solely on the argument about political rhetoric.” Ibid., 137-38.  Yunis 
makes the error, in my view, of assimilating Pericles’ position to that of Thucydides’ himself. 
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deed, logos and ergon,69 followed immediately by a reference to the requirements of 
custom, or nomos.  Furthermore, “in both cases the speaker emphasizes the fact that not 
only the burial rite but also the oration itself is prescribed by a law which the speaker 
must respect.”70   
The second allusion is perhaps more significant.  Socrates refers to the city of 
Athens in his speech, remarking that: “One man calls our polity democracy, another some 
other name that pleases him; in reality, it is government by the best men along with 
popular consent” (238c-d).  Thucydides’ Pericles also uses the same verb, kalein, to 
describe the Athenian polis: “In name it is called a democracy on account of it being 
administered in the interest not of the few but the many.” (2.37).  However, the real 
allusion here is not to Pericles’ Funeral Oration, but to Thucydides’ judgment of Athens 
under Pericles: “what was in name a democracy became in actuality rule by the first 
man” (2.65).  As Kahn puts it: “Plato says that whatever one may call this constitution, it 
is really rule by the best men with the approval of the many.  Again the echo is clear, and 
since these words are not found in a speech but in the comment of the historian they show 
that what Plato has in mind is…the published work of Thucydides himself.”71    
Finally, Plato essentially calls Thucydides out by name in the Menexenus’ frame 
scene.  After claiming Aspasia as his teacher, Socrates claims that her instruction has left 
him a superior rhetor than “someone less well educated than I—a man who 
learned…oratory from Antiphon the Rhamnusian” (236a).  Since Pericles was not 
Antiphon’s student, to whom is Socrates referring?  Almost certainly the answer must be 
                                                
69 Charles H. Kahn, "Plato's Funeral Oration: The Motive of the Menexenus," Classical Philology 58, no. 4 
(1963). 
70 Ibid., 222.  Kahn notes that “Plato echoes the Thucydidean figure here only to make the precisely 
opposite point.” Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 222-23.  However, Kahn believes, as I do not, that it is “inevitable that Plato and Thucydides 
should disagree—and disagree profoundly—in their appreciation of Pericles.” Ibid., 223. 
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Thucydides, for two reasons.  The first is that Marcellinius states that Thucydides studied 
philosophy with Anaxagoras and rhetoric with Antiphon.72  Though some consider 
Marcellinius unreliable,73 Thucydides’ own extraordinary praise of Antiphon in the 
History is sufficient to establish Plato’s linking of the two.  In his own voice, Thucydides 
says Antiphon: 
[was] a man second to no Athenian of his time in ability and a master both at 
developing plans and at stating his conclusions, and while he was not one to come 
forward in the assembly or go willingly into any other scene of contention but was 
regarded with suspicion by the people because of a reputation for cleverness, he 
was nevertheless the one man most able to help those contending in law courts or 
in the assembly whenever anyone consulted him.  An in addition, after the 
democracy had been changed back, and Antiphon was brought to trial at a later 
time when the actions of the Four Hundred had been reversed and were being 
dealt with harshly by the assembly, it is clear that he in person, on trial for these 
very actions, as a collaborator, made the best defense on a capital charge of all 
men up to my time. (8.68)  
In the following chapters, I will weave Plato’s allusions to Thucydides’ History 
into a larger narrative of how the two thinkers treat the problem of Athenian imperialism.  
The arc of the dissertation is as follows.  In order to help situate the reader, Chapter One 
examines two of the most infamous episodes in Thucydides’ History, the Corcyrean Civil 
War and the Melian Dialogue.  These two incidents help illuminate Thucydides’ 
understanding of the human motivations that generate and support the manifestation of 
greed that inexorably leads to imperialism.  Because many of Plato’s textual and thematic 
references are to these passages, it is instructive to begin here.   
Because I argue that Plato and Thucydides agree that the underlying cause of 
Athenian imperialism can be attributed to a combination of greed (pleonexia) and the 
                                                
72 See Timothy Burns, "Marcellinius' Life of Thucydides, translated, with an introductory essay," 
Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2010). 
73 Judith Maitland, "'Marcellinus" Life of Thucydides: Criticism and Criteria in the Biographical 
Tradition," The Classical Quarterly 46, no. 2 (1996). 
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internalization by the Athenians of specific sophistic teachings that support unbridled 
appetitiveness as the best way to live, the remaining chapters will examine some of the 
most prominent sophists in the Platonic corpus: Gorgias, Polus, Callicles, Protagoras, and 
Thrasymachus.  Chapter Two takes Thucydides’ accounts of the Corcyrean Civil War 
and the Melian Dialogue as points of departure and shows how Plato’s Gorgias can be 
read as a radical—but ultimately unsatisfactory—critique of the politics of greed.  Plato 
puts a particular phrase into the mouth of Callicles that is designed to direct our attention 
to Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue in order to demonstrate the practical 
implications of Gorgianic rhetoric.  Plato’s solution to the problem of Callicles in the 
Gorgias, however, rests at the individual level—developing the self in order to bring 
justice and truth to the world (and thereby eradicate evil).  For it is Socrates’ and Plato’s 
profound belief that evil is caused by a failure of insight: those who through personal 
development have acquired insight into goodness will act on that basis and thereby find 
happiness.  Once individuals do this, it becomes impossible for them in the future to act 
in bad faith, as they would then make themselves unhappy.  On the other hand, evil men 
act out of a fundamental lack of wisdom, as they believe themselves omniscient, driven 
by the tyranny of their subconscious desires and hubris.  However, Socrates’ solution 
here is fundamentally apolitical and, as such, is defective, partial, or inadequate to the 
task.     
   Chapter Three extends this theme and shows how a textual flag in the 
Protagoras that directly refers to Pericles’ first speech in the History unlocks a more 
comprehensive critique of the Periclean Age by both Plato and Thucydides.  The 
fundamental disagreement between Socrates and Callicles in the Gorgias concerns the 
question of justice—the quintessential political virtue.  However, like Thucydides, Plato 
recognizes that the problem of Athenian imperialism results from collective rather than 
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individual behavior.  As such, an adequate response to the ethos of power politics and 
greed requires the political virtue of justice which Socrates only hints at in the Gorgias, 
but develops more fully in the Protagoras.  The Protagoras introduces the new themes of 
the political art (or political wisdom) which, for Plato, is primarily or essentially the art of 
educating the young such that they will be effective citizens and leaders.  Unlike Gorgias, 
Protagoras introduces and rhetorically emphasizes the necessity of justice for the 
existence of communities.  And he understands that justice must be redefined from its 
traditional or Homeric understanding. 
In the Iliad, justice (dike) is not a principal virtue; it is subordinate to a conception 
of virtue (arête) that is closely associated with battlefield excellence: courage, strength, 
or cunning.  Whenever justice enters into the poem, it does so in the context of these 
warrior-like characteristics.  The necessity of redefining justice is illustrated in the 
poem’s opening scene.  Recall that the Iliad begins with a quarrel raging between 
Agamemnon and Achilles.  After we learn that the plague that has descended on the 
Greek camp is a result of Agamemnon’s refusal to release a young woman he had taken 
captive, he reluctantly releases her, but only after he is compensated by taking Briseis, 
Achilles’ prize girl.  Achilles objects and exacts revenge by withdrawing his troops and, 
more importantly, his own arête, from the battlefield.  The calamities that ensue for the 
Greeks form the tragic story that occupies the rest of the poem.  For our purposes, it is 
important to note that this traditional conception of justice is primarily associated with 
vengeance.  In the midst of a later battle, Agamemnon’s brother Menelaus is about to 
spare the life of one of their Trojan enemies.  When Agamemnon arrives on the scene, he 
exhorts: 
“Going soft, Menelaus?  What does this man 
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Mean to you?  Have the Trojans ever shown you 
Any hospitality?  Not one of them 
Escapes sheer death at our hands, not even 
The boy who is still in his mother’s womb. 
Every Trojan dies, unmourned and unmarked.” 
And so the hero changed his brother’s mind 
By reminding him of the ways of conduct and fate. 
Menelaus shoved Adrastus aside,  
And Agamemnon stabbed him in the flank. 
He fell backward, and the son of Atreus 
Braced his heel on his chest and pulled out the spear.74 
The traditional understandings of justice (articulated here) are either fair distribution of 
rewards (in Achilles rage against Agamemnon) or, more commonly, revenge.  As 
Protagoras and Plato know, neither of these understandings provides the necessary 
ground for a community to flourish.  So Socrates will argue that the best life is one that 
combines the five classic virtues of piety, courage, temperance, wisdom and justice—and 
that virtue, properly understood, is the truest form of pleasure.  Unlike the Gorgias, 
however, the Protagoras shows that to the extent that individual virtue conflicts with 
civic virtue or the common good, focusing on the individual alone can exacerbate the 
problem by introducing a selfish understanding of the good.  Taken too far, this 
selfishness transforms into tyranny and this fact drives the need for justice, which serves 
to moderate the conflict between selfishness and the common good. 
                                                
74 Homer, Iliad, trans. Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), VI: 55-65. 
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Chapter Four builds on the prior two and shows how the Republic may be read as 
a logical extension of Plato’s response to the problems of imperialism and greed 
embodied in Callicles.  In doing so, we will be guided by Plato’s textual allusion to 
Thucydides’ account of the revolution on Corcyra.  Socrates’ solution to Callicles’ ethos 
of aggression, greed and tyranny in the Gorgias is primarily individual—the happy life 
devoted to individual virtue.  In the Protagoras, Socrates shows the necessity for the 
virtue of justice to moderate the conflict between individual and civic virtue.  The 
Republic is Plato’s attempt to harmonize individual and civic virtue.  In order to do this, 
Plato will need to shift the focus of the Greek Enlightenment as applied to the political 
world by re-educating the people.  Following Plato’s solution in the Republic, we will 
examine Thucydides’ History as a whole to construct a Thucydidean solution to the 
problem of greed and imperialism that I believe is congruent with Plato’s.  
A brief methodological coda on how I interpret Plato.  I confess that while I 
characterize positions as Plato’s, I acknowledge the problems in doing so.  As we’ve 
mentioned, Plato never speaks in his own voice (in contrast to Thucydides’ mere 
reticence), but instead puts every word in the mouth of a fictional character.  Paul 
Woodruff is correct to describe Plato’s work as “historical fiction”75—but, as he points 
out, one with a philosophical purpose.  Even Socrates is not designated as an authority to 
be believed without examination.  Indeed, Socrates’ claims of ignorance, liberal use of 
irony, and use of rhetorical maneuvers invite readers to adopt a critical stance to authority 
figures more generally and to open themselves to different arguments.  All of this makes 
it extremely difficult to say that we can reliably turn to Socrates as Plato’s mouthpiece.  
Socrates plays a more difficult and complex part: sometimes he asks questions, other 
                                                
75 Paul Woodruff, “Rhetoric and relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 291. 
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times he answers them, sometimes he advances his own arguments, other times he 
examines and refutes the arguments of others.  
However, we need not conclude from this that we can say nothing about what 
Plato himself thought.  Instead, we can piece together his thinking by drawing inferences 
about what he may have thought based on the way he presents various issues and 
problems in the dialogues.  Ironically, this method ultimately relies on the very principle 
that Socrates so often rails at against the sophists: eikos (what is likely or probable)—but 
understood here as the best explanation given the various possibilities.76  Despite how it 
might initially appear, I do not think this interpretative principle does violence to Plato’s 
intent.  Socrates’ arguments often contain fallacious elements and Socrates himself gives 
the reader clues to see why many of his arguments are tentative or provisional rather than 
definitive.  For example, in the Republic, Socrates never claims to have certain 
knowledge of the Form of the Good.  As such, he cannot and does not claim absolute or 
unqualified knowledge about whether it is always good to be just.  He only claims that he 
himself is totally persuaded of it.  This comports with our everyday experience—since we 
are not philosopher-kings (who alone have knowledge of the Good), we live our lives and 
make our decisions based on our deeply held convictions about what is good.  I do not 
think this should surprise us, since I think Plato wants us to struggle to draw our own 
conclusions about the best way each of us should live.  For Plato, this isn’t a 
responsibility that can or should be abdicated—for example, examining the value of 
justice requires one to decide about the goals of one’s own life.77 
A final word.  One theme that runs through the thought of both Plato and 
Thucydides (and I hope is reflected in every chapter of this dissertation) is their 
                                                
76 See Woodruff (1997), 296-298 for a more detailed discussion of eikos. 
77 Republic, 545a-b. Socrates answer is, I think, relatively simple: his life is the answer. 
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humanism.  My readings of both thinkers present them as resolute, courageous thinkers 
who directly faced challenges remarkably similar to those we face today.  I believe we 
make a fatal mistake by failing to come to terms with the human reality that lies behind 
both thinkers’ works, because it is only in doing so that we may discover exactly who we 
are and exactly what values we stand for.  By attending to the humanity of Plato and 
Thucydides, we both celebrate their respective geniuses as well as focus our attention on 




Chapter 1: Thucydides on the Foundations of Imperialism 
Thucydides’ account of the revolution (stasis) at Corcyra is justly famous for 
laying bare the limits of political community and underscoring the possibilities open to a 
human nature unfettered by the restraining influence of law and custom (nomos).  It is 
here, in his retelling of the violence, where he makes perhaps his most remembered 
remark that war “is a violent teacher” (3.82).  It is important to note that Thucydides 
reserves the analysis of the Corcyrean episode to himself, rather than one of the actors in 
the History.  Here, in one of the few places he speaks in his own voice, he very candidly 
reveals his own understanding of human nature, power, and greed.78  In my view, he uses 
the Corcyrean revolution to lay the groundwork for his critique of the Athenian Empire as 
a whole.  Indeed, Thucydides pays particular attention to the stasis at Corcyra because it 
is the first of many that will eventually engulf the whole of Greece.    
Thucydides describes how the civil strife transpired as follows.  In one of the 
opening salvos of the Peloponnesian War, Athens supported Corcyra in their conflict 
with Corinth because they coveted Corcyra’s navy.  In 427, tensions between the 
oligarchs and democrats within Corcyra were inflamed; the democrats requested aid from 
Athens and the oligarchs aid from Sparta.  The Spartans arrived first, but an Athenian 
fleet quickly followed and the Spartans fled, giving the Corcyrean democrats the 
confidence and political room they needed to slaughter the oligarchs and their supporters.  
During the massacre, approximately four hundred supporters of the oligarchs took refuge 
in the Temple of Hera.  Thucydides recalls the ensuing carnage:  
                                                
78 Simon Hornblower considers this episode to be “the most substantial expression of direct personal 
opinion [in the History]” in Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1991), 478. 
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[The Corcyrean democrats] came into the temple of Hera and persuaded fifty of 
the oligarchic sympathizers who had taken sanctuary there to submit themselves 
to a trial; then they condemned them all to death.  When they saw what was being 
done, most of the suppliants—all those who were not induced to stand trial by 
law—killed one another right there in the temple; some hanged themselves on 
trees, and everyone made away with himself by what means he could.  For the 
seven days the Athenian admiral Eurymedon stayed there with his sixty ships, the 
Corcyreans went on killing as many of their own people as they took to be their 
enemies.  They accused them of subverting the democracy, but some of the 
victims were killed on account of private hatred, and some by their debtors for the 
money they had lent them.  Every form of death was seen at this time; and (as 
tends to happen in such cases) there was nothing people would not do, and more: 
fathers killed their sons; men were dragged out of the temples and then killed. 
(3.81, italics mine)79  
The upheaval (metabolai) in Corcyra was so great as to create a state of affairs 
where men “reversed the usual way of using words to evaluate activities” (3.82).80  When 
words—the classic instance of conventions that help govern society—change their 
meanings, the very possibility of community or an expressible common good is made 
impossible.  Plato, too, appears to draw on Thucydides’ account in his discussion of 
constitutional change in Book VIII of the Republic.81  Socrates here describes the 
transformation of language as the soul moves from oligarchy to democracy: 
Socrates: Doing battle and controlling things themselves, won’t they [desires] call 
reverence foolishness and moderation cowardice, abusing them and casting them 
out beyond the frontiers like disenfranchised exiles?  And won’t they persuade the 
young man that measured and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean, and, 
joining with many useless desires, won’t they expel it across the border? 
Adeimantus: They certainly will. 
                                                
79 Woodruff translation.  Thucydides, On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides' 
History of the Peloponnesian War. 
80 There are two items worth attention here.  First is that Thucydides uses the same word, metabolai, to 
describe both the revolution at Corcyra and the plague that ravages Athens in Book II.  Second, we note 
with interest the fact that in Hobbes’ state of nature, words also have no precise definitions and require a 
sovereign to provide a shared meaning.     
81 R.B. Rutherford believes this to be “the best candidate for actual imitation of the historian [Thucydides] 
by Plato.” Rutherford, The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation: 67. 
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Socrates: Having thus emptied and purged these from the soul of the one they’ve 
possessed and initiated in splendid rites, they proceed to return insolence, 
anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness from exile in a blaze of torchlight, 
wreathing them in garlands and accompanying them with a vast chorus of 
flowers.  They praise the returning exiles and give them fine names, calling 
insolence good breeding, anarchy freedom, extravagance magnificence, and 
shamelessness courage.  Isn’t it in some such way as this that someone who is 
young changes, after being brought up with necessary desires, to the liberation 
and release of useless and unnecessary pleasures?  
Adeimantus: Yes, that’s clearly the way it happens. (560c-561a) 
Unfortunately, the linguistic somersault on Corcyra was a mere harbinger of the 
carnage to come.82  As definitions eroded, the values which words signified began to be 
ignored as well.  Other bonds began to supplant and destroy those of philia, one of the 
Ancient Greek words for love.  For the Greeks, philia meant a friendly love or affection 
for another and was understood in contrast to the passionate desire and yearning that they 
called eros.  Philia could extend to loyalty or friendship to kin, friends, and even the city 
(polis) itself.  As J. R. Wilson explains, philia signifies the “continuum of attachment that 
extends in a stable system of relationships from the self to one’s immediate family and 
friends and then outwards to one’s polis and one’s race.”83 Loyalty to political party or 
faction soon trumped devotion to family and, for Thucydides, once this occurred, the 
possibility of political community was lost.  A man’s “own” should include his 
immediate (and then extended) family, and ultimately include the community of his city 
(polis).  But, on Corcyra, where fathers killed their own sons and the ties of philia within 
even the household were violated, “kinship became more foreign than party tie” (3.82.6).  
It’s hard not to agree with Nicole Loraux’s assessment that this represents the essence of 
                                                
82 Quentin Skinner argues that modern political thought is inaugurated when Hobbes (who first translated 
Thucydides’ History into English), takes exception (stasis) to represent the usual or starting point from 
which politics begins.  Quentin Skinner, "Hobbes on Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality," in Visions 
of Politics, ed. Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 87-141. 
83 John R. Wilson, "Shifting and Permanent Philia in Thucydides," Greece & Rome 36, no. 02 (1989): 147. 
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stasis for Thucydides: “[he] would have liked to condense all its horror in the murder of a 
son by his father.”84   
When partisanship replaces religion, family, honor, or citizenship as the 
foundation of trust and value, the moderation necessary to encourage the search for the 
common good evaporates.  Without the nomoi created and nourished by the polis (and/or 
a belief in the gods to enforce the keeping of promises), all relationships (including 
family relationships as well as those based on commerce and trade) were sacrificed on 
Corcyra at the altar of debased self-interest.  According to Thucydides, the revolution 
released or revealed certain essential aspects of human nature: greed, violence, revenge, 
and a lust for equality and power.  Once released, these forces inexorably led to 
suspiciousness among citizens, since each one recognized that if others are acting like 
themselves, then everyone is pursuing their own very narrow self-interest.  The demise of 
trust (pistis) signaled the end of politics.  Individuals began to trust one another only 
when they came together to break a law or violate custom—that is, whenever they were 
partners in crime.  Revenge became especially sweet whenever it involved treachery.  
Oaths became worthless because everyone would break them when it furthered their own 
advantage.  This collapse of trust, formerly the glue that held the community together, 
was a direct consequence of individuals’ willingness to do whatever was in their power to 
advance their own interests, even when this meant throwing out long-established notions 
of what properly belonged to others, the community, or the gods. 
Thucydides locates the cause of the revolution in the love of gain (pleonexia) and 
the love of honor (philotimia)—the substituting of public ambitions with private ones 
(3.82). The individual replaces the community (and the gods) as the arbiter of 
                                                
84 Nicole Loraux, The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens  (New York: Zone 
Books, 2002), 39. 
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determining what is good.  How and why did this occur at Corcyra?  The civil war there 
resulted from the conflict between democratic and oligarchic factions over who would 
rule (arche).  The conflict was inextricably linked with the status of Corcyra’s 
relationship with Athens.  The oligarchs considered the alliance with democratic Athens 
tantamount to enslaving themselves and recognized that, in order to prevent this, they 
would need to consolidate power.  To make this happen, they would need Spartan 
assistance.  On the other side, the democrats saw the alliance with Athens as a chance to 
gain lasting political advantage over the oligarchs.  The political division reflected the 
underlying economic division in Ancient Greece: oligarchs were rich and democrats were 
poor.  According to Thucydides: “All this was caused by leadership based on greed 
(pleonexian) and ambition (philotimian) and led in turn to fanaticism once men were 
committed to the power struggle” (3.82).   
Thucydides’ careful unpacking of the causes of the conflict at Corcyra helps us 
understand his diagnosis of the Athenian Empire.  He begins by underscoring the 
consequences of civil war in one of the most famous passages in the History: 
Civil war brought many hardships to the cities, such as happen and will always 
happen as long as human nature is the same, although they may be less or more 
violent or take different forms, depending on the circumstances in each case.  In 
peace and prosperity, cities and private individuals alike are better minded 
because they are not plunged into the necessity of doing anything against their 
will; but war is a violent teacher: it gives most people impulses that are as bad as 
their situation when it takes away the easy supply of what they need for daily life. 
(3.82) 
At first blush it may appear that Thucydides thinks people are morally better during times 
of peace and prosperity—that it is only when they aren’t able to satisfy what they need 
for daily life that people are reduced to adopting any means necessary to satisfy their 
needs.  According to this view, we might understand Thucydides here to be conducting a 
 38 
thought experiment whereby he progressively deprives people of their daily needs in 
order to determine their natural or true motivations which are ordinarily hidden by 
conditions of peace and prosperity.  I don’t consider Thucydides to be drawing quite so 
dark a conclusion here.  Rather, I think it is important to notice precisely what 
Thucydides argues is affected by war: people’s “better mindedness” or, in Greek, their 
gnome—judgment, good sense, intelligence or prudence.  What civil war does is remove 
the constraints that help keep our judgment more sound or our sense good.  It renders our 
impulses as bad as the situation or circumstances it creates—in this case, violent ones.   
By removing calmness, order, and satisfied appetites, civil war replaces better-
mindedness and moderation with violent passion, greed, and self-interest.  Thucydides 
clarifies how this substitution occurs: 
So the condition of the cities was civil war, and where it came later, awareness of 
earlier events pushed to extremes the revolution in thinking, both in 
extraordinarily ingenious attempts to seize power and in outlandish retaliations.  
And in self-justification men inverted the usual verbal evaluations of actions.  
Irrational recklessness was now considered courageous commitment, hesitation 
while looking to the future was high-styled cowardice, moderation was a cover 
for lack of manhood, and circumspection meant inaction, while senseless anger 
now helped to define a true man, and deliberation for security was a specious 
excuse for dereliction.  The man of violent temper was always credible, anyone 
opposing him was a suspect. (3.82)       
Words changed their meanings, then, in the following sense: men began to apply the 
word courage not to what the community traditionally considered authentic acts of 
courage but rather to acts of irrational recklessness.  Thucydides argues that the reason 
that words were able to change their meanings (at least so quickly) was due to the fact 
that men’s judgment (gnome) was no longer sound—it became twisted by their passions.  
And the specific passions that caused “all this” (including the fanaticism and subsequent 
slaughter) was the desire to rule based on greed (pleonexian) and ambition (philotimian): 
 39 
For the leading men in the cities, through their emphasis on an attractive slogan 
for each side—political equality for the masses, the moderation of aristocracy—
treated as their prize the public interest to which they paid lip service and, 
competing by every means to get the better of one another, boldly committed 
atrocities and proceeded to still worse acts of revenge, stopping at limits set by 
neither justice nor the city’s interest but by the gratification of their parties at 
every stage, and whether by condemnations through unjust voting or by acquiring 
superiority in brute force, both sides were ready to satisfy to the utmost their 
immediate hopes of victory. (3.82) 
The desire to rule, the distortion of judgment, and the inversion of language that 
helps secure sound judgment all arise through the passions of greed (pleonexia) and 
ambition (philotimia).  However, for Thucydides there is no easy escape since both 
judgment and the passions are equally part of human nature.  Indeed, the problem arises 
when circumstances cause men’s judgments to not consider arguments from justice that 
caution against the arrogant use of power.  Thucydides tells us that the taking of power 
was not itself the end at which the revolutionaries aimed.  Instead, he says that the lust for 
power originated in the desire for things other than power, especially material goods and 
time—honor, or fame.  Power, then, is the means rather than the end—it serves as the 
instrument through which material goods and psychological needs are acquired and 
satisfied.  The ends remain such things as: private property, the pleasures of violence and 
revenge, and the honors of public competition.85  Thucydides suggests that greed 
(pleonexia) is conceptually distinct from both the love of honor and the love of power 
and his use of the words pleonexia and arche—typically used to describe the Athenians 
and the Athenian Empire—suggest that the History as a whole takes seriously the 
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proposition that the character and actions of the Athenians help transform the whole 
Greek world into Corcyra.86   
Thucydides continues: greed (pleonexia) and ambition (philotimia) drive 
Corcyra’s citizens to seek power at any cost.  Twisted by these twin lusts, they readily 
jettison the traditional norms that formerly bound them into a coherent and stable 
political community.  Now, pleonexia—graspingness—implies a hostility to preexisting 
norms, laws, or institutions that help cement distributions of wealth and power.  
Thucydides clarifies this understanding in the context of how to appropriately acquire 
wealth: “Political factions of this sort were formed not for the sake of profit according to 
the established customs, but for the sake of self-aggrandizement contrary to the existing 
rules” (3.82).  By unleashing their pleonectic desires, the Corcyreans circumvent what 
are, for Thucydides, appropriate mechanisms (nomoi) for acquiring wealth.  In doing so, 
the Corcyreans violate prior limits and boundaries and begin to tear apart the social and 
political fabric in ways that foreshadow the effects of Athenian pleonexia in the Pan-
Hellenic community.  Since established nomoi are shown to be the connective tissue 
holding Corcyra’s political community together, their violation at the alter of pleonexia 
by political factions makes Corcyra cease to function as a polis.  Unfortunately, the 
collapse of Corcyrean nomoi are symptoms of a more fundamental disease.  Thucydides 
characterizes these deeper concerns in terms of deceit, faction, and mistrust. 
During the Corcyrean revolution, powerful political factions took control and 
ruled with a view to only class interests.  That is, the oligarchs ruled exclusively to 
benefit their class interests whereas the democrats ruled to benefit the demos.  The 
fundamental unit of political analysis became class rather than kinship or a patriotic love 
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of the polis.  Most alarmingly, Thucydides describes how citizens identified with their 
party at the sometimes-fatal expense of their families.  No longer was it possible to 
identify with the polis as a whole.  Indeed, anything resembling a Corcyrean political 
community was destroyed by the revolution.  As Thucydides describes it, class interests 
were quickly subsumed to self-interest (or, alternatively, class interests were only 
promoted to the extent that they dovetailed with self-interest) and no one considered the 
welfare of his neighbors.  The Corcyreans embraced a more circumscribed view of their 
own individual interests than a healthy polis could ever allow.  He illustrates this in his 
discussion of the overarching results of civil wars: 
Thus was every kind of wickedness afoot throughout all Greece by the occasion 
of civil wars.  Simplicity, which is the chief cause of a generous spirit, was 
laughed down and disappeared.  Citizens were sharply divided into opposing 
camps, and, without trust, their thoughts were in battle array.  No speech was so 
powerful, no oath so terrible, as to overcome this mutual hostility.  The more they 
reckoned up their chances, the less hope they had for a firm peace, and so they 
were all looking to avoid harm from each other, and were unable to rely on trust.  
For the most part, those with the weakest minds had the greatest success, since a 
sense of their own inferiority and the subtlety of their opponents put them into 
great fear that they would be overcome in debate or by schemes due to their 
enemies’ intelligence.  They therefore went immediately to work against them in 
action, while their more intelligent opponents, scornful and confident that they 
could foresee any attack, thought they had no need to take by force what might be 
gotten by wit.  They were therefore unprotected, and so more easily killed. (3.83)             
Notice the subtlety of Thucydides’ analysis.  The civil war divides the poor 
(democrats allied with Athens) from the rich (oligarchs allied with Sparta) into opposing 
camps.  When this happens, both the democrats and the oligarchs are made worse.  The 
democrats’ sound-mindedness (gnome) is obscured by passion, whereas the oligarchs, 
though retaining sound judgment, lack the passion to take necessary action.  For 
Thucydides, both passion and sound-mindedness are necessary ingredients for healthy 
men and healthy cities.  Civil war separates the classes, detaching sound-mindedness 
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from those passionate enough to effectuate intelligent policy.  Unsurprisingly, this creates 
on the one hand rash, ignorant, and passionate men and, on the other, men who are 
enervated yet reasonable (indeed, according to Thucydides, enervated because they are 
reasonable).87  
The Corcyrean stasis brings to light the effects of particular basic human forces 
such as: the lust for power, greed, revenge, and the concomitant violence that follows in 
their wake.  Trust naturally falls by the wayside, since individuals see each other adopting 
a policy of mutual exploitation in accord with their own narrow understanding of self-
interest.  And, indeed, this loss of trust (pistis) signals the demise of politics.  At Corcyra, 
trust eroded to the point that individuals would trust each other only if they were 
partnering in crime.  Oaths became meaningless since everyone would break them if it 
were personally beneficial.  In short, “citizens had become divided into two hostile 
camps, and each side viewed the other with mistrust” (3.83). The trust between 
individuals that formerly bound Corcyra as a political community frayed due to the 
willingness on the part of individuals to employ any mechanism for acquiring 
advantage—even those that flew in the face of laws and customs that helped establish 
what properly belongs to others or the polis.  Political leaders were most guilty of 
flouting pre-existing limits.  They promoted reforms which they cynically claimed would 
benefit the city as a whole and promised to serve both the people and the aristocrats.  
Thucydides exposes their claims as unfounded propaganda designed to reserve political 
awards for the few who came out on top (3.82).  Political leadership became nothing 
other than a vehicle for self-interest and served to generate further skepticism and 
collapse.  For Thucydides, ambition, greed, and self-interest serve as catalysts of civic 
                                                
 87 The New York Times columnist David Brooks makes a similar point about moderates in the American 
political system. 
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dissolution and lead to skepticism, the pursuit of narrow self-interest, and the perversion 
of politics.  
With this in mind, let us turn to Thucydides’ second elaboration—perhaps his 
summation—of the causal relationship:88 
Most of these atrocities, then, were committed first in Corcyra, including all the 
acts of revenge people take, when they have the opportunity, against rulers who 
have shown more arrogance than good sense, and all the actions some people 
choose unjustly to escape longstanding poverty.  Most of these acted from a 
passionate desire for their neighbors’ possessions, but there were also those who 
attacked the wealthy not for their own gain, but primarily out of zeal for equality, 
and they were the most carried away by their undisciplined anger to commit 
savage and pitiless attacks.  Now that life had been thrown into confusion in the 
city, human nature—which is accustomed to violate justice and the laws—came 
to dominate law altogether, and showed itself with delight to be the slave of 
anger, the mater of justice, and the enemy of anyone superior.  Without the 
destructive force of envy, you see, people would not value revenge over piety, or 
profits over justice.  When they want revenge on others, people are determined 
first to destroy without a trace the laws that commonly govern such matters, 
though it is only because of these that anyone in trouble can hope to be saved, 
even though anyone might be in danger someday and stand in need of such laws. 
(3.84)       
Thucydides begins by focusing our attention on poverty.  Before the revolution, the pro-
Spartan oligarchs are wealthy and powerful and the pro-Athenian democrats are poor and 
powerless.  Once the conflict between Athens and Sparta commences and offers the 
respective parties the opportunity for wider support, civil strife breaks out and the poor 
unjustly seize what belongs to the rich.  Thucydides says that what motivates them is 
either pleonexia—a passionate desire for more than their fair share of their neighbor’s 
                                                
88 Some commentators consider 3.84 to be spurious.  However, I agree with Paul Woodruff that, if it is not 
authentic, it is at least “thoroughly Thucydidean in thought and style” and will treat it as such. Thucydides, 
On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War: 93. 
For the arguments against authenticity, see Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, 1.  The most 
persuasive argument in favor of authenticity is Matthew R. Christ, "The Authenticity of Thucydides 3.84," 
Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-) 119(1989).  Robert Conner also offers a 
convincing defense of the passage. W. Robert Connor, Thucydides  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 102. 
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possessions—or by a “zeal for equality” coupled with “undisciplined passion,” both of 
which are brought to the surface by the oligarchs’ arrogant behavior before the war.  
C.D.C. Reeve offers an explanation for why Thucydides considers it unjust for the poor 
to seize the possessions of the rich.  As he puts it: “The answer must surely be that the 
underlying motives, pleonexia in one case, undisciplined passion in the other, lead the 
poor to go beyond what equality itself demands.  They do not rest content with a fair 
redistribution of wealth, but take more than their fair share or inflict unjust or unfair 
retribution on the rich.”89 It is envy that helps account for the actions that spring from 
pleonexia or the “zeal for equality” and “undisciplined passion.”  What’s more, the envy 
itself is created by the pre-stasis distribution of power and wealth.  Leaving some parts of 
society in conditions of enduring poverty and powerlessness, subject to the arrogant 
whims of those in power with no opportunity to participate, Corcyra was a tinderbox 
waiting to ignite.  Indeed, Thucydides hints that the pre-revolution distribution of power 
and wealth violated principles of justice, equality, and fairness available to those with 
good sense (or the pious).  Reeve is again instructive: “No doubt, power and wealth 
naturally attract some envy, but unfairly or unjustly held or arrogantly used power and 
wealth attract something else.  They attract righteous indignation—not so much envy at 
legitimate success, but indignation at arrogant, unfair, unjust success.”90 
A closer examination of this passage shows that Thucydides is not making a 
blanket condemnation of human nature but, rather, specific parts of it which are 
susceptible to being overcome by passion.  For example, he highlights the almost causal 
relationship between the arrogant use of power and the desire for revenge.  He notices as 
well the lamentable fact that pleonexia often overcomes justice and that the desire for 
                                                
89 C.D.C. Reeve, "Thucydides on Human Nature," Political Theory 27, no. 4 (1999): 437. 
90 Ibid., 438. 
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equality typically stems from unfair distributions of power and wealth.  We should not be 
surprised, in other words, that law and justice often fall in the face of the passionate 
desires.  However, it is important to recognize that Thucydides does not go so far as to 
indict human nature as a whole; he restricts his view to particular aspects of our character 
and, even then, under specific conditions.  For example, piety (to hosion) is the aspect of 
human nature that is overcome by passion.  The primary meaning of hosios is 
“sanctioned by the law of God, opposed to dikaios (sanctioned by human law).”91  
Therefore, the effect of passion is to overcome the laws of Gods or nature (phusis)—as 
opposed to the laws of the city—which are grounded in sound judgment and good sense.  
But revenge serves to motivate people to attack anyone who exercises power arrogantly 
(instead of sensibly).  In so doing, it causes people to undermine appeals to the laws that 
protect those who are powerless to defend themselves.  Of course, these laws are not the 
typical nomoi of the city; anyone in jeopardy has recourse to them.   
Appeals to these higher laws are later made explicit by the Melians in one of the 
most famous episodes in the History, the Melian Dialogue: 
Well, then, since you [Athenians] put your interest in place of justice, our 
[Melians’] view must be that it is in our interest not to subvert this rule that is 
good for all: that a plea of justice and fairness should do some good for a man 
who has fallen into danger, if he can win over his judges, even if he is not 
perfectly persuasive.  And this rule concerns you no less than us: if you ever 
stumble, you might receive a terrible punishment and be an example to others. 
(5.90) 
The Melians argue that it is actually in the interest of those in power to consider 
appeals to justice and fairness, even though the powerful have the ability to arrogantly 
                                                
91 Henry George Liddell et al., A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), s.v., "hosios". 
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ignore them because, if they lose power, they may need recourse to these same appeals.92  
These appeals derive their authority not from any positive law, because there is no Pan-
Hellenic governing body to make it.  Rather, their authority is generated by virtue of 
reason, prudence, good sense or sound judgment (sophrosune and gnome). Whereas 
arrogantly exercising power will lead to acts of revenge and stasis, prudence contains 
within it the possibility of generating justness and fairness.  This is why appeals to justice 
and fairness should be heard by the powerful—it is a common good of both the powerful 
and the powerless.  To recapitulate, it is not simply positive law or convention that is at 
issue on Corcyra but, rather, an understanding of justice that is grounded in reason and 
sound judgment.  And Thucydides hints that it is particularly important to attend to it in 
the face of human nature’s tendency—not to say propensity—toward revenge when faced 
with the arrogant exercise of power and pleonexia, and toward reckless passion when 
confronted with longstanding poverty.  A fuller examination of the Melian Dialogue 
helps bring these points to light. 
In 416, during the Peace of Nicias, Athens decided to invade the island of Melos 
in order to compel it to become a tribute paying member of the Athenian Empire.  Melos 
was originally a colony of Sparta and had attempted to remain neutral since the beginning 
of the Peloponnesian War in 431.  However, neutrality became unsustainable in the long 
term.  Indeed, in 426 Athenian troops commanded by Nicias attempted to take the island.  
While the 426 campaign ultimately failed (and Thucydides gives the impression that it 
was a fairly half-hearted effort), it may have inclined the Melians to embrace a more 
                                                
92 That Athens is more just than her power requires is precisely the argument that the Athenian 
Ambassadors give at the Congress at Sparta for the justness of Athenian empire in Book I of the History. 
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confrontational position toward the Athenians.  This early success may even have 
encouraged them to think that they could resist the powerful Athenians.93 
The Melian Dialogue comes at the end of Book V in the History, which focuses 
on the time period between the onset of the Peace of Nicias and the destruction of Melos.  
Most of Book V concerns the rise and fall of Argos and, reminiscent of Corcyra, pays 
special attention to, on the one hand, high-minded pledges and oaths and, on the other, 
calculated scheming and deceit.  The way Thucydides presents the machinations 
surrounding the Argos episode strongly suggests that calculated self-interest dominates 
concerns for justice in relations between states.  Thucydides never makes much of a case 
for Melos having any strategic significance to the Athenians.  Melos is only mentioned 
on two other occasions in the History, both of which highlight Nicias’ failed attempt to 
subdue the island.94  Thucydides gives the impression that the second Athenian attempt 
on Melos was equally incidental.  He introduces the episode by saying: “The next 
summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos…The Athenians also made an expedition against the 
island of Melos” (5.84). Since the siege lasted several months and reinforcements needed 
to be sent, it is highly likely that the matter was debated in the Athenian assembly—
especially with respect to the extremely significant penalty of putting all the Melian men 
to death and enslaving the women and children.95  Yet, Thucydides does not mention any 
debate, unlike the earlier case of Mytilene, where he details the discussion as a reflection 
of the significant threat the revolt posed for Athens.96  But Thucydides draws our 
                                                
93 There is some debate over whether Melos was in fact neutral as suggested by some statements in the 
Melian Dialogue.  The Melians appear on the Athenian Tribute List for the year 425, hence the conjecture 
that Athens was perhaps collecting tribute and, therefore, not violating the neutrality of an independent city.       
94 See 3.91 and 3.94. 
95 See Xenophon, Hellenica 2.2.3 and 2.2.10 for an account of how the Athenians later regretted their 
treatment of the Melians. 
96 Perhaps this is because he reported the debate over the similar Mytilenean decree (which was repealed) 
and the motion to annihilate Scione. 
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attention to the importance of the Melian episode by presenting us with the only dialogue 
in the entire History.  He further focuses our attention on arguments by removing 
strategic significance from the discussion.  Whether or not the Athenians control Melos 
will not have a significant effect on the war’s outcome.                   
Before beginning the siege—specifically, ravaging the Melian countryside in 
order to induce starvation and poverty—the Athenian generals send envoys to negotiate a 
Melian surrender.  Thucydides tells us that the Melians refused to let the Athenians speak 
to “the common people,” but instead asked them to address “the officials and a small 
group,” implying that Melos is an oligarchy and that those in power fear that the envoys 
might find a sympathetic audience in the Melian population at large (5.85).97 While 
agreeing to the Melian demand—even complimenting them on their cleverness—the 
Athenians propose a point-counterpoint type of debate as an alternative to long, 
uninterrupted speeches that might be persuasive to the majority.98   As Patrick Coby 
observes, the “Athenians are honest even about the deceptiveness of rhetorical speech.”99  
Furthermore, Thucydides uses the Athenian frankness at Melos to make a pedagogical 
point—specifically, a new way of thinking about the discrepancy between speech and 
action.  Prior to the Melian Dialogue in the History, cities use arguments from history, 
honor, and justice in addition to advantage in order to persuade other cities, though 
Thucydides tends to show the overwhelming predominance of expediency in determining 
the choices cities make.  Indeed, as we have seen, the first major episode in the war—
                                                
97 Andrewes notes that “archai in Greek would include the council, often the most powerful organ in an 
oligarchy, as well as magistrates in the more familiar sense; and oligoi will be the privileged voters.” 
Arnold Wycombe Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides  
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), IV, 159. 
98 See Plato’s Protagoras and Gorgias. 
99 Patrick Coby, "Enlightened Self-Interest in the Peloponnesian War: Thucydidean Speakers on the Right 
of the Stronger and Inter-State Peace," Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de 
science politique 24, no. 1 (1991): 76. 
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between Corcyra and Corinth—showed that the Athenians allied with the Corcyreans not 
out of a consideration for justice, but because of the substantial naval resources that 
Corcyra would bring the empire (1.44).  More infamously, the Spartans slaughtered the 
Plataeans because the Thebans “were useful” to them, in spite of the overwhelmingly 
moral character of that debate (3.68).  By drawing our attention to the gap between actual 
and rhetorical motives, Thucydides encourages us to notice the distance between the 
rhetoric of the debates and what ultimately motivates cities’ actions.  The Melian 
Dialogue is the apotheosis of this approach: the Athenians explicitly reject what 
constitutes the appropriate language of political argument—they pull back the veneer of 
appeals to history, honor, and justice.100   
Returning to the dialogue, the Athenians further encourage the Melians to 
interrupt them if they disapprove of something said (5.85).101  We may wonder whether 
the Athenian Ambassadors’ arguments at Melos bring the very institutions of Athenian 
democracy into question.  That is, if set speeches are problematic with respect to truth, 
and decisions by the Athenian democracy are made by voting after a series of speeches, 
how credible are these democratic decisions?102  The Melians seem to understand the 
Athenian suggestion as a typical Greek agon or competition between opposing parties 
with a panel of judges deciding the outcome.  However, the Melians note that the 
                                                
100 For a more thorough discussion of this point, see James V. Morrison, "Historical Lessons in the Melian 
Episode," Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-) 130(2000). 
101 Of course, as James V. Morrison points out, this “has to cause some uneasiness for the reader, who is 
now forced to revisit the previous speeches within the History in an entirely new light.  To what extent 
have the speeches from the first five books been deceptive?”  Indeed, by criticizing set speeches 
“Thucydides has highlighted the choice of format for this discussion by raising the question as to whether 
the dialogue form is actually a better way to arrive at the truth.” Ibid., 124.   
102 As Josiah Ober puts it, “Thucydides’ implicit lesson is that democratic knowledge does not provide an 
adequate grounding for assessing the truth value of rhetorical discourse.  And thus, badly—or at best 
indifferently—instructed by speech, the Athenian Assembly was likely eventually to fall into error and, as a 
result, to make bad policy.” Josiah Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of 
Popular Rule  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 78. 
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significant difference here is that the Athenians are to serve as both contestant and judge.  
The Melians, then, seem to be left with a Hobson’s choice: if they are victorious in the 
rhetorical agon because of better or more just arguments, there will be war; if they lose 
the debate, they will become slaves or subjects in the Athenian Empire (5.86). 
The Athenians admonish the Melians to set aside any “suspicions about the 
future” and encourage them to adopt as the debate’s purpose “planning your city’s 
survival on the basis of the present circumstances as you see them” (5.87). If they intend 
to consider “anything else,” the Athenians say they are not interested in continuing the 
conversation—the preservation of Melos is the only salient item on the agenda.  The 
Athenians are frank and unambiguous: both parties understand that the Athenians are 
threatening to raze an entire Greek polis.  The Melians concede that it “is natural and 
understandable” for men in their position to “look in many directions as they speak and 
reflect” but agree it is true that their survival is at stake and that the discussion should 
follow the Athenian proposal (5.88).103  The Athenians, who have already circumscribed 
the debate to include a single topic—Melian survival—introduce further restrictions.  
They claim that they will not further their argument by using “noble phrases to furnish a 
lengthy and unconvincing speech.” (5.89).  The Athenians offer that they will themselves 
forego two specific arguments: (1) that they have the right to their empire because they 
defeated the Persians and saved Greece, and (2) that their arrival on Melos is a response 
to an injustice or injury done to them by the Melians.  The Athenians attempt to render 
justice outside the bounds of debate.  Possibly thinking that their self-restriction gives 
them the warrant to place yet another restriction on the Melians, the Athenians ask the 
Melians to not attempt to persuade them with the claim that they should be left free due 
                                                
103 Though they hint that their agreement is simply a result of Athens’ power, not Melian preference. 
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to their neutrality thus far during the war or “that you have done us no injustice” (5.89).  
Rather, the Athenians recommend that the focus should be on “what both parties really 
believe”—that in human affairs justice only applies under conditions of relative equality.  
When a superior power faces an inferior one “it gets as much as it can, and the weak 
acquiesce” (5.89).104 
The tone adopted by the Athenians at Melos in Book V is markedly different from 
that taken by the Athenians at Sparta in Book I of the History.  There, they attempt to 
justify their empire by noting their prominent role in the Persian Wars and their 
aftermath—thereby suggesting a moral justification for their rule.  In the Melian 
Dialogue, the Athenian Ambassadors reject the relevance—even the mention—of justice 
and much more forthrightly assert the primacy of power and the irrelevance of moral 
values.  Expediency becomes the only relevant question, and in this case expediency is 
defined in Athenian terms (and in terms of power): what best contributes to Athenian 
domination and what the Athenians consider to be expedient for the Melians—saving 
Melos from utter destruction.105  Concern for justice is simply inapplicable, for “right is 
judged in the human sphere from an equal necessity” (5.89).  Echoing the Corcyrean 
slaughter, the Athenians assert that justice is only relevant among equals in power.  
Power dictates the relevance of justice.  When one power is sufficiently greater than 
another, discussion of justice is inapplicable and expediency, self-interest, and greed rule.  
The only law (nomos) is that of ruling when strong.  According to the Athenian view of 
                                                
104 Paul Woodruff interprets the Athenians’ point as follows: “justice is relevant when both sides must feel 
the force of law; but when one side is more powerful, it does not apply.  The Athenians are not saying that 
might makes right; merely that might supersedes right between unequals.” While I understand his point, I 
will argue that the Athenians are engaged in willful self-delusion and know that their view cuts the heart 
out of justice—specifically, that justice may require self-sacrifice.  Nowhere is this more the case than is 
situations of unequal power.  Thucydides, On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of 
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War: 103.  
105 Euphemus, in his Book VI speech to the Camarinaeans in Sicily, completely omits the argument from 
Athens’ role in the Persian Wars (6.83.2). 
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international politics, then, equality is not a natural condition.  Yet, interestingly, the 
Athenian regime itself depends internally on relative equality—and applied internally, the 
only way to establish equality is through positive law (nomos).  Despite their claims 
about equality at Sparta, the Athenians are reluctant to admit it outside their own polis.106       
In response to the Athenian assertion of justice’s irrelevance at the hands of 
advantage, the Melians argue that it is equally advantageous to the Athenians to carefully 
consider the importance of the common good.  Should the Athenians truly reject the 
significance of justice and equity, they will become a paradigm (paradeigma) to others 
for a very great punishment when they are eventually defeated (5.90).107 The Melians 
thus understand justice as a common good shared by all cities (it is, of course, very much 
in their interest to do so) and arguments from justice—so long as they are “somewhat 
within the bounds of accuracy”—should in this sense “benefit” both parties (5.90).  
Therefore, they agree to the Athenian stipulation that considerations of advantage guide 
the discussion, but deny the Athenian claim that the Athenians and Melians are 
fundamentally (i.e., essentially) unequal.  While the Melians may presently be weaker 
than the Athenians, someday the Athenians will be the weaker.108  Nevertheless, there is a 
fundamental problem with the Melian claim that the Athenians are all too quick to 
recognize: if advantage governs how cities behave, it is uncertain whether whoever 
conquers the Athenians will make them a paradigm of punishment.  The Athenians will 
only be punished if it is in their conqueror’s interest to do so, and they doubt that their 
                                                
106 See Thucydides, 1.77. 
107 According to Aristotle, a paradigm is one class of imitation, presenting things as they ought to be 
(Poetics 1460b).  As we shall see, Socrates echoes the Melians’ suggestion in the Gorgias, arguing that “It 
is fitting for everyone who is being punished—rightly punished by another—either to become better and 
thus be benefited or to become a paradigm for the others, so that the others, seeing what a person who is 
suffering suffers and becoming afraid may become better” (Gorgias 525b, italics mine).   
108 There is a remarkable similarity between the Melians’ logic here and Hobbes’ understanding of equality 
in Leviathan.  
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conqueror will care much about how they treated the Melians.  And, as Thucydides and 
his readers know all too well, the Spartans do not seek revenge or punish the Athenians 
for their past actions.  The Athenians note that the Spartans also rule over other cities 
(that is, the Melians’ savior is no different from the Athenians) and repeat that it is to 
advantage themselves that they have come to Melos, and it is the possible salvation of the 
Melians that both parties should be concerned with.  Notice that the Athenians and 
Melians agree that a common good exists—they simply understand it in fundamentally 
different ways.  They both will benefit if the Melians surrender instead of fighting.  The 
Athenians will subsume Melos into the empire without much effort and expense and the 
Melians will save themselves from annihilation.109  
The Athenians reiterate their basic position, claiming that the preservation of 
Melos is to the advantage of both parties—they suggest that their interests coincide.  In 
Chapter 92, the Melians seriously question the substance of the Athenian position.  In 
what way is it equally advantageous for the Melians to be enslaved and for the Athenians 
to rule?  The Athenian reply is relatively simple: by submitting to the Athenians, Melos 
will be saved.  In doing so, Melos avoids complete annihilation and Athens profits by 
gaining future Melian tribute.  As Thucydides presents it, the Melians seem to recognize 
the accuracy of the Athenian diagnosis.  They do not even attempt to directly respond to 
the Athenians’ unpleasant highlighting of their coincidence of interests.  Instead, they put 
forth a new position in the hopes of resolving the issue—peace through neutrality.  That 
is, the Melians raise the possibility of friendship and neutrality with the Athenians.  They 
will not formally ally with either Athens or Sparta.  The Athenians reject the Melians’ 
offer outright and in so doing reveal their reformulated theory of power politics.  
                                                
109 Notice here that the Athenians adopt Diodotus’ view of deterrence at 3.42-3.48. 
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Counterintuitively, for the Athenians, Melian friendship (here understood as neutrality, 
not as an alliance) is even more damaging to Athens than their enmity, because Athens’ 
subjects will view Melian neutrality as an indication of Athenian weakness.  By contrast, 
Melian hatred will simply show or reinforce the magnitude of Athenian power to her 
subjects (5.95). 
The Melians counter that Athens’ subjects have a fairly robust sense of fairness 
(fairness here serving as a placeholder for justice, despite or because of the fact that the 
Melians previously agreed to forego speaking of justice).  According to the Melians, 
Athens’ subjects will distinguish between the neutrality of cities unconnected with 
Athens and her colonies—especially her rebellious ones.  Only the neutrality of the latter 
(theoretical, since Athens claims that none successfully resist) shows any weakness on 
the part of Athens, since these cases explicitly show that she has difficulty keeping her 
“colonies” or “rebels who were subdued” under control (5.96).  For their part, the 
Melians consider it unreasonable to treat the two cases similarly and doubt that Athens’ 
subjects would view her leaving an insignificant and unallied Greek city alone as a sign 
of weakness.  The inference here is that Athens is either misrepresenting her allies’ views 
or seriously misunderstands her allies.  The Athenians reply that their subjects think that 
both unconnected cities and colonies could make similar cases for independence based on 
right, namely, that both kinds of cities would plead for their rights and argue that it is 
unjust that some survive and maintain their independence while others are enslaved.  Yet, 
those very subjects also think that the (only) reason that some cities maintain their 
independence is due to their strength.  Athens doesn’t attack them out of fear.110  
                                                
110 This realpolitik view is similar to how much of the world understands the recent U.S. military 
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya and lack of intervention in North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. 
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Therefore, from the Athenian perspective, Melian surrender will simultaneously enlarge 
and help secure the empire. 
The Greek word for security (asphales) conveys the idea of steadfastness, 
especially of not being liable to move or fall.111  The Athenians, then, understand the 
security of the empire to depend on its ability to remain firm or immobile.  The 
perception of power becomes nearly as important—indeed, perhaps more important—
than actual power, for if their enemies think Athens strong, they will not attempt to resist.  
This is independent of Athens’ true strength.  Security is a matter of façade and the 
façade of the Athenian Empire will be more formidable if Melos, one of the weakest 
islands in the Aegean, does not prevail over the “masters of the sea,” as the Athenians put 
it (5.97).   
The Melians parry this, again object to excluding considerations of justice from 
the debate, and proceed to put forth a new argument on the basis of Athenian interest.  If 
Athens attacks Melos, other neutral cities will naturally fear that they will be the next 
target and, therefore, will join with the Spartans (5.98).  Destroying Melos, then, would 
be a pyrrhic victory, ultimately increasing the number of Athenian enemies.  The 
Athenians answer that the most immediate threat to Athens is not from the neutral states 
on the mainland, since they have relative liberty, but from independent islands like Melos 
and “those already exasperated by the empire’s constraints” (5.99).  These island city-
states are the ones most likely to “indulge most fully in unreason and subject both 
themselves and us to foreseeable dangers” (5.99).   
The Melians seize upon the reference to danger and invoke the inextricable link 
between confronting danger and the essential Greek virtue of courage (andreia).  If the 
                                                
111 Liddell et al., "A Greek-English Lexicon," s.v. "asphales". 
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Athenians are willing to act courageously, that is, are prepared to take risks in order to 
preserve their empire (and similarly their subjects in order to escape it), then the Melians 
who are still free would be cowards if they do not do everything within their power to 
avoid enslavement.  Notice that the Melians here break one of the ground rules of the 
dialogue: they introduce a moral argument.  They intend to make certain that the 
Athenians understand the historical importance that the fear of shame and the respect for 
courage have in Melian (and Greek) culture.  Indeed, in the two chapters where 
Herodotus mentions Melos, he tells us that it was one of the three islands in the Aegean 
that did not submit to the Persians when they invaded Greece.112  The Melians even sent 
two of their very dated ships to fight alongside the Athenians and other Greek forces at 
Salamis.113   
Here, however, the Athenians chide the Melians for what they take to be 
immature views.  They highlight the important distinction between base cowardice and 
submitting in light of superior strength.  They emphasize that no one will consider the 
Melians cowardly if they deliberate in a sensible manner (sophronos). The standard 
which the Melians use to evaluate their actions is the traditional or Homeric 
understanding of virtue (arête), where death is by far the more choice worthy outcome 
when compared with shame and defeat.  Again we see the distinction or, perhaps more 
appropriately, the problem of justice and self-interest.  On the one hand is the appeal to 
courage in contradistinction to cowardice, honor as opposed to shame—but the Athenians 
claim that these categories are intelligible only when both parties are of equal power.  On 
the other hand is the appeal to prudence and self-preservation that should govern under 
conditions where one party is substantially more powerful than the other.  According to 
                                                
112 Herodotus, History, 8.46. 
113 Herodotus, History, 8.48. 
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the Athenians at Melos, it is irrational and imprudent to apply the former categories in the 
circumstances confronting the Melians because “the contest is not an equal one about 
manly virtue” but about the safety of their city (5.101).  Indeed, it seems that the 
Athenians consider the virtues themselves only applicable for those contending on an 
equal footing.  When rough equality doesn’t obtain, standards of virtue must give way to 
safety.          
The Melians seem to accept once again the truth of the Athenian position about 
the power disparity.  However, their hopeless position perhaps induces them to invoke 
the humbling concept of chance, fortune, or luck (tuche) in the hopes of reminding the 
Athenians that in warfare chance can help one party overcome a lack of strength.  From 
the Melian point of view, the Athenians should be particularly sensitive to this argument 
because without it the Athenians would likely have been enslaved by the Xerxes in the 
Persian Wars.  According to Herodotus, two powerful storms decimated the Persian fleet, 
reducing it to a more manageable (though still numerically superior) size prior to the 
battle of Salamis—and storms are unquestionably not part of Athenian agency.114   But 
fortune, the Melians add, cannot intervene if they surrender.  Luck would not be able to 
influence events unless they continue to resist.  All hope would then be lost, whereas if 
the Melians remain active, there is always the hope (elpis) or chance of victory (or, as in 
the initial Athenian attempt, stalemate).  It is difficult not to again suspect an ironical 
reference to Athenian attitudes during Xerxes’ invasion.  Indeed, if Athens had obeyed 
the warnings of the Delphic oracle and abandoned hope, there would have been no 
chance for fortune to help deliver the victory that helped establish the empire.115 
                                                
114 Herodotus, History, 7.188-192, 8.13. 
115 Herodotus, History, 7.139-140. 
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Despite this rather obvious allusion to the Persian Wars, the Athenians feign 
ignorance and proceed instead to focus exclusively on the danger of hope. 116  As 
characterized by the Athenians, hope (elpis) is nothing more than wishful thinking during 
times of trouble.  Thucydides here foreshadows the very different way in which the 
Athenians themselves will hope during the infamous send-off of the Sicilian Expedition 
that immediately follows the Melian Dialogue (6.31).  Hope is dangerous for those who 
do not have sufficient resources to fall back upon after they have risked everything.  
According to the Athenians hope is “intrinsically extravagant,” and there is a costly price 
to pay by heeding its call.  The Athenians remind the Melians that they are weak, have 
only “a single turn of the scale” and caution them against indulging in such things as 
prophecies, oracles, and the like, when there are obvious and available human means to 
save them (5.103).  The warning implies that, given the disparity of forces, the Melians 
have no evidence that justifies any hope of prevailing and therefore they should not find 
much solace in religion.  They still have a human way to save themselves at their disposal 
that does not require their entrusting their fate to invisible hope—they should simply 
submit to Athenian rule.  However, bringing religion into the debate only serves to 
increase Melian hope and, as a rhetorical strategy, backfires against the Athenians.  For, 
as we often find in war, the Melians view themselves as the pious fighting against the 
unjust.  Here they embrace the traditional understanding of justice (going back at least to 
Hesiod) that the gods favor the good and punish the bad.117   
The Melians recognize the challenge of warring against the Athenian Empire and 
the special difficulty posed should fortune happen to favor the Athenians.  The Melians 
                                                
116 Perhaps the Athenians brush aside the allusion to the Persian Wars out of respect for their proposed 
rules of the debate.  Recall that at 5.89, they explicitly promise to not mention that their rule is just due to 
their having destroyed the Persians. 
117 Hesiod, Works and Days 232-234. 
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consider the candor of this observation as evidence that they are not deluding themselves.  
However, they immediately follow this by asserting their confidence that they will not 
fall short with respect to fortune “from the god” (5.104).  It is important to see that the 
Melians do not consider fortune to be some irrational force operating alongside human 
agency—sometimes favoring it, other times dashing its hopes and expectations.  For 
them, fortune is not a random force.  Rather, it is sent by the gods and the gods distribute 
it in light of moral principles.  The reason the Melians give for expecting fortune to be on 
their side is that they are “righteous men who stand in opposition to unjust ones” (5.104).  
The Melians, then, live immersed in the archaic world-view with its deep religious 
conviction that the world is subject to cosmic justice.  Nature is understood as just and, 
therefore, as a protector of the good.  The Melians extend the values of the polis to nature 
as a whole.  Their words do not betray any awareness of sophistic doubt or agnosticism 
that we will see in Plato’s Gorgias, Protagoras, and Republic in the following chapters.  
They are innocent of the Greek Enlightenment and instead assume the standard 
theonomic or divine origin of law.  Reversing Protagoras’ famous formulation, for the 
Melians, gods, not men, are the measure of all things.  However, the Melians hasten to 
add that their confidence is “not completely irrational” (5.104).  They are not ignorant of 
the empirical fact that they lack power relative to the Athenians.  To compensate for this, 
the Melians claim, “the Lacedaemonians and their allies will redress our deficiency in 
power” (5.104).118  And they will be “compelled” (ananke) to do this from a sense of 
honor and kinship.  The Melians hope that the Spartans will be moved to action by moral 
                                                
118 Commentators wonder whether this implies that the Melians were members of the Peloponnesian 
League or whether they had a separate alliance with Sparta.  I suspect that Thucydides is suggesting that the 
Melians are being progressively seduced by hope, and are engaging more and more in wishful thinking.  
There is no formal treaty with Sparta; they simply hope that Sparta will come to their rescue. 
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reasons: fulfilling the duty of helping one’s kinsmen, and avoiding the dishonor of failing 
to do so.  
 In the next chapter, which can be rightly seen as the culmination of the Melian 
Dialogue, the Athenians proceed to demolish the grounds for Melian confidence.  With 
respect to the gods—and hence of favorable treatment by fortune—the Athenians say that 
they do not think their own behavior is in any way offensive.  They are no less pious than 
the Melians.  Athenian claims and actions do not fall outside of men’s understandings 
about the gods, nor are they beyond men’s attitudes in their dealings with each other.  As 
the Athenians put it: “according to our understanding, divinity, it would seem, and 
mankind, as has always been obvious, are under an innate compulsion to rule wherever 
empowered” (5.105).119  The Athenians, then, refuse to accept the Melian extension of 
the values of the polis to nature and the gods.  Rather, they impose their behavior onto the 
gods, thereby inverting the traditional view of justice to support their actions.  Nature 
becomes the unlimited acquisition of power and is in accordance with the gods.   J.H. 
Finley’s assessment of this passage very much hits the mark: “In attributing to the gods 
their own belief that superior power sanctions any conduct, [the Athenians] reveal the 
total disappearance of higher standards.”120 
The Athenians here express their central conviction about “the divine” and “the 
human,” about the behavior of gods and men.  Their thoughts about the former are based 
on common opinion or belief (doxa) or, as they said before, on men’s ideas about the 
                                                
119 Woodruff’s translation is perhaps clearer: “Nature always compels gods (we believe) and men (we are 
certain) to rule over anyone they can control” (5.105).  James Arieti and Roger Barrus provide the most 
literal rendering: “You see, with respect to the divine we think by opinion and with respect to the human 
[we think] clearly [that] it rules everything by this convention” (5.105, italics mine). They note that the 
antecedent to the italicized it is unclear in the Greek, but probably refers to both the human and the divine; 
the Greek word for the italicized convention is nomos.  Plato, Gorgias, trans. James A. Arieti and Roger M. 
Barrus (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2007), 207. 
120 Finley, Thucydides: 211. 
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gods.  To be sure, they do speak of a goodwill which can be expected with regard to the 
gods that matches the “from the gods” of the Melians, but most of their expressions are 
couched in such a way that doesn’t require the actual existence of the gods.  The 
Athenians limit themselves to what people think about the gods.  They themselves make 
no claims about them.  However, they do not place such restrictions on their statement 
about “men’s attitudes toward themselves.”  The Athenians are well aware (as are 
Thucydides’ readers) of how they actually behave.   
What, then, are their specific thoughts about gods and men?  Both are driven by 
an “innate compulsion” (anankias) that they supposedly cannot resist.  Its agency is not a 
matter of convention or choice and it leads both gods and men to always dominate those 
who are weaker than they are.  This behavior is not only natural, it is also a nomos—a 
custom, or convention—which the Athenians have neither established nor been the first 
to follow.  It is an eternal nomos which has been handed down to them and which will 
continue to exist for all time.  Not even the Melians can evade it: should they ever acquire 
the same power that Athens has, they will do the same thing, exercising control over 
whoever happens to be weaker than they.  The conclusion that the Athenians draw from 
this general doctrine is that since the gods are thought to behave exactly as the Athenians 
do, they have nothing to fear from the gods.  Notice that the Athenian view is put forth as 
a law of political behavior—the desire to dominate is simply a universal command or 
necessity.  As Steven Forde puts it: “It may not have the immediate force of a natural 
principle like gravitation, but its operation is comparably irresistible.”121 And, if this is 
indeed true, then no city can be blamed for acting in accord with this impulse.  
                                                
121 Forde, "Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli," 376. 
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Unfortunately for the Melians, it is the powerful alone who determine whether and whom 
they wish to dominate.        
The Athenians consider the Melians’ confidence in receiving aid from the 
Spartans equally unrealistic.  Here the Athenians become openly sarcastic: “we find a 
touching naivety yet do not envy your folly” (5.105).  Indeed, the Melians’ trust in the 
Spartans is equally a matter of opinion and faith—that is, of an untrustworthy kind of 
knowledge.  The Spartans may follow standards of virtue (arête) or moral motivations in 
their dealings with other Spartans, but in their dealings with others, the Athenians caution 
that it is absolutely clear that the Spartans more than anyone else consider noble or 
honorable whatever is expedient, and justice as whatever is in their own best interest.  In 
other words, the Spartans are the exemplars of pursuing their own advantage—they 
simply disguise their motives.  Interestingly, the Melians do not reject this contention.  
They implicitly grant once more the truth of what the Athenians say, for their next move 
is to try to show that it is in the best interests of the Spartans to help them.  If they do not 
come to their aid, the Spartans will lose the confidence of their friends and thus benefit 
their enemies (5.106).  The Athenians answer with a general characterization of action 
according to its motivation.  It is essential to the pursuit of self-interest to minimize risk, 
whereas action in pursuit of justice and honor involves danger.  From this it follows that, 
since the Spartans are infamous for being risk-averse, this aspect of their self-interest will 
be foremost in their minds (5.107).  The Melians advance two reasons why the risk 
should not be too great for the Spartans: (1) Melos is close to the Peloponnesus and (2) 
their common Dorian spirit makes the Melians “more reliable than others” (5.107). 
The Athenians categorically reject both arguments.  According to the Athenians, 
in taking up another’s struggle, what provides security is not the goodwill of the party in 
need, but whether you have superior strength.  Without superior strength, intervention 
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would be too risky.  The Spartans know this better than anyone, for even when attacking 
their neighbors they prefer to have the company of their allies.  Moreover, even though 
Melos is relatively close to the Peloponnesus, the Athenians control the sea (5.109).  The 
Melians make a last desperate attempt to convince the Athenians (or perhaps simply 
themselves) that Spartan help will be forthcoming.  It is much easier, they hold, to run a 
blockade than to intercept a ship in the vast Cretan sea.  But, as if they suddenly realize 
how unrealistic this is, they add that the Spartans would invade Attica, something they 
have often done in the past, and find a way to subvert those allies of Athens that were not 
reached by Brasidas, the brilliant Spartan general whose swift campaigns in northern 
Greece led not only to the revolt of several cities, but to the exile of Thucydides himself.  
To mention Brasidas, the only individual whose name appears in the Melian Dialogue is, 
of course, only baiting the Athenians (5.110). 
The Athenians brush aside the new suggestion, reminding the Melians that Athens 
has never lifted a siege because of danger elsewhere.  They then proceed to withdraw 
from the negotiations, though not before delivering a lengthy speech in which the 
distinction between morality and self-interest reappears in the guise of two forms of 
dishonor.  They mention, on the one hand, “shameful and manifest dangers,” because 
their outcome is defeat, and “shame more shameful in folly than in misfortune,” the 
shame involved in being too foolish to avoid destruction, which is worse than being 
doomed by involuntary misfortune.  Thus, according to the Athenians, the decision to 
avoid shame—that is, the moral motivation of courage—is responsible for something 
more shameful: defeat and destruction.  The Athenians withdraw after offering 
“reasonable terms,” the Melians reiterate their trust in the gods and the Spartans, the 
Athenians accuse them of being unrealistic, and hostilities begin.  The dialogue is over. 
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Unsurprisingly, what the Athenians warned the Melians of comes to pass.  Even 
though the Melians score a brief victory with a surprise night assault, Athens sends 
reinforcements under Philocrates and the Melians surrender.  The final sentences of Book 
V are among the most harrowing in the History.  The Melians “surrendered to the 
Athenians to be dealt with as they wished.  They [the Athenians] killed all the grown men 
they captured, enslaved the children and women, and settled the place themselves” 
(5.116).   
Thucydides suggests in the Melian Dialogue that justice is not equal to the task of 
restraining power—everything comes down to relative strength.  Justice is not rewarded 
and weakness merely waits to be punished, since cities will choose to rule with violent 
expediency.  Justice is either too weak or is simply irrelevant to restrain the stronger 
powers.   Had the Melians surrendered, they would sacrifice their freedom at the altar of 
existence.  Their belief in the gods’ justice led to the destruction of their polis.  
Thucydides seems to conclude that the Melians tried to reconcile what is necessarily 
separate: nomos and phusis rule in their respective realms.  In spite of these reflections, 
the Melian Dialogue remains, as much in Thucydides, an unresolved antinomy.  The 
Athenians are right in their warnings to the Melians and wrong in their theory of power, 
the Melians are wrong in expecting Spartan help and are perhaps right in their claim to be 
acting justly.  But, on balance, his fellow Athenians stand tacitly condemned by 
Thucydides: they are blind to the true nature of power, they do not deliberate with 
intelligence (gnome), but under the spell of their passions, and they commit a monstrous 
crime which, according to Xenophon, weighted heavily on their conscience at the hour of 
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their total defeat.122  At Melos and elsewhere, a failure in moderation is responsible for 
blindness in the face of the value of justice.   
Indeed, let us not forget how the Corcyrean stasis ends (as do many 
commentators).  The oligarchs finally surrendered on the condition that they be tried by 
the Athenians, rather than the Corcyreans.  The Athenians demanded that the oligarchs 
accept temporary imprisonment on a nearby island, from which the oligarchs agreed not 
to escape.  The Corcyrean democrats, afraid that the Athenians would pardon the 
oligarchs, convinced some of them to attempt an escape, ensuring that they would be 
discovered and, therefore, angering the Athenians.  That is precisely what occurred.  The 
Athenians accused the oligarchs of breaking the agreement, and turned them over to the 
Corcyreans.  Thucydides shows his indignation at the immoderate way the democrats 
treat their fellow countrymen through his harrowing description of the incident: 
When the Corcyreans took over the prisoners they shut them up in a large 
building and later brought them out twenty at a time, bound them together, and 
made them go down a path lined with hoplites drawn up on both sides.  They 
were beaten and stabbed by the troops in the lines, whenever any of them was 
spotted as someone’s personal enemy.  And to speed up the laggards, men with 
whips followed them down. 
They took about sixty men from the building, drove them down the path, and 
killed them, while those inside the building thought they were only being moved 
to another place.  When someone told them, and they saw the truth, they cried out 
to the Athenians and asked them to kill them if they wanted, but said that they 
were no longer willing to leave the building, and that, as long as they had the 
power, they would not allow anyone to come in. 
The Corcyreans, however, had no intention of forcing their way in at the door; 
they climbed up on the roof of the building, tore off the roofing, and began 
throwing roof tiles and shooting arrows inside.  The inmates defended themselves 
as well as they could, but most of them killed themselves either by stabbing their 
throats with arrows that had been shot at them or by strangling themselves with 
cords from beds that happened to be there or ropes they made from their own 
                                                
122 Xenophon, Hellenica 2.2.3, 2.210. 
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clothes….At daybreak the Corcyreans threw them criss-cross on wagons and 
carted them out of the city.  The women they had captured at the fort were made 
slaves…and at this point the civil war that had grown so large came to an end, at 
least as far as this war was concerned, since there was hardly anything left of one 
of the two sides. (4.47-4.48)  
There is a remarkable similarity between the arguments of the Athenian 
Ambassadors at Melos and those made by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias.  In the next 
chapter, I will present what I take to be Plato’s initial response to the view of the 




Chapter 2: Plato on the Moral Foundation of Politics 
The seriousness with which Plato takes the moral challenge underlying Athenian 
imperialism is reflected in the fact that his attempt to adequately respond to the problem 
gives rise to his second and third longest works.  The Gorgias is the longest “Socratic” 
dialogue and the Republic is the second longest dialogue in the Platonic corpus, at the 
center of which lies an extensive discussion of the structure of reality and the way the 
soul has access to it.  Plato’s desire to sufficiently respond to the ideology of Athenian 
greed and aggression ultimately leads him to the relationship between goodness, truth, 
and being.  To put this in the starkest possible terms: for Plato, the problem of power, 
violence, and greed—which Callicles (and Thrasymachus) represent—is, at root, also an 
epistemological, linguistic, and metaphysical problem.   
The essence of the Melian Dialogue is the central challenge that Plato poses in the 
Gorgias, and his response is a radical critique of the deterministic “realism” put in the 
mouths of the Athenian Ambassadors by Thucydides.  Plato doesn’t mention the Melian 
Dialogue or indeed any specific episode of the Peloponnesian War by name—it would be 
unnecessary; his audience was all too familiar with its details.  But Plato is none too 
subtle in the ways that he invokes the Peloponnesian War and the new Athenian morality.  
The very first word of the Gorgias is “battle” (polemou), and during the course of the 
dialogue Socrates attacks four of Athens most esteemed leaders: Themistocles, Cimon, 
Miltiades, and Pericles.123  Each of these leaders played an instrumental role in the 
development of Athenian imperialism.  Themistocles inaugurated Athenian naval 
                                                
123  Socrates attacks Themistocles on three separate occasions in the Gorgias (455e-456a, 503c-d, 515d-
519a).  Though Terence Irwin considers Socrates’ attack “a gross over-simplification—typical of Socrates’ 
political comments,” for Plato, Themistocles was the embodiment (along with Pericles, Cimon, and 
Miltiades) of Athenian imperialism.  Plato, Gorgias, trans. Terence Irwin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 235.  
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supremacy by routing the Persian navy at the battle of Salamis.  Cimon brought Athenian 
naval supremacy to fruition by crushing the Persians again at the battle of the Eurymedon 
River in 466.  Miltiades led the Athenian army to victory over the Persians at the battle of 
Marathon and, to this day, Pericles stands as the paragon of Athenian wealth and culture.  
Indeed, Seth Benardete is probably correct in saying that: “No other Platonic dialogue is 
as saturated with allusions to events that span the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.E.) as 
the Gorgias.”124   
The Gorgias is perhaps most famous for the speech given by Callicles where he 
ridicules Socrates for his political foolishness and naiveté.  As R.E. Allen puts it: “The 
Gorgias is a meditation on the meaning of Socrates’ trial and death.”125 While Socrates’ 
impassioned defense of reason and morality is sometimes overlooked by commentators, 
the values that underline Callicles’ position seem to be generally accepted as true by 
many in our postmodern world.  For example, Callicles’ views find fertile soil with 
radical leftist doctrine that eviscerates the concept of the soul, libertarians’ embrace of 
free-market political and economic values, and conservative “realists” who tend to side 
with Callicles’ censure of Socrates for using moral arguments to undermine longstanding 
tradition.  Callicles’ outburst can be understood as an attempt to take the argument 
between Socrates and Polus over whether shame, morality, and justice are natural or 
conventional to an extreme.  And Callicles’ account is farther-reaching than that of 
Thrasymachus in the Book I of the Republic.126  Whether Callicles actually existed or not, 
his views clearly represent the undercurrent of hedonism that coursed through Athens at 
                                                
124  Seth Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 7-8. 
125 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, Volume 1, trans. Reginald E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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126 We will examine the Republic in Chapter Four.   
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the time.  It also raises the question of whether Plato thought the regime of the Republic 
was necessary because of the failure of Socrates’ strategy of changing individuals one at 
a time to refute the Athenian ideology of greed and power.  Thirty years of war that 
culminated in the loss of her empire, over half of her adult male population, and countless 
other deaths due to plague, had perhaps inured the Athenian mind to the possibility of an 
underlying goodness in the world. 
Before getting to Callicles’ arguments, however, it is important to put the 
dialogue in context so that we might better understand what Plato wishes to draw our 
attention to.  First, Plato makes it impossible for us to determine a dramatic date for the 
Gorgias.  As commentators have frequently noted, there are references to: the “very 
recent” demise of Pericles (who died in 429); and the trials of the generals at Arginusae 
(which occurred in 406) are said to have occurred “last year” (474a).  Furthermore, the 
only historical evidence for Gorgias actually visiting Athens dates it to 427—which is 
consistent with Pericles’ death, but inconsistent with the discussion of the Macedonian 
tyrant Archelaus, who didn’t take power until 413, as well as the references to Euripides’ 
play, Atiope, from the last decade of the fifth century.  As Benardete puts it: “Plato 
situates the Gorgias in wartime Athens but in such a way that we are enjoined to believe 
that the conversation never occurred.  The Gorgias is of a time but not in time.”127  
However, we should not overlook the significance of Gorgias’ visit to Athens in 
427—the early years of the Peloponnesian War.  Gorgias was chosen to represent his 
native Sicilian polis of Leontini, and sent to Athens to persuade the Athenians to help the 
Leontines in their conflict with Syracuse.128 According to Diodorus Siculus: 
                                                
127 Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: 7. 
128 On Gorgias’ mission to Athens, see Richard Leo Enos, "Why Gorgias of Leontini Traveled to Athens: 
A Study of Recent Epigraphical Evidence," Rhetoric Review 11, no. 1 (1992). Paul Woodruff argues, 
however, that “we have no reason to think that his [Gorgias’] teaching affected the conduct of politics in 
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The Leontines were attacked by the Syracusans.  Being hard pressed in the war 
they dispatched ambassadors to Athens asking the Athenians to send them 
immediate aid and save their city from the perils threatening it.  The leader of the 
embassy was Gorgias who in eloquence far surpassed all his contemporaries.  He 
was the first man to devise rules of rhetoric and far excelled all other men in the 
instruction offered by the sophists….When Gorgias had arrived in Athens and 
been introduced to the people in assembly, he discoursed to them upon the subject 
of the alliance, and by the novelty of his speech he filled the Athenians, who are 
by nature clever and fond of dialectic, with wonder…he won the Athenians over 
to an alliance with the Leontines, and after having been admired in Athens for his 
rhetorical skill he made his return to Leontini.  For some time past the Athenians 
had been covetous of Sicily because of the fertility of its land, and so at the 
moment, gladly accepting the proposals of Gorgias, they voted to send an allied 
force to the Leontines, offering as their excuse the need and request of their 
kinsmen, whereas in fact they were eager to get possession of the island. 129 
Gorgias successfully executed his assignment, the result of which marked the advent of 
Athenian involvement in Sicilian affairs that culminated in the ruinous Sicilian 
Expedition ten years later.  Athenian meddling in Sicily ended up costing them 10,000 
hoplites, 30,000 seasoned oarsman, and the majority of their fleet.  As Thucydides tells it, 
the Sicilian Expedition drastically changed the course of Athenian history (though the 
fact that the empire didn’t immediately fall shows its remarkable resilience).  T.K. Seung 
concludes from this that “Socrates’ ultimate opponent in the Gorgias is none of his three 
interlocutors, but the ethos of Athenian power politics or rather the moral principle that 
shaped the imperialism and expansionism of Athens.”130  I might put Seung’s point 
slightly differently: Socrates’ debate with Callicles that serves as the dialogue’s 
showpiece is his attempt to graphically illustrate to Gorgias the eventual—perhaps 
necessary—consequences of his manipulative rhetoric and, therefore, his moral 
irresponsibility.  The seed of the moral principle that shaped Athenian imperialism can 
                                                                                                                                            
Athens.” See Paul Woodruff, "Socrates Among the Sophists," in A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-
Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2006), 20.  
129 Diodorus Siculus, Diodorus Siculus: The Library of History, trans. Charles Henry Oldfather 
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130 Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and Social Order: 5. 
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thus be found in Gorgias’ teaching, and its flower and fruit in what Polus and Callicles do 
with it.  As we shall see in the next chapter, if Plato shows us the impact of sophistry on 
the first generation in the Protagoras, the Gorgias shows how sophistry helps twist the 
minds and actions of the Athenians after being exposed to sophism and war.131 
Let me briefly lay out why I think this is the case.  To begin, the dialogue’s title is 
Gorgias, not Polus or Callicles.  I conclude from this that the purpose of the Gorgias is to 
highlight the relationship between sophistic rhetoric and politics—specifically, the effects 
of this rhetoric on the polis.  The Gorgias draws our attention to the danger of 
demagoguery to an Athens that, as we saw in the last chapter, claims to transcend nature 
and the gods.  Plato lays responsibility for this mess at Gorgias’ doorstep.  According to 
Socrates, Gorgias values success over truth, answers over questions, and pleasure over 
understanding.  In the course of teaching how to use language as a means for unlimited 
acquisition, he helped erode Athenian (and, by extension, Greek) culture.  His combative 
worldview seeps from speeches to deeds, infecting everything it touches, until the soul 
itself becomes corrupted.  For Plato, the effects of Gorgias’ teaching are both a cause and 
an effect of the Peloponnesian War.  Thucydides’ account of the Corcyrean bloodbath 
that followed the dissolution of language underscores the practical significance of this 
issue.  In contrast to Gorgias and his progeny, Socrates takes a different and more 
respectful approach to language and the people who participate in it.  Opportunistic 
rhetoric sickens a polity by tearing people apart and reinforcing a worldview where 
people are alienated from more ennobling ties that bind them together.  For Socrates, 
shared dialogue is essential because it is the vehicle through which we are able to move 
toward understanding, truth, justice and, ultimately, a unifying common good.   
                                                
131 It is important to recognize that I am speaking here of Plato’s understanding of the sophists.  For an 
account of why Plato is far from a neutral arbiter, see Woodruff, "Socrates Among the Sophists." 
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Before moving to the text, it is instructive to examine what information we have 
about the historical Gorgias, since it is likely that Plato would assume his readers would 
use this information to inform their readings of the dialogue.  Unlike many of the 
sophists, we have several good sources other than Plato himself.  With respect to 
metaphysics, the only information we have is Gorgias’ own On Not Being.  In this 
fragment, Gorgias seems to be arguing against the Parmenidean/Eleatic thesis of the 
unchanging oneness of being.  Gorgias puts forth three propositions against the oneness 
thesis that run something like this.  For anything we might mention: (1) it is nothing, (2) 
even if it were something, it is unknowable, and (3) even if it were knowable, it couldn’t 
be made evident to others (DK 3).132  Gorgias’ argument seems contradictory (or at least 
convoluted)—perhaps intentionally.  Paul Woodruff observes that Gorgias’ thesis:  
is simply negative, so we cannot be sure what, if anything, Gorgias would have 
put in place of the views he refutes.  It seems most likely that he had no 
philosophical theory to propose at all—no alternative account of being, 
knowledge, or meaning—just the practice itself of what he taught, of influencing 
human affairs through the effective use of words.133 
Gorgias’ conclusion appears to be that, in the absence, incomprehensibility, or 
indescribability of things, the world is constructed (only or primarily) through persuasive 
speech.  This understanding of Gorgias’ position is supported by his assertion that “a 
woman should be known to many by reputation, not by appearance” (DK 22). It appears 
that Gorgias understands being or reality in a similar way to women.  Gorgias’ 
fundamentally negative teaching is more clearly illustrated in his Encomium of Helen,134 
where he defends Helen against the traditional charge that she triggered the Trojan War 
                                                
132 All fragments attributed to Gorgias are cited by Diels-Kranz number and are from Early Greek Political 
Thought from Homer to the Sophists, trans. and ed. by Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
133 Paul Woodruff, "Rhetoric and Relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 306. 
134 DK 82 BII, hereafter Helen. 
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through her adultery.  His stated aim in this speech is to display his ability to speak 
persuasively on any side of any subject, “and for my [Gorgias’] amusement” (Helen 11). 
Gorgias argues that Helen is blameless in causing the Trojan War because her journey to 
Troy was a result of either: (1) the gods’ planning, (2) physical force, (3) the persuasive 
power of speech, or (4) the intoxicating power of love (Helen 6).  
In his discussion of the powers that render Helen blameless, Gorgias states: “a 
human’s anticipation cannot restrain a god’s inclination” (Helen 6).  He continues, 
foreshadowing Callicles, “for by nature the stronger is not restrained by the weaker but 
the weaker is ruled and led by the stronger: the stronger leads, the weaker follows” 
(Helen 6).  Persuasive speech is, for Gorgias, an equally effective influence on human 
action: “if speech (logos) persuaded and deluded her mind, even against this it is not hard 
to defend her or free her from blame, as follows: speech is a powerful master and 
achieves the most divine feats with the smallest and least evident body.  It can stop fear, 
relieve pain, create joy, and increase pity” (Helen 8).  Gorgias ties the power of speech to 
the uncertainty of human knowledge: “For if all men on all subjects had memory of the 
past, <understanding> of the present and foresight into the future, speech would not be 
the same [kind of power] as it is now” (Helen 11).  Under conditions of ignorance and 
fear, persuasion overcomes thought since “persuasion…has the same power, but not the 
same form as compulsion (ananke)” (Helen 12).  Gorgias concludes that “persuasion, 
when added to speech, molds the mind as it wishes” (Helen 13).  According to him:  
The power of speech has the same effect on the disposition of the soul as the 
disposition of drugs on the nature of bodies.  Just as different drugs draw forth 
different humors from the body—some putting a stop to disease, others to life—
so too with words: some cause pain, others joy, some strike fear, some stir the 
audience to boldness, some benumb and bewitch the soul with evil persuasion 
(Helen 14). 
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This is why Gorgias compares the art of persuasion, which “molds the mind as it 
wishes,” to the art of astronomy, which “make[s] incredible, invisible matters apparent to 
the eyes of opinion” (Helen 13).  This making of “invisible matters apparent” applies 
equally to the “opinions” of celestial motion as it does to shaping opinions regarding the 
power and decisions of a polity.  Gorgias reminds us that persuasion may be salutary or 
necessary in polities, since the minds of men when confronted with fear (as in the state of 
nature first articulated by the sophists) are debilitated by the shock of events: “Some, 
indeed, who have seen fearful things, have lost their present purpose in the present 
moment, so thoroughly does fear extinguish and expel thought; and many have fallen into 
useless labors, terrible diseases, and incurable madness, so thoroughly does sight engrave 
on the mind images of things that are seen” (Helen 17).  Here, Gorgias presents 
persuasive speech as absolutely necessary during times of war and hardship.  Persuasive 
speech can reinterpret these traumatic memories and “tell a different story”—generating 
more beneficial conclusions, interpretations, and understandings.   
With this understanding of the historical Gorgias in mind, we can examine the 
dialogue to see Plato’s initial response to the normative crisis reflected in the position of 
the Athenian Ambassadors at Melos.  Let us begin with some textual similarities.  
Gorgias claims that his art of rhetoric is the greatest good because it brings to the 
possessor “freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the 
source of rule over others in one’s own city” (452d).  This description is remarkably 
similar (perhaps edited) to a line from Thucydides describing the intoxicating effects of 
hope, desire and fortune that generate imprudent and hubristic actions.135  Thucydides 
puts these words in the mouth of the Athenian Diodotus during his famous debate with 
                                                
135 My point here is not to emphasize a specific textual allusion; rather, it is that Gorgias’ thesis has 
become widespread. 
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the demagogue Cleon—introduced by Thucydides as the “most violent” of the 
Athenians—over the fate of the Mytileneans, which occurred at approximately the same 
time as Gorgias’ visit to Athens.   But whereas Diodotus speaks of the desire of “freedom 
or rule over others” as “men irrationally [having]…the impression of being greater,”136 
Plato presents Gorgias as actually believing that his art can create “freedom for human 
beings and rule in one’s own city.”  At this point, Gorgias fails to see (as Diodotus hints), 
that self-mastery—temperately ruling over oneself—as opposed to the power to rule 
others, is the greatest human action.   
However, it is important to note that Gorgias is not advocating demagoguery.  He 
rejects the notion that rhetoric supports imperial orders or ventures.  He views these 
actions as relying on (silent) violence rather than persuasion (peitho)—a word that, as 
Seth Benardete points out, “Gorgias uses nineteen times but, like the dog that didn’t bark 
in the night, is utilized by neither Polus nor Callicles.”137  For Gorgias, persuasive speech 
is properly used to make oneself influential within the polis, but he recognizes the 
integrity of the polis as a natural limit to speech (and deed).  The art of rhetoric and its 
product must always serve the polis.  This attitude is reflected in Gorgias’ mission to 
Athens, which he undertook to support the interests of his own polis.  As Roslyn Weiss 
observes, “Gorgias is not like his successors in the argument…he disapproves of 
injustice…it would appear that he aspires neither to political office, nor to committing 
atrocities against others, nor to the unlimited indulgence of appetite.”138  Yet, as his On 
Not Being and the Encomium make clear, Gorgias’ denial that anything exists ends up 
                                                
136 Thucydides, 3.45, italics mine. 
137 Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: 6. 
138 Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
70. 
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freeing humanity to use persuasive speech to generate happiness because there are no 
metaphysical or normative grounds for belief. 
While Gorgias himself may strive to practice his art within the limits set by the 
polis, “ruling over others” appears to be a necessary condition for ensuring individual 
freedom—at least from the perspective of the consequences of one’s actions.  As Gorgias 
puts it, the art of rhetoric (for him, the art of persuasion) makes it possible for a 
practitioner to sway judges, councils, assemblymen, and “any other political gathering 
that might take place” (452e).  He argues that the other professionals put forward as 
possible bringers of the greatest good (doctors, physical trainers, financial experts) would 
be the “slave” to whomever has the power to persuade the professionals and the masses 
to follow (452e).  And Gorgias further reveals that the persuasive power of rhetoric 
(through politicians like Themistocles and Pericles) is what brought Athens’ long walls, 
dockyards, and the Piraeus itself into being (455d-e).  If Gorgias was able to convince the 
Athenians to send their navy to Sicily in 427, this would be a most effective way for Plato 
to silently indicate rhetoric’s power. 
What is implicit with Gorgias is made explicit by Polus who describes the life of 
the tyrant as best possible life, and who associates democratic leaders with the notorious 
tyrant Archelaus who, despite having no right to the throne of Macedonia, ascended to 
the throne after murdering his uncle, cousin, and seven-year-old step-brother through 
deceit  (470d-473e, 479a-e).139  Thucydides’ brief account of Archelaus fails to mention 
his ascent to power, describing only the benefits of his rule: “he [Archelaus] built those 
[strong fortresses] that there are now in the country, made straight roads, and in other 
ways mustered resources for war with greater strength in horses, weapons, and general 
                                                
139 This story was apparently infamous in antiquity but modern scholars have begun to question it.  For a 
detailed account of the evidence on Archelaus’ life, see Eugene Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: the 
Emergence of Macedon  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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preparation than all the eight kings who had come before him” (2.100).  Archelaus helped 
save Athens after the disaster at Sicily by placing Macedonia’s timber and pitch at her 
disposal to rebuild the fleet.  In recognition for his help, the Athenians passed a decree 
praising Archelaus for his assistance and honoring him (and his children) with the status 
Proxenos and Euergetes of the people.  He became a patron for Athenian artists, poets, 
and sophists.  Euripides became a client of his and wrote an Archelaus, of which we 
know little today. Thucydides may have visited Archelaus, but Aristotle reports that 
Socrates refused his invitation.140  Nevertheless, his reputation in Athens seems to have 
been poor.  As Eugene Borza explains: 
there was also a genuine underlying disgust at what Archelaus seemed to 
represent…Whether Archelaus knew of his evil reputation among some 
Athenians, or even cared about it, is a matter best left to speculation.  But it is 
clear—his notoriety notwithstanding—that Archelaus was able to create a veneer 
of Greek culture by purchasing the services of some notable Athenians.141 
Interestingly, Archelaus was assassinated in 399, the same year Socrates was put 
to death.  Because of this, I agree with E. R. Dodds that Plato’s use of Archelaus is 
probably not coincidental.142  At the time of Plato’s writing, Macedonia’s star was 
ascending and would bring the entire Greek world under its orbit within ten years 
following Plato’s death.  Socrates and Archelaus serve to embody the just and unjust life. 
Yet, Gorgias’ student Polus is so enamored with Archelaus’ injustice that he neglects to 
mention any other aspect of his rule.143  When Polus asks Socrates if he thinks Archelaus 
“happy or miserable,” Socrates reminds us of his declined invitation: “I don’t know, 
                                                
140 See Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1398a.24. 
141 Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence of Macedon: 176. 
142 Plato, Gorgias: A Revised Text with Notes and Commentary, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 241. 
143 See Devin Stauffer, The Unity of Plato's Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 61. Unlike the Melians, perhaps the Athenians 
overlooked any moral quims in the face of necessity. 
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Polus, I haven’t met the man yet” (470d).  Socrates expresses surprise that Polus thinks 
the example of Archelaus reinforces rather than refutes his opinion that the life of 
injustice is beneficial to its practitioner.   Polus believes that his opinion about preferring 
the unjust life is completely self-evident and needs no further support.  Indeed, he 
attributes Socrates’ claim to “disagree with every single thing” he has said to old-
fashioned recalcitrance: “You’re just unwilling to admit it.  You really do think it’s the 
way I say it is” (471e).   The two are at an impasse, and both argue from assertion: for 
Polus, conventional opinion about Archelaus’ enviable power needs no proof, while 
Socrates responds that Polus’ “oratorical style…‘refutation’ is worthless, as far as truth is 
concerned” (471e-472a).  The rhetoric of the Athenian law courts—where “reputable” 
witnesses are produced to undermine the truth fail to impress Socrates, though he 
concedes that “nearly every Athenian and alien” will take Polus’ side (472a).  Still 
Socrates, though “only one person,” will not agree: “You don’t compel me; instead you 
produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my property, the 
truth” (472b).  
This is an often overlooked but, in my view, crucial point in the dialogue.  To 
someone like Polus, the way Socrates understands and privileges personal integrity is 
perplexing.  If, as Socrates says, nearly every Athenian and alien—that is, most of 
Greece—will think of his conduct as baffling or foolish, they therefore fail to understand 
or take seriously the value or integrity of the human soul.  Socrates’ refusal to submit to 
the pressures exerted by both his body (e.g., his refusal to wear shoes) and the demos 
(e.g., his behavior during the Arginusae trial) suggest that he is ruled by forces other than 
the body or convention.  This is both a hopeful message as well as an acknowledgement 
of a high degree of difficulty: even in a world where words lose their meaning and the 
will to power dominates, Socrates shows us the possibility of finding in ourselves the 
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ability to resist what Thucydides calls the coercive force of ananke (and, therefore, that it 
not a true ananke). 
Returning to the dialogue, Socrates insists that they will have accomplished 
nothing unless one of them, either Polus or himself, gets the agreement of the other on the 
relationship between justice and happiness (472c-e).  And we can now see why the 
methodological question of how the issue will be settled is of such significance.  Whether 
the answer to the question will be determined by reference to the power of opinion or to 
reason and dialectic is nothing other than the question of what principle should rule the 
individual person.  For Socrates, it is essential that individual souls can withstand the 
external pressures brought to bear on the soul by bodily desires and the coercive power of 
public opinion.  As we’ve seen, the examples of Corcyra and Melos demonstrate the 
necessity of moderation and self-rule for peace and human flourishing.  Polus asserts that 
the pleasures of a life such as Archelaus’ should generate feelings of envy in any sane 
person.  This, of course, implies that reason is the instrument or handmaiden to 
passion.144 Socrates, however, is equally convinced that happiness is the flourishing of 
personal integrity, and is reflected in one’s ability to resist unhealthy desires. 
After Socrates claims that even though an unjust man is miserable, he is made 
more so by not being punished for his injustices, Polus laughs, asserting that Socrates has 
already been refuted since he is “saying things the likes of which no human being would 
maintain” and invites him to “ask any one of these people [here]” (473e).  Socrates 
shorts-circuits Polus’ “poll the audience” lifeline, returning to his previous distinction 
between rational argument and popular appeals.  Socrates admits that he doesn’t know 
how to call for a vote of the people.  He is not so subtly referring here to the scandalous 
                                                
144 Polus anticipates here Hume’s instrumentalist view that reason alone is merely “the slave of the 
passions.” See Book 3 of the Treatise on Human Nature. 
 80 
trial of the victorious Athenian generals at Arginusae when demagoguery trumped the 
law (since they were tried en masse rather than individually) as well as Athenian interest 
by executing six of their best remaining generals (and discouraging any others from 
wanting to serve).  During the trial, Socrates courageously but unsuccessfully tried to 
stop the proceedings when he was the presiding officer over the Athenian Council.145  
Socrates gently reminds Polus (and those present) of this appalling example to make 
absolutely clear to Polus that, for Socrates, the well-reasoned thinking of a single 
individual is more valuable than an assembly of senseless sentiment.  
Socrates now expands his original claim, asserting that Polus and “everybody 
else” believes that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and that avoiding a just 
punishment is worse than accepting it (474b).  Socrates again turns our attention back to 
the example of the tyrant Archelaus.  Socrates suggests to Polus that anyone like 
Archelaus, who “although he commits the most serious crimes and uses methods that are 
most unjust, succeeds in avoiding being lectured and disciplined and paying his due,” has 
the worst life of all, alongside “other tyrants, orators, and potentates” (479a).  Socrates 
believes it is ridiculous for these men to fear justice, as it is the cure for their disease.  
This fear is as irrational as someone seriously ill avoiding medical treatment simply 
because it is painful.  Their fear of being cured and their ignorance of its benefit is why 
these men “go to any length to avoid paying what is due” (479c).  Instead they try to 
shape their worlds to mesh with their deluded understanding of their own good by finding 
themselves “funds and friends, and ways to speak as persuasively as possible” (479c).  
Therefore, for Socrates, though doing injustice is worse than suffering it, refusing the 
cure for injustice is worst of all.  Though Socrates doesn’t explicitly say so, the reason 
                                                
145 For an account of the Arginusae incident, see Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War  (New York: 
Viking, 2003), 461-66. 
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this may be so is because the skillful practitioner of injustice himself becomes trapped in 
his own deluded web of betrayal and deceit.  If we agree with Aristotle that man is a 
political animal, then human flourishing or happiness (eudaimonia) necessarily occurs in 
a setting that requires individuals to interact with others in the world through speeches 
and deeds.  As Socrates has shown, this is precisely what an unjust life cannot permit, 
because it cannot share—rather, the freedom and power over others it requires demand 
that it turn all its energy toward making itself the center of things.  In doing this, it seeks 
to twist the perceptions of others through political power and rhetoric to think its disease 
and corruption are, in fact, the nature of things. 
As it turns out, though, it is not simply inter-personal communication that 
generates happiness—intra-personal communication also plays an essential role.  That is, 
for Socrates, self-rule is more important than Gorgias’ summum bonum—the pursuit of 
“freedom for humankind itself and…the source of rule over others in one’s own city” 
(452d).  Gorgias fails to see the double meaning of his own words; they apply equally to 
one’s polis and one’s soul.   Socrates previously tried to direct Polus to focus on self-rule 
when he referred to his sole concern of calling a vote from one person only—himself or 
his interlocutor.  The full import of this insight is not immediately obvious, but without it 
the life devoted to power and greed, exemplified in the murderous events of the 
Peloponnesian War, will be impossible to overcome.  Indeed, with the backdrop of 
bloodshed and chaos that reigned during and after the Peloponnesian War, we can see 
that Plato reverses the dramatic trajectory of the Gorgias to suggest that the seeds of this 
disaster were sown by teachers and practitioners of demagogic rhetoric a generation or 
two earlier. Thucydides reports that Pericles’ foresight was accurate: Athens was 
invulnerable as long as she stayed within her long walls, took care of her navy, and did 
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not attempt to expand the empire.146  Yet, his advice was not taken as ambitious parties 
like Alcibiades pursued private ambition, power, and glory and used the tools of 
demagogic rhetoric to paint the rosiest pictures of future prospects for victory to the 
ignorant and greedy demos.  Unsurprisingly, the Athenians encountered vastly tougher 
conditions after they were seduced—by their own rhetoric and greed—to leave the safety 
of the long walls.  Military defeats that can and should be expected (once optimistic plans 
run headlong into the harsh light of reality) end up generating anger and righteous 
indignation on the part of the public.  Consumed by anger, and ignorant of the honesty 
and self-rule required to see the true cause of their condition, men rip each other apart as 
on Corcyra.  Socrates teaches that when we indulge or corrupt others (whether they are 
friends or enemies), we only damage ourselves by polluting the social environment we 
hold in common.  Only men like Archelaus are myopic enough to believe they can create 
such an anti-Kallipolis for themselves. 
Furthermore, Socrates argues that we will remain ignorant about what is truly just 
so long as we look to the polis, rather than the soul, as the source of virtue.  This is 
because it is the individual soul which has the capacity to perceive justice and injustice.  
A collective or shared experience of injustice cannot by itself substitute for this.  For 
Socrates, a regime governed by virtue can only be created in the individual soul—it can 
never be imposed on any larger unit.  This is why Socrates argues that it is impossible for 
rhetoric to make men just.  Socrates uses speech and deed to show that moral 
improvement arises by exposing the false beliefs and desires that send human beings 
awry.  If this is an effective way of combating injustice, we should be highly critical of 
the way in which Athens acquired her empire.  By requiring tribute from her allies as a 
                                                
146 Thucydides, 2.65. 
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means of waging wars against their common enemy (Persia), Athens encouraged the 
gullible demos that fighting injustice through (external) military action is more beneficial 
than establishing justice in one’s own polis and one’s own soul (internal).  The violence 
and greed that came with post-Persian War Athenian imperialism grew like a virus that 
ultimately infected everyone.  And if Socrates is correct, anything that makes a man’s 
enemies worse will necessarily have an unhealthy effect on his own polity and his own 
soul.  A polis becomes corrupted when its citizens believe that they become more just 
themselves by fighting injustice abroad, rather than pursuing their own private virtue.147 
T. K. Seung suggests an anthropological explanation for this phenomenon.148  He 
argues that in primitive societies, the love of kin or the extended family is the basis for 
social cohesion.  This kinship-based love was philia, and, in such societies, friends were 
treated interchangeably with relatives, as they held the same importance for social 
stability.  All those who belonged to the same kin were friends, while those who did not 
were considered strangers or enemies.  The distinction between a friend (philos) and a 
stranger (xenos) became critical for tribal communities.  The oldest civic virtue in the 
ancient Greek world was aidos (mutual respect) and is tightly linked with philos.  The 
virtue of aidos necessitated both the respect for each other’s rights, but also prescribed a 
duty to defend the other members of the tribe if outsiders attacked them.149  As Seung 
puts it: “Aidos was the virtue of caring for the philos against the xenos; conversely, 
friends owed the duty of mutual care and respect to one another.”150   
                                                
147 One possible way of squaring this circle might be for Athens to relinquish its self-interest and mastery 
by force and offering leadership as opposed to tyranny.  Were this the case, we might imagine an 
Atheninan led Greek alliance governed by a sense of mutual purpose and respect. 
148 Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and Social Order: 40-44. 
149 Emile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society, trans. Elizabeth Plamer (Coral Gables: 
University of Miami Press, 1973), 277. 
150 Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and Social Order: 41-42. 
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Though the love of kinship was a natural basis for tribal states, it began to brake 
down when members of different tribes came into contact with each other through 
communication and transportation.  The love of kinship was unable to manage the 
difficult interactions between disparate tribal communities.  The Homeric world 
attempted to solve this problem by extending the expectation of care of the philos to the 
xenos.  For example, the host had the duty of treating his guests like friends, even though 
he was a stranger. The most infamous violation of this guest-friend relationship was 
Paris’ abduction of Helen, while he was a guest of Helen’s husband Menelaus.151 When 
the extension of philia failed in the relation of tribal states, war ensued, and this war 
ended up spawning power politics.152  The politics of power becomes the rule in a world 
of strangers and begins where the bonds of friendship and kinship end.  Historically, the 
rise of power politics is coincident with the increase in the size of ancient Greek polis.  
As they became too big to be held together by bonds of friendship and kin, cities began to 
include too many people, who were, by the old standard of friendship, merely strangers.  
Hence the new ideal of power and pleonexia began to replace the old ideal of brotherly 
love and mutual care, and Callicles personifies this new ideal. 
Returning to the Gorgias, Callicles exemplifies the self-indulgence of the new 
generation by bursting onto the scene in a manner akin to Thrasymachus’ famous 
entrance in the Republic.  As Eric Voeglin notes, “the battle has now reached the real 
enemy, the public representative of the corrupt order.”153   While Gorgias appeared to be 
merely absorbed in the technical aspects of the art of rhetoric, and Polus took this one 
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step further, emphasizing the link between rhetoric and political power, Callicles is far 
more of a hedonist.  Indeed, Callicles’ name (“famed for visible excellence”) may itself 
support the idea that he stands for the overheated desire and corruption of imperial 
Athens.  The character Callicles has long puzzled commentators.  Since nearly all of 
Plato’s dramatis personae were real people, some, like Dodds, believe Callicles to have 
been an actual person.154  While it is undoubtedly true that Plato rarely invents his 
characters, he does invent them from time to time—take, for example, Diotima in the 
Symposium.  Other scholars argue that Callicles is Plato’s mouthpiece for Critias, one of 
the leaders of the Thirty that staged a coup against the democratic government of Athens 
and who was said to have personally plotted some of its most reprehensible actions—
murders, confiscations, banishments, and the mass slaughter of the citizens of Eleusis.155  
Following Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, Critias was perhaps the dominant 
person in Athens and used his power to execute his rivals and seize their wealth. Yet, his 
tyranny was relatively short-lived (though too long for his victims), and he was killed by 
Thrasybulus less than a year after taking power.  Callicles’ views are quite similar to 
those of Critias, and it is noteworthy that Critias authored a play entitled Rhadamanthys 
given the large role Rhadamanthys plays in Socrates’ closing myth.  Plato is perhaps 
inviting us to make this identification.  Those who consider Callicles a stand-in for 
Critias note that Critias’ actions and end may, for Plato, indicate to us that Calliclean 
doctrine is repugnant to civilized life as well as being effective only in the very short-
term.156        
                                                
154 Plato, Gorgias: A Revised Text with Notes and Commentary: 12.  Dodds argues that Plato does not 
introduce fictional characters.  
155 See Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3-4 and Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and 
other Socratics  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 108-11. 
156 In the Seventh Letter, Plato indicates that the Critias affair was influential in turning him away from a 
life of politics. 
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Callicles begins by accusing Socrates of demagoguery—specifically, exploiting 
the difference between nature (phusis) and convention (nomos), while pretending to seek 
the truth.  According to Callicles, nature and convention are almost always in opposition, 
and he proceeds to describe a state of nature opposed to convention.  In doing so, 
Callicles begins (or at least participates in) the long tradition in political philosophy of 
appealing to natural values (often arrived at through thought-experiments about the “state 
of nature”) to generate normative standards.157  Callicles tills the soil here by arguing that 
only a “slave,” for whom death is preferable to life, naturally suffers injustice, since he is 
“abused and can’t protect himself or anyone else he cares about”—i.e., “real men” don’t 
suffer injustice by nature (483a-b).  He further claims that it is these “slaves”—“the weak 
and the many”—who create human laws and norms out of the fear that they cannot 
compete with the more powerful under the laws of nature.  So they proceed to establish 
laws that institutionally “assign praise and blame within themselves and their own 
advantage in mind” (483c).  By doing this, they attempt to sideline those who are 
naturally more powerful in order to artificially create a condition of equality among men 
by saying “that getting more than one’s share is ‘shameful’ and ‘unjust’” and declaring it 
unlawful (483c). 
Callicles’ argument here is blasphemously anti-democratic.  Whereas Socrates 
criticized the art of rhetoric for flattering public opinion and corrupting it against its true 
best interests, he did not argue against nomos itself—only that the requirement of any 
true nomos is governing with the common good or health of the polis in mind.   Callicles, 
on the other hand, rejects all notions of equality and justice based on nomos (though, as 
we shall see, it gets more complicated for him later when he characterizes the law of 
                                                
157 Callicles reverses Greek naturalist approaches to normative standards.  Instead of than using nature to 
determine what is, and then generate normative standards to avoid or mitigate the bad effects that 
sometimes accompany nature, Callicles identifies what is with what ought to be. 
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nature as a nomos).  For him, nature itself reveals that it is just for the better to have more 
than the worse and the stronger to have more than the weaker.  To illustrate this natural 
right, Callicles uses two examples from the great kings of Persia: Xerxes and Darius—
though he says there are “countless other such examples” (483e). Yet, as some 
commentators point out, these examples are puzzling because, of the “countless” 
examples he could have chosen, Callicles chooses two that are failures.  Xerxes’ invasion 
of Greece, with hordes of troops, culminated in the great Athenian victory at Marathon.  
And Darius’ invasion of Scythia similarly ended in utter defeat.  These invasions resulted 
in the deaths of tens of thousands of Xerxes and Darius’ own people. 
Callicles argues that these actions (and presumably the “countless others” as well) 
were conducted “in accordance with the nature of what’s just—yes, by Zeus, in 
accordance with the law of nature” (483e).158   This is the first known use of this phrase 
in literature.  By “law of nature,” Callicles means that ideas of equality, nobility, and 
justice are nothing other than—to borrow imagery from the Republic—chains designed to 
restrain the best and strongest individuals.  Though Plato saves this imagery for the 
Republic’s cave, the point is the same.  Callicles laments that the best and most powerful 
youths are ensnared like lion cubs and tamed by “charms and incantations” until they 
slavishly uphold the ideal of human equality.  But Callicles believes that if a sufficiently 
powerful man breaks the chains of convention, he will “rise up and be revealed as our 
master” (484a).  Anticipating Nietzsche, such a superman will trample men’s laws, 
                                                
158 The two formulations are interesting.  Callicles is apparently so excited (hence the curse “by Zeus”) that 
he extends his first claim “the nature of what’s just” to a nomos—the law or convention of nature. It is 
likely that Callicles intends this to be an interesting rhetorical juxtaposition or paradox.  Dodds helpfully 
adds that: “Callicles’ coinage is not to be confused with ‘natural law’ in the Stoic sense…or with the 
modern scientist’s ‘laws of Nature,’ which are simply observed uniformities.  Callicles’ ‘laws of Nature’ is 
not a generalization about Nature but a rule of conduct on the analogy of ‘natural behavior.”  Plato, 
Gorgias: A Revised Text with Notes and Commentary: 260-61.    
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conventions, and habits that violate nature, and “the justice of nature” will shine forth 
(484a-b). 
This radicalization of Gorgias’ teaching—Callicles’ rhetor-king—shows what, for 
Plato, occurs in the second generation of sophistic rhetoricians.  Unsurprisingly, it is here 
that Callicles famously attempts to shame Socrates and, in so doing, reveals his own 
intemperance.  Callicles says that Socrates will acknowledge the “truth of the matter,” as 
soon as he sets philosophy aside and moves on to more important things.  Callicles here 
inverts the hierarchy of the Republic.  In his upside-down world, philosophy is the lowest 
stage on an intellectual ladder that culminates in the truth of natural tyranny.  Though 
Callicles concedes that philosophy is a “delightful” thing in moderation and when one is 
young, he warns Socrates against its “undoing of mankind” (484c-d).  For, when one 
engages in philosophy as an adult, one loses the capacity to gain experience in the laws 
and practices of the city, in the speeches one must make in private and public associations 
with fellow citizens, in the pleasures and appetites, and “the ways of human beings 
altogether” (484e). 
For Callicles, then, men become mature when they become as unjust, irrational, 
and power-driven as he believes is reflected in nature herself.   In this respect, he mirrors 
one of the most infamous demagogues in ancient Greece, Cleon (“the most violent” 
Athenian) who, during his famous debate with Diodotus over the punishment of the 
Mytileneans in the History, castigated the Athenians for preferring intelligence over force 
and a concomitant tendency to give in to things incompatible with empire: “pity, 
enjoyment of speeches and evenhandedness.”159  According to Cleon’s view, the making 
of unreasonable demands on reality was nothing other than begging for fortune to deliver 
                                                
159 Thucydides 3.40. 
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a pounding.  The idea of equality, condemned by Callicles, is similarly understood by 
Cleon as illusory—a goal that only the naïve attempt to impose on the world.  Cleon and 
Callicles are incapable of seeing that, rather than suppressing strong souls, noble ideas 
serve to remind us of the best things human beings are capable of. 
Polus and Callicles’ hubristic position has the further consequence of 
undermining the natural or appropriate civic limits on rhetoric and politics recognized by 
Gorgias. After all, they both preach—very loudly—the benefit and superiority of 
injustice, in contrast to Gorgias’ explicit commitment to teach justice to his students.  I 
believe that Callicles’ intemperate desire for glory and dominance is meant to reflect the 
accelerated pace of Athenian imperialism in the later generation.  This quickening 
generated excesses of speech and hubristic deeds such as: the mass execution and 
enslavement at Scione, the slaughter at Melos, and the subsequent Sicilian Expedition 
that resulted in a disaster for Athens and the permanent loss of autonomy for Gorgias’ 
own Leontini.  For Plato, the combination of Gorgian agnosticism with respect to reality 
(or being),160 and the fevered climate of wartime Athens, with its exposure to and 
participation in spectacles of moral depravity so acutely depicted by Thucydides, 
generated the philosophy of greed and power that ultimately led to the misery of the polis 
and every individual within it.  Note, however, that for Plato the intellectual basis for the 
subsequent Athenian ethos of immorality can be traced to the implications of Gorgias’ 
teaching—all that was needed was famine, plague and war to break down the previous 
understandings that gave meaning and stability to life and replace them with a new one.  
Returning to the dialogue, Socrates asks Callicles how Pindar (the professional 
praise-singer if ever there was one) and he would explain justice according to nature.  
                                                
160 See his thoroughgoing negative beliefs in On Not Being discussed above and in Woodruff, "Rhetoric 
and Relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias," 305-06. 
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Socrates suggests that Callicles’ position is that the superior should forcibly take away 
the property of the inferior, that the better should rule the worse, and sums them up as 
saying that the strong violently bear away the property of the weaker, and the worthy get 
more than the less worthy.  After confirming that this is still Callicles’ position, Socrates 
asks him if he considers the same man to be both “better” and “stronger.”  In light of 
Callicles’ earlier thesis about the natural right of the great powers to bully weaker states 
(reminiscent but, as we shall see, not identical to the position taken by the Athenians in 
the Melian Dialogue), Socrates wonders if “strength,” “superiority,” and “better” are for 
Callicles’ the same thing, and whether being better or worse is nothing other than an 
empirical question of physical power (488b-d).  Once Callicles states that all three are the 
same, Socrates asks him whether the many are stronger than the one since, as Callicles 
previously argued, they are the ones who impose the laws.  Callicles agrees to this, only 
to then be asked whether, since the many are stronger, their laws are therefore superior 
and “admirable (kalon) by nature” (488e-489a).  Socrates then asks Callicles if the many 
observe the rule that it is just to have equality and that doing injustice is shameful.  After 
Callicles reluctantly admits that the many do observe this rule or view, Socrates points 
out that by Callicles’ own logic, pursuing equality and the shame of doing injustice is not 
merely convention, but is also true by nature (489b-c). 
It is important to notice that Socrates is not simply showing his intellectual 
superiority to Callicles here.  Rather, he is trying to show the naturalness or inherent 
internal-ness of shame, which Callicles claims to transcend by labeling it a failure to 
understand the nomos/phusis distinction.  That is, when Callicles accuses Polus and 
Gorgias of succumbing to shame, he claims that the emotion of shame is externally 
imposed and, therefore, cannot affect someone who understands its mere conventionality.  
But Callicles now appears to feel shame himself.  Richard McKim makes this point 
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exceptionally clear: “our shame about vice is a natural sign that deep down we prefer 
virtue.  What Callicles calls our ‘natural’ beliefs represent for Socrates the artificial 
virtues imposed upon us from without by such corrupting influences as a Gorgianic 
rhetorical education.”161  Paul Woodruff refers to this “Socratic shame” as “solipsized 
shame”—described as “the full awareness that one has betrayed values that are entirely 
one’s own.”162  If Gorgias represents the sophistic withdrawal into rhetorical technique, 
the brutal circumstances of the war induce men like Callicles to give up trying to 
manipulate nomos, using those same rhetorical techniques to convince themselves of the 
truth of choosing force and injustice without shame as an end in itself. 
Socrates now encourages Callicles to continue speaking frankly so that they can 
together determine the best way to live.  Callicles claims that the life of virtue consists of 
unbridled desire, letting appetites grow as large as possible and fulfilling them in every 
possible way.   Socrates then asks whether it is mistaken to characterize those who need 
nothing as happy.  Callicles rejects this opinion out of hand, because “in that case stones 
and corpses would be happiest” (492e).  As a matter of plausibility, Callicles’ theory of 
instant gratification is obviously incomplete, since it fails to account for things such as 
delayed gratification.  Socrates immediately points out the strangeness of Callicles’ view.  
To adequately maintain a constant flow of expanding desires and their satisfaction would 
require that the soul be a “leaky jar” in constant need of replenishment, and that this kind 
of human being would lead the life of a charadrios, a bird that excretes while it eats.163  
Put differently, Callicles’ ideal human’s appetites would be as excessive, harmful, and 
                                                
161 Richard McKim, "Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias," in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. 
Charles L. Griswold (New York: Routledge, 1988), 39.  
162 Paul Woodruff, "Socrates and the Irrational," in Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy, ed. 
Nicholas D. Smith and Paul Woodruff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 144. 
163 Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 154. 
 92 
wasteful as his exertions to satisfy them would be long, dangerous, and arduous.  Arlene 
Saxonhouse applies the parable of the leaky jar to the city as well as the individual soul.  
She observes that because “filling the city is like filling the leaky jar…(Athens) can never 
be fully satisfied.”164  This is why when Callicles mentions the storied names of 
Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles as men who improved the Athenians, 
Socrates responds that this could only be the case if virtue were synonymous with 
satisfying desires (one’s own as well as others).165   
In stark contrast with Callicles, Socrates argues that the pursuit of pleasure in 
itself cannot organize a life in such a way to generate happy flourishing (eudaimonia).  
Callicles’ life of pleasure is a life without organization, which itself requires self-rule:  
It looks as though anyone who wants to be happy must seek out and practice self-
discipline, and beat as hasty a retreat as possible away from self-indulgence.  The 
best course would be for him to see to it that he never had to be restrained, but if 
he or anyone close to him (whether that’s and individual person or a whole 
community) does ever need it, then he must let justice and restraint be imposed, or 
else forfeit happiness….We should devote all our own and our community’s 
energies towards ensuring the presence of justice and self-discipline, and so 
guaranteeing happiness….We shouldn’t refuse to restrain our desires, because 
that condemns us to a life of endlessly trying to satisfy them.  And this is the life 
of a predatory outlaw. (507c-e) 
For Socrates, a life devoted to pleasure fulfillment is a mindless life—organized (if one 
can call it this) around what he will call in the Republic the non-rational part of our being.  
Socrates objects to Callicles’ account on the ground that it makes the very good that is 
sought after (pleasure) dependent on the removal of a pain in order to bring the pleasure 
into being.  In other words, pleasure itself depends on a prior depravation or pain.  Thus, 
                                                
164 Arlene Saxonhouse, "An Unspoken Theme in Plato's Gorgias: War," Interpretation 11, no. 2 (1983): 
166. 
165 I agree with Stauffer that this exchange indicates that Callicles believes, with Pericles, that the 
underlying glory of Athens is more important than improving the souls of the Athenians. Stauffer, The 
Unity of Plato's Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life: 129. 
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the pleasure of eating requires one to be hungry and the pleasure of scratching requires an 
itch.    And, for Socrates, this cannot be enough to create a happy life.  Instead, the happy 
life is essentially about rule, and requires that reason control and organize the non-
rational parts of our being.  Pleasure cannot be a final end in itself that amounts to 
happiness.  This is because, for Socrates, happiness is discovered during the course of an 
entire life, unlike pleasure which cannot coexist with pain.  Searching for pleasure 
inevitably falls short of what is required to achieve happiness over the course of one’s 
whole life (494b-497a).166  Furthermore, if satisfying our desire for pleasure is the sole 
criteria for happiness, how can we understand our admiration for the traditional virtues, 
which typically demand self-sacrifice or self-rule?  For example, we shun cowards, 
even—perhaps especially—when they achieve more pleasure than the courageous.  The 
pursuit of pleasure as a normative standard cannot, by itself, generate this stance.  This is 
why Socrates believes that the life of the temperate man is both blessed and happy and 
anyone who desires happiness should flee from intemperance.  In his opinion, one must 
consistently strive to direct all the aspects of one’s life—as well as the goals of one’s 
polis—toward happiness through temperance and justice. The ethos of Callicles is, 
according to Socrates, the path of akolasia—“the life of a marauder” (507c-e). 
This is an essential point and worth pausing over.  The life of a marauder, which 
applies equally to the polis as to an individual soul, is so powerfully damaging because it 
alienates us from ourselves and from others.  Socrates tries to show Callicles that such a 
man could never be “dear to another man or to a god” because he is unable to partner 
with others—to live in common or community (koinonia).  And, as we saw in our earlier 
discussion of philia, where there is no community there can be no friendship.  According 
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was one of long-term gratification.  
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to Socrates, then, the intemperate soul cannot become friends with gods or men because 
there is no friendship within his own soul—only a frenzied and insatiable tyranny of 
desire.  
We are now in a position to see how Socrates’ condemnation of Callicles’ 
encomium to the life of pleonexia is nothing less than the severest possible attack on fifth 
century Athenian leadership.  The ongoing war with Persia led to the steady erosion of 
morals and a growing opportunism justified on the basis of necessity (ananke)—all the 
while making possible the great economic and cultural progress that led to the building of 
the Acropolis, and Pericles’ proud proclamation of Athens as the “school of Hellas” 
(2.41).   In this sense, there is substantial similarity between the imperialist Athenian 
regime and the rule of Archelaus, with its combination of authoritarianism and high 
culture.  During this time, Athens’ former allies in the Persian War irrevocably became 
tribute-paying members of an Athenian Empire from which attempts to escape were met 
with violence.  As we saw in Chapter Two, the apotheosis of this view is voiced in the 
Melian Dialogue, where the Athenians state to the much weaker Melians that: “justice is 
what is decided when equal forces are opposed, but when one side is stronger, it gets as 
much as it can, and the weak must accept that” (5.89).167 
This bleak vision of the world posits both human beings and cities as naturally 
existing in a state of war.  The implication of this view is that law is nothing more than 
convention and is supported by nothing other than the threat of violence.  Therefore, the 
wise and prudent recognize that the highest values in these circumstances are security and 
survival and it is quite easy to make moral compromises when the lives of one’s philoi 
are at stake.  This is why Socrates cautions Callicles against trying to emulate the 
                                                
167 Here I combine Lattimore and Woodruff’s translation to make the point more clearly. 
 95 
Athenian regime for the sake of gaining power.  Socrates likens this attempt to the 
Thessalian witches, who were reputed to gain a power sufficient to cause an eclipse by 
killing a loved one.  Similarly, Callicles is told to be careful what he wishes for: it will 
not profit him to gain power over the polis at “the cost of what we hold most dear” 
(513b).  Socrates then argues that the job of rulers, properly understood, should be to tend 
or “care for” the polis and its citizenry in such a way to make them “as good as possible” 
(513d-e).   
If this is the true purpose of the rulers, the question of their authority and 
credentials becomes critically important.  How can prospective rulers demonstrate their 
competence in areas they know little about?  Socrates uses the example of building 
projects to make his point.  When it comes to major works of construction, he suggests 
that their advocates present the people with evidence of having successfully completed 
these kinds of projects in their private capacity (514a-515b).  This is not only a matter of 
suitability; it is also a serious question of resource allocation and is another indictment of 
the Athenian regime.  The analogy to the war is simply this: successful leadership in 
times of war implies having experience or knowing whether or not it is necessary or wise 
to go to war in the first place.  The most obvious example of this distinction can be seen 
in the debate over the Sicilian Expedition.  While Thucydides suggests that Alcibiades 
was probably the most competent to lead the expedition, he was—from a Socratic 
perspective—among the least competent to care for the interests of the polis when the 
question was the necessity of war.  Thucydides describes Alcibiades’ motives for the 
Sicilian Expedition as follows: 
Alcibiades made the most spirited case for the expedition partly out of his desire 
to cross Nicias (with whom he had been at odds on other points of 
state)…Mainly, however, it was because he wanted to have a command and 
hoped to be the man who would take both Sicily and Carthage for Athens, and, 
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with success, to increase his own personal wealth and glory.  Because he was 
highly esteemed by the citizens, he had desires that were too vast for his actual 
estate to support…Later on this was one of the main causes for the destruction of 
Athens. (6.15) 
Ironically, Nicias, who was among the least competent to lead the expedition, was 
probably more competent (though rhetorically challenged) to advise the polis on the 
necessity of war: “for he thought the city had made the wrong decision to take on the 
conquest of all Sicily—an enormous task—on a slight and specious pretext.  So he came 
forward with the intention of changing their minds, and gave this advice to the 
Athenians” (6.8). 
Seen in this context, it is immediately obvious why it is so important for Socrates 
that questions regarding competence, prudence and maturity be asked of prospective 
rulers.  In its absence, considerations such as appearance, wealth, political connections, 
family history, and sheer demagogic charm will trump temperance.  As we shall see in 
the Republic, Socrates argues that the best rulers will be among those most hesitant to 
rule, and that people with private virtue will be best suited to serve as rulers because they 
will at least be able to see the folly of hubristic projects like the Sicilian Expedition that 
seduce citizens with avarice and greed away from justice and temperance.  This, of 
course, is why Socrates criticizes Athens’ canon of past leaders: Miltiades, Themistocles, 
Cimon, and Pericles.  Socrates specifically indicts Pericles for making the Athenians wild 
and reckless: “A man like that who cared for donkeys or horses or cattle would at least 
look bad if he showed these animals kicking, butting, and biting him because of their 
wildness, when they had been doing none of these things when he took them over” 
(516b).  While we might argue that, in fact, the Athenians regretted their anger at Pericles 
by restoring him to office before his untimely death, it is nevertheless true that he failed 
to curb their hubris and, after his death, left them with a regime that “managed the state 
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for their private ambition and private gain, to the detriment of themselves and their allies” 
(2.65).   
Socrates saves his most damning indictment for last: that Athens’ great leaders 
turned a free people into a slavish mob focused on appearances and incapable of ruling 
(or even knowing) themselves.  The ignorant many end up praising the very bakers and 
wine merchants who enable them to grow lethargic and diseased (518c-e).  However, 
Socrates points out that, rather than blame those who truly cause the disease, the ignorant 
will erroneously indict those who happen to rule when the symptoms become present and 
painful.  He scolds Callicles for singing the praises of those: 
who threw parties for these people [the Athenians], and who feasted them lavishly 
with what they had an appetite for. And they say that they have made the city 
great! But that the city is swollen and festering, thanks to those early leaders, that 
they don’t notice.  For they filled the city with harbors and dockyards, walls, and 
tribute payments and such trash as that, but did so without justice and self-control.  
(519a)   
The Gorgias concludes with what Socrates says Callicles will consider a myth 
(mythos), but that he considers a “fine account” (logos) of judgment.  The myth/account 
incorporates the various positions Socrates has defended during the course of the 
dialogue.   According to it, men will no longer be judged by false appearance, rhetoric, or 
flattery because everyone at this court (judges included) will be naked and, therefore, 
immune to the seduction of appearance.  The judges will see only the souls of the dead, 
and judge them with unfiltered eyes (which is why they are naked as well). Interestingly, 
the judge who would deal with the Athenians, Aeacus, was the fabled king of Aegina, the 
hereditary enemy of Athens.  It is also noteworthy that Minos, another great Athenian 
foe, will hear appeals of Aeacus’ ruling.  This would be as concerning to citizens of 
imperial Athens as it is irrelevant to Socrates.  In a manner somewhat akin to John 
Rawls’ original position, Socrates’ decision procedure focuses attention squarely on the 
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moral character of the soul appearing before the judges.  Judgments become largely self-
evident; just as the body of a corpse retains the physical damage it had sustained while 
alive, the souls of the dead retain the records of the good and evil deeds they performed 
during their time on earth.  
Through his myth or account, Socrates effectively practices “the true political 
art,” by restoring knowledge to the individual soul (521d).  Like medicine, which restores 
health to the sick, Socratic dialectic is meant to be the cure to the corrupting disease of 
pleonexia.  For Socrates, there is no way to escape the consequences of our injustices if 
we want to live well—sooner or later we must eventually look inward and come to grips 
with the consequences of our offences.  Likewise, Athens will have to look inward to 
purge herself of the predatory spirit, destructive glory, and pleonectic imperialism of 
Cimon and Pericles.  She will no longer be preoccupied with power, accumulation, and 
appearance—all part of the warlike worldview that has come to plague her and led her 
citizens to see the world as a zero-sum game that requires a dominant strategy of 
exploitation.  Socrates argues that what she will lose in pride, tribute, and trade, she will 
gain in self-understanding.   
As we’ve observed, Callicles uses language strikingly similar to that of 
Thucydides’ Athenian Ambassadors at Melos.  The Ambassadors, for example, use the 
phrase ou an krate archein, “to rule whomever one exceeds in strength,” while Callicles 
uses ton kreitto tou hettonos archein, “that the stronger rule the weaker” (5.105, 483d). 
By using the same or similar expressions, Plato may be deliberately echoing the Melian 
Dialogue.168  However, the kinship between the two passages has, I believe, led to a 
misunderstanding of the Melian Dialogue.  In order to see the relevant differences, it is 
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phusis (nature), both distinguish between two forms of shame or dishonor, and both present the same 
theory of power that is supposed to justify certain forms of domination.    
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useful to reflect first upon the primary intentions of the speakers in each case.  Let us 
briefly re-examine each of the arguments from this perspective.   
I think it is fair to say that Callicles’ goal in the dialogue is to justify certain kinds 
of actions which—as Polus has granted earlier—to the average Greek appear to be 
shameful.  In order to achieve his goal, Callicles introduces a sharp distinction between 
phusis and nomos which allows him to classify the same action as shameful under one of 
these headings, but not under the other one, and vice versa.  Thus, in his opinion, 
pleonexia, “graspingness or a desire to have more than one’s proper share” of wealth and 
power, is shameful and unjust according to convention (nomos), but just according to 
nature (phusis).  The essence of Callicles’ argument is that:  
this is what’s admirable and just by nature—and I’ll say it to you now with all 
frankness—that the man who’ll live correctly ought to allow his own appetites to 
get as large as possible and not restrain them.  And when they are as large as 
possible, he ought to be competent to devote himself to them by virtue of his 
bravery and intelligence, and to fill them with whatever he may have an appetite 
for at the time. (491e-492a)  
As we’ve seen, Callicles claims that law (nomos) is an unnatural constraint 
promoted by the weak, who fear the power and mastery of the strong.  Hence, it is not 
just according to nature for the strong man to abide by law’s constraints on his natural 
power.  According to Callicles, the strong man should allow his desires to continually 
expand and to increase his power to such an extent as he can fulfill them.  As a result, 
Callicles argues that desire and power must be congruent in order for the pleonectic man 
to be successful.  For Callicles, the happiest man is the successful grasping tyrant, whose 
enormous power is capable of gratifying the largest number of desires (particularly 
material desires).  He explains his understanding of pleonexia using the examples of 
Xerxes and Darius which he believes cut to the heart of his teaching of natural justice. As 
we discussed, Callicles considers imperialistic invasion as the prime example of the 
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natural law that the superior should rule over the inferior.  He goes on to add the example 
of Heracles, who according to Pindar, “drove off Geryon’s cattle, even though he hadn’t 
paid for them and Geryon hadn’t given them to him, on the ground that this is what’s just 
by nature, and that cattle and all the other possessions of those who are worse and inferior 
belong to the one who’s better and superior” (484b-c).  Here Callicles says that natural 
law dictates that the stronger man should use his greater power to gratify his desire to 
possess, at the expense of the weaker and, therefore, at the expense of conventional 
justice.  As Roslyn Weiss puts it: “in Callicles’ twisted view, the oxen actually belonged 
to Heracles (so that he is not really stealing them), because the possessions of the inferior 
and weaker belong to the superior and stronger.”169   
Callicles then goes on to “coin a new and paradoxical phrase, as nai ma dia 
indicates,” the phrase namely kata nomon ge ton tes phuseos, “according to the nomos of 
nature” (483e).170  This nomos he contrasts with the norms we enact which require “the 
best and most powerful among us” to acknowledge that the just and noble thing is 
equality, and to behave accordingly.  The reference to the nomos of nature points to a 
different set of norms and thus seems to mark a transition from the factual, customary 
behavior of animals and men to a normative code based upon it.  In the human domain 
there is, of course, a necessary transition from a factual starting point (is) to normative 
results (ought).  Every community has certain customs and manners of behaving.  An 
anthropologist may describe these customs in a roughly neutral way, but the community 
itself not only knows those customs, it also approves some of them and rejects others and 
expects its members to abide by the former.  Thus, the approved way individuals actually 
                                                
169 Roslyn Weiss, "Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Plato's Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94. 
170 Plato, Gorgias: A Revised Text with Notes and Commentary. 
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behave becomes the way they and others ought to behave.  Custom becomes law if and 
when it is deemed good by the community.  Therefore, to act according to sanctioned 
custom is to act in the lawful, justified way.  Callicles here makes the move of going 
from unqualified custom to approved, sanctioned custom, or law.  Nature customarily 
behaves in a certain way and thus, he holds, makes manifest that it is just to behave that 
way.  And, indeed, according to Callicles, the rights of the stronger are grounded in 
nature and these rights justify the particular kinds of domination he speculates about—for 
example, what we could expect to see from someone endowed with a strong nature, 
capable of reducing us to slavery and establishing himself as “our lord and master.”  His 
might would make his right. 
In the ensuing debate, Socrates hones in on the nature of Callicles’ desire, forcing 
him (and us) to see that his lust for power is merely instrumental.  What Callicles really 
desires are the material possessions and pleasures that power brings.  Specifically, 
Callicles does not really want more desires and the power to fulfill them, but rather wants 
to get more material possessions than he currently has.  According to Socrates, Callicles’ 
arguments are vacuous—in spite of his lofty rhetoric about the law of nature and rule of 
the stronger he is at bottom nothing other than an exceptionally greedy materialist. This is 
why Socrates is able to so effectively undermine and enrage Callicles by presenting the 
life devoted to pleonexia as no different from the life of the catamite (494e).  By 
extension, Socrates advances the proposition that the position of the Athenian 
Ambassadors at Melos is similarly suspect (at least philosophically) and, at root, nothing 
more than shameful greed.171    
                                                
171 Plato gives us some evidence that Thrasymachus and Callicles’ views were widespread in Athens.  In 
Book II of the Republic, Glaucon says that while he still believes that the just life is superior to the unjust 
life, his support may be wavering since his ears “are deafened listening to Thrasymachus and countless 
others” (358c).  Many of the Athenian elite, he suggests, have come to not only embrace the life of greed 
but to elevate it as a philosophic and cultural ideal.  Thucydides’ History provides further proof, illustrating 
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Unlike Callicles and Socrates in the Gorgias, in the Melian Dialogue we find the 
Athenians and the Melians not just hypothesizing about a kind of domination that would 
arise if someone were born with a “strong nature.”  The Athenians have already landed 
troops on Melos and are about to begin siege operations to reduce the city to ruin.  The 
basic Athenian goal in the dialogue, then, is to undermine the will of the Melians to 
resist.  This military goal will not necessarily be achieved by providing justification for 
Athenian actions.  Paradoxically, this would (in their view) weaken them.  What, then, is 
the role of the principle that might makes right at Melos?  Recall that early in the Melian 
Dialogue, the Athenians declare that they will not bring forth any arguments based on 
justice.  Particular examples of what they will not say include: that they rule justly 
because they defeated the Persians, and that they have come to revenge an injustice done 
to them.  They ask in return that the Melians refrain from arguing that (though they were 
originally Spartan colonists) they did not join the Peloponnesian League or that they have 
done the Athenians no injustice (5.89). 
It is interesting that the first argument, which the Athenians refrain from using is 
simply invalid.  It does not follow that because the Athenians were the greatest military 
force behind the Greek victory over the Persians sixty years ago that they now have a 
right to dominate other cities.  And the Athenians’ second argument is, if not invalid, at 
least unsound.  It is very unlikely that the Melians ever staged an attack on Athenian 
territory (Thucydides certainly says nothing to this effect).  Hence, the second Melian 
argument—that they have done the Athenians no wrong—is both sound and valid.  
Finally, the first Melian argument was perhaps sound given the nomos of the times.  The 
Dorian descent of the Melians probably did imply that they would have been justified in 
                                                                                                                                            
how Athenians collectively (and proudly) identify themselves with their own pleonexia, believing that they 
are behaving in accordance with a time-honored principle of self-interest in international relations.  For 
Thucydides, pleonexia is a primal impulse of nature encouraged by culture. 
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joining the Peloponnesian League.  Since they did not join it, Athenian aggression is 
therefore unjustifiable. 
If this analysis is correct, the Athenians have much to lose and nothing to gain if 
the debate at Melos is conducted in terms of rights, justice, and/or the nomos of the times.  
Their case would be quite weak on all three counts.  However, they do not therefore 
argue, like Callicles, that these are merely conventional notions that they counter with a 
law of nature or the right of the stronger.  They do not, like Callicles, put forth two 
different understandings of justice.  Rather, they sharply distinguish between justice, on 
the one hand, and advantage, expediency, or self interest on the other.  Thus, there is here 
no attempt by the Athenians to justify what they threaten to do to the Melians.  They 
simply say that it would be mutually advantageous for the Melians to surrender.  For the 
Athenians, expediency should rule the day. 
When the Melians propose neutrality, the Athenians concede that though any city 
may have “legal arguments” for neutrality (or the right to remain neutral), the neutrality 
of any city—and especially weak ones located on islands—actually harms Athenian 
interests.  When the Melians (finally) confess their trust in divine favor and Spartan 
assistance, the Athenians expose their underlying theory of power.  They do not say, like 
Callicles, that it is just for the stronger to rule the weaker—they say that justice is 
irrelevant (5.89).  In its place, they assert that “nature always compels” both gods (as far 
as they can tell) and men to always rule if they happen to be stronger.  It is unclear 
whether this principle necessarily carries with it any normative force, or whether it 
purports to be purely descriptive: power dictates—there is no room for debate and no 
room for normative law.   For their part, it seems that the Athenians believe it to be 
descriptive, since they hasten to add that this principle is independent of any agency.  
There appears to be no choice in the matter.  Their reference to an “innate compulsion” 
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may not serve as an attempt to justify their actions, but instead to explain why this “has 
always been obvious” (5.105). 
The Athenians claim that this is a nomos.  But does this particular nomos carry 
with it any normative force?  The Athenians say explicitly that they had no part in its 
enactment and in fact were not the first to embrace it—it is a law of nature just like the 
laws of physics.  This nomos is apparently nothing other than the custom or usual 
behavior of gods and men in the past, the present, and for all eternity.  Even the Melians 
would, according to the Athenians, follow this practice were they sufficiently strong.  
Whether they ought to follow it is simply irrelevant.  No contrast is drawn here between 
phusis and nomos—both are descriptive concepts from which no transition is made to a 
normative concept like justice.172  The Athenians have no desire to claim that what they 
are doing is just or right, perhaps since it would be grossly inconsistent with their own 
earlier rules for the debate.  They simply wish to warn the Melians about what happens in 
the real world, a world in which moral notions are nothing more than tantalizing yet 
illusory words that lead people to their own destruction (as we saw earlier at Corcyra).173  
This, then, is what the Athenians argue.  But is their description of the “real world” 
accurate?  Is what they say in fact true?     
The basic Athenian position is that in any conflict between un-equals, the stronger 
party rules the weaker.  To show this to be false, we need to find (in the pages of 
Thucydides or elsewhere) an instance where a stronger party confronts a weaker one but 
nevertheless allows the weaker party to remain neutral.  The Athenians refuse to allow 
this as a matter of argument (not as a matter of empirics—since they did allow some 
island cities to remain neutral).  Rather, they insist that the only reason a weaker party 
                                                
172 Compare 5.102 with 3.45.3, 3.45.7, 3.84.2, and 2.53.4. 
173 In my view, it remains an open question to what extent the Athenians sincerely believe this. 
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could remain neutral would be due to its power and, therefore, that the stronger power 
was not as strong as it appeared.  But if this is so, then the only way to really determine 
power is by domination.  There is no independent way of determining power. 
If the foregoing account of the positions of Callicles and of the Athenian 
Ambassadors is correct—namely that Callicles advances a normative theory while the 
Athenian Ambassadors make a descriptive claim, it follows that undermining these 
doctrines require fundamentally different approaches.  And refuting them is an urgent 
task for anyone wishing to resist political actions taken in their name.174  Let us briefly 
look at how this might be done. 
As we’ve seen, Socrates ultimately undermines Callicles because Callicles is 
willing to make further normative and evaluative claims, especially the claim that the 
indiscriminate enjoyment of pleasure constitutes happiness (491e-492c). This allows 
Socrates to show that there are serious inconsistencies in Callicles’ value system.  For 
example, his claim that no one can hope to stay in power in a city like Athens while at the 
same time enjoying the life of the catamite or enjoying the pleasures of the coward when 
he sees the enemy troops retreating (494b-495a; 497d-499b).  Since there is no direct 
evidence that counts, on its own and by itself, against a normative or evaluative claim, 
Socrates’ strategy seems sound.  We mentioned the deliberate irony on Plato’s part by 
having Callicles cite Darius and Xerxes as evidence for the principle that it is right for the 
strong to rule the weak, since Darius came close to complete disaster at the Danube while 
                                                
174 The Athenian speakers at Sparta say that Athens acquired its empire for the “three greatest” reasons: 
fear, honor, and profit.  These speakers candidly acknowledge that Athens is motivated by the desire for 
profit in maintaining its empire and in pursuing further conquests.  This understanding of greed is justified 
by the Athenians’ perception of their empire as a possession and by their belief that their former allies—
forcefully brought into the empire—are their “slaves.”  Naturally, this attitude dovetails with basic ideas of 
property ownership, and links Thucydides’ conception of Athenian imperialism more closely to 
Thrasymachus and Callicles’ conception of the strong man’s successful pleonexia.  As Pericles forthrightly 
admits in his final speech to the Athenians: “The Empire you possess is like a tyranny.  It may have been 
unjust to acquire, it is perilous to relinquish it” (2.63).   
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his son was totally defeated in Greece.  By themselves, these facts are not inconsistent 
with a claim to be acting according to natural justice.  Indeed, one could argue that Darius 
and Xerxes’ right remained uncontested as long as they retained their might and Callicles 
does claim that according to nature one needs no justification for invading other than the 
right of the strong to rule the weak (and to have more).  That the loss of might implies the 
loss of right is also reflected in the Gorgias when Socrates puts forth the argument that if 
the majority are stronger than the tyrant and decide to replace greed with equality as the 
central principle of justice, then equality would be just not only by convention but also by 
nature, which is inconsistent with Callicles’ original distinction (488b-489b). 
In both the History and the Gorgias, then, we see that the problem of pleonexia 
inexorably leads to violence and tyranny.  We also see that the sophist position of 
dividing the natural (phusis) and the political or conventional (nomos) has radical 
implications for both thought and deed.  The sophists, represented by the Athenian 
Ambassadors at Melos and in the positions of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles in the 
Gorgias, question the foundations and values of the Greek polis by stressing the 
differences between the natural world and the moral values that ground the political 
community.  This distinction has the tendency to favor natural desires over (or 
independent of) any particular societal customs, laws, or traditions.  Nature is redefined 
as hostile to man-made laws and communal laws.  Written or unwritten laws cease to be 
divine and, as a result, no longer rise above the flux inherent in the natural world.  Victor 
Ehrenberg notes that: “The Nomos changed from sacred tradition to a purely human 
convention, against which ‘nature,’ the phusis of the autonomous individual, rebelled.”175   
                                                
175 Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek State  (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), 99. 
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However, Callicles remains unconvinced.  I believe this reflects Plato’s 
recognition that the rhetoric required to convince someone like Callicles to abandon the 
world of aggression and greed for that of friendship and virtue is inadequate to the task.  
In the Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles simply talk at each other not with each other.  
Succeeding in this effort will require the fairly drastic remedy of reconstituting the entire 
city, which will be conducted by Socrates in the Republic.  The solution proposed in the 
Gorgias is inadequate or insufficient because a happy life based exclusively on individual 
virtue is only possible within a just city.  Looking exclusively to individual virtue to 
establish justice in a pleonectic polis like imperial Athens is doomed to fail. This is why 






Chapter 3: Thucydides’ Pericles and Plato’s Protagoras 
Plato’s Protagoras is a wonderful example of how Plato purposefully draws our 
attention not only to events of the Peloponnesian War but also to Thucydides’ History in 
particular.  When Protagoras is laying out the purpose of his instructional program to 
Socrates, he says that he will instruct Hippocrates about: 
good judgment (euboulia) about domestic matters, so that he may best manage his 
own household, and about political affairs, so that in affairs of the polis he may be 
most able both in action and in speech. 
Socrates: Am I following what you say?  I think you mean political knowledge 
(techne), and you promise to make men good citizens. 
Protagoras: That is exactly what I proclaim. (319a, underline mine)176   
The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database shows only a single other reference in all of 
Greek literature where the underlined group of words is used to convey preeminence in 
action and speech—Thucydides’ introduction to Pericles’ first speech in the History.177  
By linking the Protagoras so explicitly to Thucydides, Plato directly connects his portrait 
of Protagoras to Thucydides’ portrait of Protagoras’ most famous student, Pericles.  By 
doing so, Plato invites us to consider the hypothesis that it is Protagorean thought that 
provided the assumptions (concealed and pessimistic) about human nature that supported 
the optimism of the Greek Enlightenment, embodied in Pericles.  
Thucydides speaks here in his own name and introduces Pericles as “the first man 
in Athens at that time, the ablest in both speaking and acting” (1.139).  As Neil 
O’Sullivan puts it: “The identity of the diction and the absence of the phrase from the rest 
                                                
176 Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists: 175.  Unless otherwise specified, all 
references to Protagoras are from this edition and are cited by Diels-Kranz number. 
177 Neil O'Sullivan, "Pericles and Protagoras," Greece & Rome 42, no. 01 (1995).  O’Sullivan reports that 
the only other phrase that comes close is from the rhetorical work Peri Skematon by an Alexander who 
lived in second century A.D. and who quotes Thucydides nine times in the work.  O’Sullivan concludes 
that Alexander “made up an example by adapting a phrase of the historian.” Ibid., 23.  
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of Greek literature must raise a strong prima facie case that Plato is here [at Protagoras 
319a] recalling the historian’s description of Pericles.”178 Plato points to Thucydides’ 
presentation of Pericles at precisely the point in the dialogue where Socrates introduces 
the question of virtue and its teachability that will echo through the rest of the dialogue.  I 
believe that he does this to draw our attention to the practical political consequences of 
Protagorean thought.  As Protagoras’ most famous student, Pericles represents 
Protagoras’ ideal statesman and the end product of his educational system.  We can, then, 
think of Thucydides’ Pericles as a mouthpiece for Protagoras, and Plato encourages us to 
understand post-Periclean Athens as Protagoras and Pericles’ true offspring.179  
As we saw in our discussion of the Gorgias, the fundamental disagreement 
between Socrates and Callicles concerns the question of justice, which is the 
quintessential political virtue.  The problem of Athenian imperialism and its concomitant 
moral decline was a result of collective rather than individual behavior.  Hence, a 
satisfactory response to the Calliclean challenge requires the political virtue of justice, 
which Plato only hints at in the Gorgias, but develops more fully in the Protagoras.180  
The Protagoras introduces the new themes of the political art (politike techne) and 
education because, for Plato, the political art is primarily or essentially the art of 
education—namely, educating the young in such a way as to ensure their future 
effectiveness as leaders and citizens.  Thus, in the Protagoras, Socrates will put forth the 
position that the best life is one that combines the five classic virtues of piety, courage, 
temperance, wisdom, and justice, and will argue that virtue, properly understood, is the 
                                                
178 Ibid., 21-22. 
179 See Gorgias 515e. 
180 Recall that in the Gorgias, Socrates asserts: “I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians—so as not to say 
I’m the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political art (politike 
techne) and practice true politics” (521d). 
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truest form of pleasure.  If in the Gorgias Socrates puts forth a primarily individual 
solution to the problem of pleonexia, he uses the Protagoras to begin exploring the 
communal virtues necessary to address the challenge.  This question of civic virtue and 
education also play a significant role in the Republic, which we will examine in more 
detail in the next chapter.181  For now, it is sufficient to say that a central theme for Plato 
in the Protagoras is the teachability of the political art, and that Plato ties Protagoras’ 
claim to teach the political art directly to Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles.  Let us 
examine Pericles’ speech in more detail.  
What does Pericles teach the Athenians in his first speech?  It is here, with his 
very first words, that Pericles persuades the Athenians to consider the inevitability of war 
with Sparta, to see their own resources for executing that war as superior to Sparta’s and, 
therefore, to urge the Athenians to resist.  This speech, then, sets in motion the course of 
events that will ultimately lead to the destruction of the Athenian Empire.  Pericles 
asserts that: “it must be known that war is inevitable, but that if we accept it more readily, 
we will find our enemies less committed, and that out of the greatest dangers emerge the 
greatest honors for both city and individual” (1.144).   In Thucydides’ narrative, Pericles’ 
speech occurs immediately after the majority of the Peloponnesian League votes for war 
against Athens.  However, the Spartans do not immediately march into Attica and lay 
siege—they remain hesitant to commence hostilities and give the Athenians a final 
opportunity to avoid war.  The terms, unfortunately, are too severe: the Spartans demand 
                                                
181 In Book II of the Republic, Socrates argues that virtue is advantageous because of its consequences, as 
well as being good in itself.  It is, I think, Socrates’ belief in this that explains why his first response to 
Glaucon and Adeimantus’ desire that he show how a perfectly just man could be happy under conditions of 
depravation, pain, and injustice is to say he is “at a loss as to what to do…Indeed, I believe I’m incapable 
of it” (368b).  For Socrates, the perfectly just life implies virtue’s utility, which implies its ability to create 
happiness.  As we saw in our discussion of the Gorgias, Socrates argues that injustice does irrevocable 
damage to an individual’s soul and that by practicing virtue individuals can orient themselves toward 
happiness. 
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that the Athenians halt their siege of Potidaea, leave Aegina autonomous, and rescind the 
Megarian Decree which banned Megarians from Athenian ports and markets.  Not 
surprisingly, the Athenians refuse these terms. The Spartans send a final embassy to 
Athens that announces: “the Lacedaemonians wish there to be peace, and there would be 
if you leave the Hellenes autonomous” (1.139).  That is, the Spartans call for Athens to 
dismantle their empire and, in the very next chapter, Thucydides brings Pericles on stage 
to speak for the first time, advising the Athenians about how they should respond to the 
Spartan ultimatum.  Because Thucydides gives Pericles no opposing speaker, he implies 
that Pericles is “unrivalled even among the Athenians of his time.”182  
Pericles begins his speech by arguing that it is not the Athenians, but the Spartans 
who are the instigators of the conflict.  The existing treaty stated that any disputes 
between Athens and Sparta be resolved by binding arbitration.  But rather than submit to 
arbitration, the Spartans threaten war.  Pericles insists that the conflict is inevitable and 
that the Spartan demand is indistinguishable from slavery, since any compromise with 
Sparta will show a slavish desire for peace.  In this sense, Pericles appeals to the 
Athenians’ sense of honor by equating the coming conflict with the heroism and courage 
in the wars with Persia.  He then moves to an assessment of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League.  He argues that 
Athens has little to fear since she holds an advantage over Sparta in all key respects.  A 
prolonged conflict requires capital resources and the Spartans are but poor farmers, with 
neither large amounts of private wealth nor a treasury to draw upon.  Given their paucity 
of resources, and the exiting dominance of the Athenian Navy, Pericles concludes that it 
                                                
182 Strauss, The City and Man: 213.  Indeed, Pericles is the only named Athenian politician who speaks in 
the first two books of the History and, as Josiah Ober notes, Pericles’ are the only speeches by an Athenian 
politician that are never countered or paired by opposing speeches. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic 
Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule: 81. 
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is unlikely that Sparta will be able to raise a large enough navy or pay for the necessary 
naval experience to defeat the Athenians.183  
Pericles continues, arguing that the Peloponnesian League’s position is more 
precarious still because, unlike Athens, they are not an empire.  Their form of political 
organization lacks any form of unified decision-making.  In contrast to Athens’ 
dominance—which Pericles will later call a “tyranny”—over her subjects, the 
Peloponnesian League has no single assembly capable of quickly guiding policy.184  As a 
league, they are comprised of member cities that are primarily motivated by their own 
domestic interests, rendering collective action difficult and ponderous.  For Pericles, 
though, it is Athenian wealth and Spartan poverty that will rule the day: “the most 
important way in which they [Sparta] will be hindered is through shortage of money, so 
long as they waste time by its slow provision; military opportunities are not stationary” 
(1.142).  Furthermore, Pericles suggests that the Athenians shouldn’t be terribly 
concerned about the Spartan Army, even though it is “capable of withstanding all Hellas 
in a single battle” (1.141).  This is because, even if the Spartans establish a “small fort” in 
Attica that “might harm the country somewhat by raids and harboring runaways,” the 
Athenians will still be able to launch substantially more debilitating naval attacks against 
Sparta: 
If they move against our country on land, we will sail against theirs, and from 
there on there will be no comparison between devastating one part of the whole 
Peloponnesos and the whole of Attica; they will not be able to replace land 
without fighting battles, but for us there is abundant land on both the islands and 
the mainland. (1.143) 
                                                
183 Of course, readers of the History know that Pericles’ predictions turn out to be mistaken on almost all 
counts. 
184 In his final speech, Pericles says that: “For you now hold it [the empire] like a tyranny that seems unjust 
to acquire but dangerous to let go” (2.63). 
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 According to Pericles, in a war between land and sea, naval power is decisive.  
And the Athenians can count on lasting naval supremacy because their wealth (and 
Sparta’s poverty) will enable them to prevent Spartan attempts to bribe the foreign sailors 
that make up the backbone of the Athenian Navy.  Pericles then introduces the metaphor 
of Athens as an island: 
If we were islanders, who would be more unassailable?  As it is, thinking like 
them as nearly as possible, we must let go of the land and its houses and stand 
guard over the sea and the city, and not let rage over the former drive us to fight 
against the much greater numbers of the Peloponnesians…nor lament over houses 
and land, but over lives; those do not create men, men create them. (1.143)  
Pericles claims that the only place where Athens is vulnerable to Sparta is the Attic plain.  
He argues further that the fertile plain is nearly worthless—making the hyperbolic 
suggestion that if “I thought I would persuade you, I would have told you to go out and 
lay waste to your property yourselves” (1.143).  Attica, then, is to be abandoned if 
necessary, and the Athenians should focus purely on their empire and the naval power 
necessary to maintain it, and ignore any Spartan destruction of their land.    At first blush, 
it appears that Pericles is merely encouraging the Athenians to adopt the same strategy 
they successfully used during the Persian wars: abandon their houses and land, deprive 
the enemy of an easy victory on the field, and defeat the enemy using their ships. 
However, I think Pericles’ vision is more than simply this—it is, in fact, a radical 
redefining of Athens as a city severed from its ancestral homeland.  As we shall see, I 
think that both Plato and Thucydides argue that the sophistic habits of thought that lead to 
the redefinition of the city also lead inexorably to the slaughter at Melos and the 
disastrous Sicilian Expedition, and that Plato believes that the wellspring of this kind of 
thinking can be traced to Protagoras.   
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Pericles pulls off some slight of hand here with his island simile.  He argues that 
if the Athenians “were islanders” they would be “unassailable.”  Because of this, he 
encourages them to think like islanders “as nearly as possible,” which means to “let go of 
the land and its houses and stand guard over the sea and the city” (1.143).  This “island” 
Pericles intends to defend includes neither the land nor the houses of Attica, but only 
what is behind Athens’ walls, and the lands and islands of the empire.  This is, of course, 
in stark contrast to actual islanders, who defend both their walls and land using the 
“walls” of the sea.  Pericles’ simile implies that, by following his plan, the Athenians will 
be doing nothing more than embracing a time-honored and well-tested strategy for 
victory.  In truth, however, there is no comparison to what Pericles urges the Athenians to 
do.  By following Pericles, the Athenians will not be acting like anyone at all, because it 
has never before been tried.  This gap in Pericles’ analogy serves to emphasize just how 
radical his new understanding of the city is.  He redefines the city as wholly distinct or 
cut off from the “houses and land” of Attica.  In the Persian War, the Athenian strategy 
was to abandon an Athens that “no longer existed, facing danger for one with small hope 
of existing” (1.74).  They took to their ships with the “small hope” of reconstituting the 
same city in Attica after the fighting ceased.  Pericles, on the other hand, persuades the 
Athenians to redefine the polis to exclude the land and homes of Attica, and include the 
rest of the empire and the sea.  This proposal should be more shocking than it perhaps 
comes across in the History (and certainly to us), for the Athenians believed that Athens 
was founded by people birthed from the Attica soil itself (autochthony).  As we shall see, 
Thucydides suggests that the Athenians will not so easily accept Pericles’ newly 
imagined city—it is no less a city-in-speech than Socrates’ Kallipolis in the Republic. 
Pericles concludes his speech by saying that Athens will be victorious so long as 
the Athenians do not make any attempts to add to the empire or take on any “additional 
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dangers” (1.144).  He goes so far as to say that he fears Athenian mistakes far more than 
Spartan planning (1.144).  Pericles again reminds the Athenians that war is inevitable and 
that the greatest honors for both cities and individuals arise out of the greatest dangers. 
Thus, the Athenians should view this conflict as no different than the fight for freedom 
against the Persians.  Just as their fathers did, the Athenians must now “resist our enemies 
by every means and attempt to hand it [the empire] on undiminished to our descendants” 
(1.144).185  What’s most remarkable about Pericles’ argument is his emphasis on 
imagination (gnome).  As Adam Parry puts it, “Pericles is represented as believing that, 
with a requisite amount of power and resource, and with the energy and devotion that is 
inherent in the Athenian nature, the intellect can in large part make the world.”186  Given 
such a valorization of the intellect’s power to imagine, it is no surprise that Pericles isn’t 
concerned about ancestral temples, tombs, fields, and homes.  One can always imagine 
them as they were or, if necessary, build new ones.  Yet, can a community really be 
nourished by such an imagined history?  For Pericles, it seems that rhetoric and history 
are inextricably linked. 
Returning to the Protagoras, Plato has Protagoras echo the unique phrasing 
Thucydides puts in the mouth of Pericles during his speech recommending war. 
Protagoras says that he will teach Hippocrates about: “domestic matters, so that he may 
best manage his own household, and about political affairs, so that in affairs of the polis 
                                                
185 It strains credulity to think that there was no significant opposition to Pericles’ advice.  Yet, there is 
nothing in the History other than a report about the success of Pericles’ speech.  Perhaps this is simply a 
dramatization of how a democracy by a “first citizen” actually works.  While there may be other speeches, 
the speech of only one man is truly considered.  In this sense, and as we shall see, Athens is considerably 
less democratic than Sparta, and Pericles’ speech may be seen as more similar to the demagoguery of 
Sthenelaidas than the statesmanship of Archidamus.  On the similarities between the speeches of Pericles 
and Archidamus, see Edmund F. Bloedow, "The Speeches of Archidamus and Sthenelaidas at Sparta," 
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 30, no. 2 (1981). 
186 Adam Parry, Logos and Ergon in Thucydides  (New York: Arno Press, 1981), 151. 
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he may be most able both in action and in speech” (319a, italics mine).187  Compare this 
phrasing with how Thucydides brings Pericles on stage for his first speaking role: 
“Pericles—who was at that time the foremost Athenian and the most able in speech and 
action—gave the following advice” (1.139, italics mine).188  There are several other clues 
which Plato gives us to suggest he is using this dialogue to critically assess Thucydides’ 
Pericles.  The dramatic date of the Protagoras is approximately 432, just before the 
Peloponnesian War, and roughly when Pericles would be making his speech to the 
Athenians that helped initiate hostilities.189  However, the tone of the dialogue is far from 
pessimistic—indeed, R. E. Allen calls it “sun-lit”—and I believe this tone is designed to 
reflect the optimism of fifth-century Athens and what Paul Woodruff calls the “new 
learning.”190  Since Protagoras was reputed to be a close confidante and advisor of the 
great Athenian statesman, Plato suggests that we consider him as the spokesperson to 
convey numerous Periclean notions and attitudes—especially the combination of rhetoric 
and imperialism that presaged Athens’ ultimate defeat—which Socrates will refute.  
Athenian ambition and bold restlessness (polupragmosune) will not be sufficient to 
defend against the resentment that her arrogant and often brutal imperialism spawned 
throughout Greece.191  Plato makes this connection especially obvious by having 
                                                
187 Hopos ta poleos dunatotatos an eiē kai prattein kai legein. 
188 Legein te kai prassein dunatotatos. 
189 Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics: 309-10.  Plato seems to 
have been preoccupied with Protagoras.  With respect to dramatic dates, Socrates’ debate with Protagoras is 
one of the very first acts in Socrates’ career.   Conversely, Socrates’ career “ends” in the frame scene from 
the Theaetetus, where a “written version” of a “narrative” given by Socrates that discusses, among other 
things, Protagoras’ famous doctrine that “man is the measure” is read to the interlocutors (143b-c).  
190 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, Volume 3: Ion, Hippias Minor, Laches, Protagoras, trans. Reginald E. 
Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 89.; Woodruff, "Rhetoric and Relativism: Protagoras and 
Gorgias," 290.; Woodruff, "Socrates Among the Sophists," 37. 
191 It is no accident that one of Socrates’ definitions of justice in the Republic is apolupragmosune, 
“minding one’s own business,” the opposite of the virtue that Thucydides’ Corinthians say identifies 
Athenians. 
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Protagoras’ great speech reflect many of the themes Thucydides puts in the mouth of 
Pericles in the History, especially his famous Funeral Oration.  As we shall see, both 
speeches articulate what I believe is Thucydides’ position that the Athenians considered 
themselves beyond morality. 
In the dialogue’s frame scene, Socrates is awakened in the dark early morning 
hours by an uninvited Hippocrates, who is “from a great and wealthy family,” and whose 
father, Apollodorus, shares at least the same name as the narrator of the Symposium 
(316b).192  Hippocrates wants Socrates to introduce him to Protagoras as an excellent 
prospective student.193  Before taking him to Protagoras, however, Socrates talks briefly 
with him and shows that Hippocrates is unable to distinguish between becoming a sophist 
by studying with Protagoras, and merely purchasing the product that Protagoras sells.  
Indeed, while Hippocrates is desperate to learn what Protagoras teaches, he confesses that 
he would be ashamed to become a sophist (312a-b).194  This view cheapens the purpose 
of sophistry.  It seems that then, as now, “most of what students have been taught about 
the sophists is wrong.”195  That is, sophistry implies a way of life as much as—perhaps 
more than—any particular teaching.196  I believe that—in a manner similar to what we 
saw in the Gorgias—Socrates’ concern with the sophists (particularly Gorgias and 
                                                
192 Nails argues that: “Hippocrates’ father, Apollodorus, cannot be the Socratic one because that 
Apollodorus says explicitly that he has been associating with Socrates for less than three years (Pl. 
Symposium 172c) in +/- 400, the dramatic date of the frame, whereas the dramatic date of Plato’s 
Protagoras is +/- 433/2.” Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics: 170. 
193 That is, he wants to use Socrates as an instrument to achieve his end of meeting Protagoras, just as he 
seeks Protagoras for instrumental means.  We should note in passing that Socrates’ examination of 
Hippocrates is his first, according to dramatic dates.  As such, it deserves more scrutiny than we are able to 
give it here. 
194 Hippocrates says that he would be ashamed “to present [himself]…to the Greek world” as a sophist 
(312a-b). 
195 Woodruff, "Socrates Among the Sophists," 37. 
196 We shouldn’t be terribly surprised by this, given how different some of the various sophists’ teachings 
are.  For a very brief summary of the variety of sophist teachings, see ibid.  
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Protagoras) is less about specific aspects of their teaching and more about the 
assumptions that form the soil from which their various teachings grow.  As we shall see, 
Protagoras considers himself the first avowed sophist—thereby identifying himself as the 
fountainhead of the various sophist technai that emerge.  This is why he considers 
himself greater than the other sophists, who teach only various skills (technai), but fail to 
convey the meaning or purpose of their activity.  
Protagoras is staying at the house of Callias III, the son of Pericles’ ex-wife and 
the son of the richest man in Athens, with a group of other famous (and younger) wise 
men.197  Callias will become the richest man in Athens during the Peloponnesian War, 
only to have his wealth reduced to two talents in the aftermath of the conflict.  Callias’ 
ambition was to become wise by spending his wealth on sophistic education.198  
According to Socrates, Protagoras was more than happy to oblige, claiming in the Meno 
that Protagoras “made more money…than Phidias who made such notably fine works, 
and ten other sculptors” (91d).   Protagoras was likely last in Athens in 443 when, at 
Pericles’ behest, he developed the laws for the Pan-Hellenic colony at Thurii that 
received Athenian support.  It would not go unnoticed by Plato’s readers that, in the 
aftermath of the Sicilian expedition, Thurii turned against Athens to aid Syracuse.  As if 
to reinforce this point, Protagoras’ two groups of followers are each lead by one of 
Pericles’ sons, who also serve as examples to remind us that the sons of good men don’t 
always turn out to be good (319e-320a). 
                                                
197 Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics: 68-74. 
198 Ibid., 70. Apology 20a. 
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It is significant that Pericles hired Protagoras to draft the Thurii constitution 
(politeia) and the Thurii nomos.199  The traditional understanding in Ancient Greece was 
that a city’s laws were gifts of the gods rather than made by human beings.  The view that 
the law is given by the gods is called theonomy; the view that laws are made by humans 
is called anthroponomy.200  Perhaps the most famous image of theonomy is Moses 
receiving the Decalogue directly from God on Mt. Sinai. While anthroponomy is the 
reigning view today in the United States and Western Europe, theonomy is still embraced 
in much of the Muslim world.201  For example, Sharia is believed to be of divine origin.  
In Ancient Greece, legendary lawgivers like Lycurgus and Minos were said to have 
received the laws from the gods Apollo and Zeus.  It was customary for lawgivers to 
apply to the oracle at Delphi to obtain advice and/or sanction for their new plans.  Plato 
draws our attention to the fact that Protagoras inaugurates the anthoponomic age, through 
his creation of the Thurii constitution—an action justified by his famous doctrine that 
“man is the measure of all things.”202  It is difficult to believe that the laws are heaven-
sent when they are created specifically with a view to supporting the expansionist 
policies of the creator’s benefactor.   Staying with the divine theme, Socrates compares 
the house of Callias to Hades, and when he and Hippocrates arrive, they discover that 
Protagoras has already seduced many of the Athenian elite.203  The Protagoras, then, can 
                                                
199 Victor Ehrenberg, "The Foundation of Thurii," The American Journal of Philology 69, no. 2 (1948). N. 
K. Rutter, "Diodorus and the Foundation of Thurii," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 22, no. 2 
(1973). 
200 Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and Social Order: 7-11. 
201 Though he does not use the terms, for an interesting comparison between theonomy and anthroponomy 
using the U.S. Constitution as an example, see Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988). 
202 Protagoras famously taught that: “A human being is measure of all things, of those things that are, that 
they are, and of those things that are not, that they are not” (DK I). 
203 This is further emphasized by having Callias’ doorman initially slam the door in Socrates and 
Hippocrates faces.  Like Hades, the house of Callias is guarded by a Cerberus.   
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be understood as Socrates’ Odyssean descent into a Protagorean or anthroponomic Hades 
where the Athenian governing class is reduced to the moral stature of well heeled, but 
nevertheless slavish, animals.204   
Pericles seems to be the model that Protagoras has in mind when he articulates his 
understanding of political excellence.  Protagoras claims, for example, that a man can be 
bold without being courageous, which fits well with the criticism that, despite the way he 
aggressively brought Athens’ “allies” to heel, Pericles was tentative in his military 
actions toward Sparta.  Most infamously, Pericles supported, participated in, and likely 
proposed Athens’ intervention in the war between two of her allies, Samos and Miletus, 
in 441.  The Athenians imposed a democracy and a garrison on Samos and took Samian 
children and men as hostages.  When the Samians resisted and sought Persian assistance, 
the Athenians besieged the city for nine months before reducing it to rubble and 
executing many of the Samian dissidents (1.115-117).  In this way, Plato encourages us 
to read the Protagoras as an argument summing up the age of Pericles.205   
Indeed, Socrates and Hippocrates discover not only the cream of the sophist crop, 
but also the best and brightest of the Athenian youth at Callias’ house.  In addition to 
Pericles’ sons and Callias, some of the others present include: Charmides, Plato’s uncle 
who later became one of the Thirty Tyrants; Philippides, whose family was rich from 
silver mining; Andron, a future member of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred; Agathon 
and Pausanias, who left Athens for the tyrant Archelaus’ court; the “two Adeimantuses,” 
one of whom later became a general in the war; Eryximachus; and Phaedrus.  However, 
Plato saves the best for last, as Alcibiades and Critias enter after Socrates’ arrival. These 
two were perhaps the most reviled politicians of their generation.  Xenophon famously 
                                                
204 See Gorgias 518e-519a. 
205 See Donald Kagan, Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). 
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describes Alcibiades and Critias in his Memorabilia: “Among the associates of Socrates 
were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state.  For Critias in 
the days of the oligarchy bore the palm for greed and violence; Alcibiades, for his part, 
exceed all in licentiousness and insolence under the democracy...ambition was the very 
life-blood of both.”206  Of the Athenians present, nearly all of them would be among 
those suspected or tried for the impiety associated with the profaning of the Mysteries 
and the mutilation of the Herms in 415.  Plato foreshadows that, though Socrates will 
attempt to save them, these future Athenian leaders will, under the influence of 
Protagorean teachings, bring themselves and the city to ruin.  They are beyond saving.  
As T.K. Seung puts it, “the house of Callias and his guests stand for the spiritually dead 
city of Athens.”207   
With this beautifully articulated framework, Socrates’ purpose in the Protagoras 
is set.  He must defend philosophy from sophistry by showing that they are born from 
different sources.  In doing so, he must also try to deliver some of the young Athenian 
souls in Hades from Protagoras’ enchanting song.  It is noteworthy that Plato’s casting in 
the Protagoras throws Socrates’ failure to reform Athens’ youth into stark relief.  This 
raises the question of whether Socrates’ failure is meant to indicate that human virtue is 
impossible to achieve, since, if Socrates couldn’t do it, then it is unlikely that anyone else 
could.  Rather than suggest this pessimistic conclusion, I believe that the Protagoras 
indicates how courageously Socrates tried to lead Athenians toward the good life.  By 
dramatically dating the Protagoras to show Socrates’ first interaction with Athenians, 
Plato strongly points to the fact that the damage had already occurred by the time 
                                                
206 Xenophon, Memorabilia, trans. E. C. Marchant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923), 1.2.12-
14.  Unless otherwise specified, all references to Xenophon are from this volume. 
207 Seung, Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and Social Order: 77. 
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Socrates arrived on the scene.  Nevertheless, Socrates will have the brief but ultimately 
unsatisfying victory of shaming the grand old man of the Greek Enlightenment in front of 
the best Athenian youth.  He will use his first appearance to try to recruit the Athenians to 
the side of virtue—thereby providing a defense of his life as well as philosophy. 
Plato drives home this point by having Protagoras begin by claiming that Homer, 
Hesiod and other famous poets were the originators of the sophistical movement (316d-
317a).  Plato’s Protagoras is well within his rights to make this claim.  The earliest 
surviving use of the Greek noun sophistes is from Pindar, where it means “poet.”208  
Unlike these men, who Protagoras claims concealed their art “out of fear of ill will,” he is 
the first who is courageous enough to openly admit to being a sophist (317a).  Given the 
prominent role the poets played in Greek religion, Walter Burkert argues that the sophists 
were responsible for “the most radical transformation of Greek religion.”209  Protagoras 
insists that his forbearers failed to conceal their art from “the people who had power in 
the cities,” which was the primary purpose of their putative disguise, since “ordinary 
folks hardly notice anything anyway, but just sing along with the men in real power” 
(317a).210  Protagoras, then, claims to have discovered a way of bringing the interests of 
the powerful and the wise into congruence in a way that evaded Homer and Hesiod.  
Presumably, he does this through mutual benefit: Protagoras helps Pericles write laws 
and Pericles’ fame makes Protagoras rich and influential.211  According to Protagoras, the 
masses do not perceive anything—they merely parrot back what their leaders say.  If he is 
right, the masses think what they are told to think, without realizing that they are being 
                                                
208 Woodruff, "Socrates Among the Sophists," 37. 
209 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 296. 
210 Woodruff translation. 
211 For an account of the mutually beneficial relationship between Pericles and Protagoras see Edward 
Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2nd ed. (Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 176-89.  
 123 
told to think it.  In Athens, therefore, the demos believe they are free because this is what 
they are told by their leaders.  But in 433, their leader is Pericles and I think Plato is here 
referring to Thucydides, who asserts that Pericles “exercised free control over the people 
and was not led by them instead of leading them…and what was in name a democracy 
became in actuality rule by the first man” (2.65).  Protagoras, then, is advertising to his 
potential clientele an avenue to exploit the democratic masses who only appear to rule 
Athens, but in reality merely parrot back what they are told by those who rule them—
Pericles, for instance.    
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Protagoras professes to teach “good 
judgment (euboulia) about domestic matters, so that he [Protagoras’ student] may best 
manage his own household, and about political affairs, so that in affairs of the polis he 
may be most able both in speech and action” (319a).  It is interesting that Protagoras 
claims to teach students how to “manage” the private matters within the household but, 
when it comes to public affairs, he will teach them how to “be the most capable” or “the 
most powerful” (dunatotatos).212  It’s difficult to know precisely what to make of this 
subtle shift.  Kathryn Morgan argues that:  
it was a peculiarity of Athenian rhetorical procedure that expertise had to be 
hidden by dissimulation; one could not risk seeming too clever, since this might 
seem non-democratic.  Hippokrates, then, is ashamed to say that he wants the 
skills that will enable him to manipulate the assembly; nor can Protagoras confess 
such an aim.213   
Cast in this light, Protagoras teaches “management,” though he must be very careful in 
how he presents it.  He will use this same technique when he delivers his myth on the 
                                                
212 One can imagine that being able to play off the ambiguity of the term dunatotatos here and dunamenous 
at 317a, which can mean either “capable” or “powerful,” would be helpful for Protagoras.  Different 
audiences might hear or receive his, for lack of a better word, “sales pitch” very differently. 
213 Kathryn A. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 137. 
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origin of the polis.  There, he adapts a traditional myth to the specific context of teaching 
excellence in the Athenian democracy.  This is perhaps also why he allows Socrates to 
(mis)characterize his teaching as using “political knowledge” (politike techne) to make 
men “good citizens,” rather than—as he himself said—the “most powerful” or “capable” 
(319a).        
With all of this in mind, let us now return to Plato’s textual allusion to 
Thucydides.  Plato directs us to Thucydides at precisely the moment where Socrates 
makes his pivotal speech that sets the political course of the rest of the dialogue.  
Socrates begins by acknowledging his belief that he does not think it possible to teach 
political knowledge.  He says that he believes “along with the rest of the Greek world, 
that the Athenians are wise” (319b), and supports this belief with two examples.  His first 
example is that when an issue arises in the Assembly that its members think is 
“technical,” they pay particular attention to the advice of experts who possess the relevant 
knowledge (it is no accident that the example he uses is the art which gave rise to and 
supports the empire—shipbuilding).  However, when the issue is a political one, the 
Athenians think that “anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, blacksmith, 
shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born, low-born—it doesn’t 
matter—and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without any prior training 
under a teacher” (319d).  Socrates takes this to be an admission that Athenians do not 
consider political knowledge teachable.  Socrates’ second example is his observation that 
“the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others the virtues that they 
possess” (319e).  He provides two further examples to support this claim, both of which 
highlight Pericles’ failure to teach his own mastery of political knowledge or the political 
art: 
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Look at Pericles, the father of these young men here.  He gave them a superb 
education in everything that teachers can teach, but as for what he himself is 
really wise in, he neither teaches them that himself nor has anyone else teach 
them either, and his sons have to browse like stray sacred cattle and pick up virtue 
on their own wherever they might find it…[and] Clinias, the younger brother of 
Alcibiades here.  When Pericles became his guardian he was afraid that he would 
be corrupted, no less, by Alcibiades.  So he separated them and placed Clinias in 
Ariphron’s house and tried to educate him there.  Six months later he gave him 
back to Alcibiades because he couldn’t do anything with him. (320a-b) 
After saying this, Socrates challenges Protagoras to explain how virtue is 
teachable and puts Protagoras in a very awkward position.  If Protagoras argues that 
political knowledge is teachable, then he will be objecting to Athenian practice.214  As 
Michael Frede explains: “Democracy rests on the assumption that the affairs of a city are 
not the subject of some special expertise, but that every citizen is competent to judge 
them. To claim that a special expertise or art is needed for these matters comes 
dangerously close to claiming that the people are not fit to rule, for they do not have this 
expertise.”215  This is dangerous for a foreigner in Athens to say openly—so Protagoras 
needs to be able to praise Athenian wisdom while at the same time undermining Socrates’ 
interpretation of these practices.  On the other hand, if Protagoras concedes that political 
knowledge is not teachable or innate, then he will be revealing himself as either irrelevant 
or as a snake-oil salesman.216  To succeed in showing his clientele that he can make them 
“mini-Pericleses,” he can challenge neither Socrates’ premise of the wisdom of the 
                                                
214 Conceding this point may undermine a central presupposition of democracy in the following sense.  If 
the politike techne can be taught, then one individual may have a more knowledgeable opinion on political 
matters than another, which cuts against Athenian democracy’s premise that, on political matters, one 
citizen’s opinion is equal to another’s.  
215 Michael Frede, "Introduction," in Plato: Protagoras (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1992), xi-xii. 
216 By claiming that political wisdom is teachable—and that he can teach it—Protagoras also silently 
indicates his superiority to Pericles. 
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Athenians, nor the capacity of his student Pericles.217  It is Protagoras’ need for a 
compromise position that drives the choice and structure of his response.  
Plato’s deliberate echoing of Thucydides, then, occurs precisely before Socrates’ 
speech and Protagoras’ response.  Any Athenian at the time, looking backward from the 
vantage point of everything that occurred, would recognize Socrates’ questioning of the 
supposed wisdom of the Athenians—how the Athenian democracy makes its political 
decisions—as being particularly significant since he does so on the eve of the war that 
will bring disaster to Athens and to the men assembled.  Socrates’ question is 
comprehensive: what future can Athenian democracy possibly have if, confronted with 
war, its Assembly will give equal consideration to any and all speakers, and if the 
greatest Athenian statesman is incapable of passing on his knowledge to his progeny?   In 
the chapters immediately before Pericles’ first speech, Thucydides recounts Themistocles 
bold strategy of naval expansion that, under Pericles, would be responsible for the rise of 
the empire.  It was Themistocles who had the foresight to use the unexpected fiscal 
surplus from the discovery of new silver mines to built the massive Athenian fleet, which 
made possible the Persian defeat at Salamis.  He was, therefore, the initial architect of 
Athenian imperialism, and Thucydides uses his position in the narrative to overtly 
suggest the tie between the two leaders.  Indeed, Pericles used the resources of the empire 
to make Athens the cultural and architectural capital of Greece.  Indeed, at the time 
Socrates and Protagoras are speaking, the last stones of the Parthenon are being set, and 
Pericles’ openness to the Greek Enlightenment encourages the greatest artists and 
thinkers, like Gorgias and Protagoras, to come to Athens.  Both Plato and Thucydides ask 
us to consider whether it is the very greatness of the Themistoclean/Periclean project—
                                                
217 Note that it is not the case that, because Protagoras has already indicated to Socrates and Hippocrates 
his views on the masses and the powerful few (or, in the case of Pericles, the one), that this automatically 
means that he believes Athenian practices are foolish.  
 127 
including the consequences of the enlightenment—that now incite the envy and fear in 
others that will, as Thucydides argues, compel (ananke) them into war against it?   
Thucydides begins the History by saying that he believed from its outset that the 
war would be greater than any that preceded it, and he identifies its cause: “For I consider 
the truest cause the one least openly expressed, that increasing Athenian greatness and the 
resulting fear among the Lacedaemonians made going to war inevitable” (1.23).  
Thucydides makes the first speech in the History an address by the Corcyreans to the 
Athenian Assembly in the summer of 433.  The Corcyraeans assert that war is 
unavoidable: “if there is anyone among you who does not believe it is coming, his 
judgment is at fault, and he is not aware that in their fear of you the Lacedaemonians are 
ready for war” (1.33).  The Corcyreans say that the summer of 433 is when the Athenians 
should be “confronting the war which is imminent and all but here” (1.36).  After Athens 
elects to make a defensive alliance with Corcyra, Thucydides tells us that the Athenians 
did so because “they considered war with the Peloponnesians a certainty in any case” 
(1.44).  Socrates, then, may properly be seen as anticipating the coming disaster in his 
speech on Athenian political knowledge and on their most powerful statesman.  
Lawrence Lampert beautifully sums up the context: “Socrates challenges the wisest man 
of the time on the most important political question of the time in the presence of the 
most promising political leader of the time [Alcibiades] on the eve of the war that will 
change everything.”218   
Protagoras responds by taking the conversation out of its Athenian context and 
begins at the beginning, with a creation myth.  Thus, Protagoras begins by purporting to 
show a universal truth about humanity, rather than a particular teaching about Athens.  At 
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the time of creation, “the gods” crafted all the species of animals from underneath the 
earth.219  Before releasing them, they asked Prometheus and Epimetheus to distribute 
“appropriate powers and abilities” to all of the various species of animals (320d).  
Epimetheus begged Prometheus for the assignment, persuading Prometheus by promising 
that afterwards he could inspect the results.  The principle behind Epimetheus’ 
distribution was the survival of each species.   So Epimetheus gave some species strength 
but not speed, some claws, some wings, some size, some tough skin, etc.  By the time he 
came to humans, Epimetheus had nothing left to give them and they were left 
“completely unequipped” (321c).220  Humans were “naked, unshod, unbedded, and 
unarmed,” and it was time for all the animals to emerge from the earth into the light 
(321d).  To fix Epimetheus’s error, Prometheus stole fire and wisdom in the practical arts 
(techne) from Olympus and gave them to human beings.  While this wisdom was 
designed to ensure the survival of the species, humans lacked the wisdom for living 
together in society (or in common).  This “political wisdom” was exclusively in Zeus’ 
keeping, and Prometheus “no longer had free access to the high citadel that is the house 
of Zeus” (321e).  Unable to steal Zeus’ wisdom, Prometheus snuck into the building 
where Athena and Hephaestus liked to practice their arts and stole techne and fire 
instead.221 
Because humanity’s gifts were of divine origin, Protagoras claims that “they alone 
among animals worshipped the gods, with whom they had a kind of kinship, and erected 
altars and sacred images” (322a-b).  In his commentary on the Protagoras, Patrick Coby 
argues that Protagoras is hinting that techne “is the source of religion...it is what links 
                                                
219 Interestingly, Protagoras does not specify which gods. 
220 Epithemeus’ lack of wisdom begs the question of how much foresight Prometheus (literally “foresight”) 
really has. 
221 Techne—a kind of wisdom—begins with theft (a kind of injustice). 
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man to the god, for it is the cause and origin of his divine portion; and the divine portion, 
or man’s kinship with the god, is the cause of his worshipping gods; hence techne 
produces religion.”222  Soon afterwards, humans were speaking words and building 
houses, clothes, shoes, and “were nourished by food from the earth” (322b).  But 
Protagoras notes that “there were no cities” (322b).  As a result, humans started being 
killed by wild animals as well as by one another, because “they did not yet possess the art 
of politics, of which the art of war is a part” (322b).  When humans attempted to gather 
together for survival, “they wronged each other…and so they would scatter and again be 
destroyed” (322b-c).  Only when “our whole race” was on the verge of extinction did any 
of the Olympians come to the rescue (322c).  To preserve humanity, Zeus sent Hermes 
down to earth with the virtues of shame/respect/reverence (aidos) and justice (dike), so 
that there could be civic order and friendship.  Though Protagoras does not say this, 
presumably dike is the system of right and wrong and aidos provides the motivation to 
respect dike.  Zeus further ordered that every human being should have a share of these 
two civic virtues, “for cities would never come to be if only a few possessed these” and 
that anyone who did not “partake of shame and justice” should be killed for being “a 
pestilence to the city” (322d).223  According to C.C.W. Taylor, the myth teaches that 
although people at first (thanks to the gods’ techne from Prometheus) acquired the skills 
necessary for existence in small groups, they did not, until Zeus dispatched Hermes, 
                                                
222 Patrick Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras  
(Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1987), 55-56. 
223 In thinking about Protagoras’ myth, the first thing that strikes us is that the real Protagoras would not 
likely have believed it (at least wholesale).  In his Obscurity and the Gods (sometimes referred to as simply 
On the Gods), he remarks that: “Concerning the gods, I am not in a position to know either that they exist 
or that they do not, nor can I know what they look like, for many things prevent our knowing—the subject 
is obscure (adelon) and human life is short” (DK 4). Protagoras, while apparently agnostic, nevertheless 
recognizes the usefulness or social role of religion in a human-centered world, and he uses his theogony to 
advance his humanist aims.  This is why it would be quite consistent for Protagoras to invoke the Gods 
here—in his mythos—and why they disappear in his logos. 
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possess the skills necessary for living politically, in communities composed of members 
not related by blood.224  Aidos and dike were distributed to all because they are necessary 
preconditions for political or social life.  It is, according to the myth, impossible to 
become truly human without the appropriate share of justice and 
reverence/shame/respect.225    
Sensing, perhaps, that the myth alone may not satisfy Socrates, Protagoras 
appends to his myth “further evidence of the universal belief that all humans have a share 
of justice and the rest of civic virtue” (323a).226  Protagoras’ logos or argument shifts the 
focus from the distribution of civic virtue to its instruction.  Interestingly, in his myth, 
Protagoras describes the civic virtues as justice (dike) and shame/reverence/respect 
(aidos).  But when he begins his logos, he shifts the content of civic or political virtue to 
be justice (dikaiosune) and temperance (sophrosune).227  Perhaps his shift in language 
here is designed to shift our frame of reference from myth to logos—or from a divine gift 
to a virtue teachable by human beings.  But Protagoras also says something strange about 
justice and “the rest of the political art”—that every sane person should at least claim to 
be just (323b-c).  Protagoras further distinguishes between political virtue and virtue in 
the other technical arts on the basis of who and how many receive instruction.  Even 
                                                
224 See Plato, Plato: Protagoras, trans. C. C. W. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 81-85. 
225 Paul Woodruff has an interesting explanation of why Protagoras adds aidos where dike would normally 
be sufficient: “Protagoras understands what poets have been teaching since Homer: That justice is not 
enough.  In the Iliad, Agamemnon has the right to take Achilles’ prize away from him—no violation of 
justice there.  But when Agamemnon insults Achilles by taking the prize, he divides his army, with 
disastrous results.  His failure is a failure of reverence.”  Paul Woodruff, Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten 
Virtue  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 58.  While I’m not sure if it a failure of reverence or 
respect, I take his point. 
226 Protagoras acknowledges his shift from muthos to logos at 324d: “On this subject, Socrates, I will 
abandon story for argument.” 
227 He adds piety at 325a and calls this “what I may collectively term the virtue of a man.”  While we can 
only speculate, I wonder if Plato’s Protagoras believes that piety is necessary as a further internal check or 
buttress to apply a more fearsome sanction to unjust and intemperate actions.  It is also noteworthy that 
Protagoras omits wisdom and courage in his discussion. 
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though the political art is simply one art among many, it is universally taught.  Because of 
its necessity for political and social life, it must be commonly held and, hence, taught by 
everyone to everyone.228  In the myth, then, Zeus—the god of law and social order—
represents law or nomos itself in the sense that a city’s laws and conventions instill and 
perpetuate civic virtue.  Protagoras believes that the need for civic virtue is a basic 
requirement for community or civil society, and specifies that everyone must have a share 
in the civic virtues of justice, temperance, and piety (342e-325a).  He claims that this 
explains why people get angry with those who ignore civic virtues, but they do not get 
upset with people who have bad afflictions resulting from nature or bad luck, like 
physical weakness or ugliness.  Protagoras takes this as proof of his claim that people 
think virtue is teachable.229  The way it is taught is equally unique—everyone is an 
instructor.  The teaching of virtue begins in childhood and extends into adulthood though 
the ministrations of parents, nurses, tutors, etc.  They teach children the difference 
between the just and unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, and the pious and impious.  It is 
no different, Protagoras suggests, than teaching language or writing.  Everyone 
participates in teaching civic virtue just as they do the Greek language.230  Protagoras’ 
description of this education is interesting for the conditioning methodology it specifies.  
As soon as children understand language, their parents “fight hard” to teach their children 
                                                
228 Protagoras says that “people…[will say] that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have 
some trace of it or not be human” (323c). 
229 Protagoras’ aside on punishment is interesting. For Protagoras, the “true significance”—and the most 
significant effect—of punishment is not retribution or vengeance but deterrence, for “both the wrong-doer 
and whoever sees him being punished” (324b-c).  The implication here is similar to that of education—that 
political knowledge can be taught by either dispensing or observing punishment.  Virtue is teachable 
through participation in or through the threat of punishment.  His view is extraordinarily behaviorist. 
230 Plato’s use of irony here is particularly rich.  Protagoras was one of the first to study and analyze the 
Greek language and would have undoubtedly considered it a matter of expertise. Woodruff explains: 
“Protagoras argued that ‘wrath’ in the first line of the Iliad (a feminine noun in conventional Greek) should 
properly have been treated as masculine in gender…there is no doubt that Protagoras’ standard [for 
linguistic usage] was independent of public opinion, because it promoted natural over conventional genders 
for words.” Woodruff, "Rhetoric and Relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias," 295.  
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with their words and actions that “this is right and that is wrong,” “this is good and that is 
awful,” “this is pious and that is impious,” and “do this, don’t do that” (325d).  If a child 
does not obey of his own accord, “teachers” will “straighten him out with threats and 
blows as if he were a twisted, bent piece of wood” (325d).  More advanced instructional 
techniques include: rote memorization, imitation, and physical education.  When it comes 
to music, Protagoras says that the teachers will “drill the rhythms and scales into the 
children’s souls, so that they become gentler” (326b).231  Adult education is primarily the 
task of the laws:  
And when they [young adults] quit school, the city in turn compels them to learn 
the laws and to model their lives on them.  They are not to act as they please…the 
city has drawn up laws invented by the great lawgivers in the past and compels 
them to govern and be governed by them.  She punishes anyone who goes beyond 
these laws, and the term for this punishment in your city and other is, because it is 
a corrective legal action, “correction.” (326d) 
 By this account, it is difficult to see how this “education” will produce political 
knowledge or wisdom; habituation or compliance seem like more natural outcomes.  
Colby remarks that: “By repeating six times the word anankazo (to force, compel) 
Protagoras leaves little doubt that compulsion is the salient feature of this kind of 
education and that moral habituation, therefore, is its principal result.”232  Based on his 
account, Protagoras believes that civic virtue must be backed by the threat of violence, 
but that this is necessary because civic virtue and justice are in the common good and “to 
our advantage” (327b).  Protagoras understands virtue and the common good in terms of 
the mutual advantage and serviceability of community members.  Protagoras says that 
this explains why the sons of good fathers do not always possess their fathers’ good 
                                                
231 While we might wonder about this account constituting the whole of what “education” requires, anyone 
who has attended a middle school band recital will likely appreciate Protagoras’ last suggestion. 
232 Coby, Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras: 64. 
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attributes.  However, instead of proving that virtue is not teachable, Protagoras claims the 
reverse.  Since everyone is a teacher of political virtue, Protagoras says that the sons of 
good fathers have no particular advantage when it comes to learning civic virtue.  Unlike, 
say, flute playing, where parents of the rich could buy the best instruction for their 
children, and the children of the poor would receive no instruction at all, everyone 
receives an education in political virtue.  That the sons of good fathers don’t always 
amount to anything is, on this understanding, wholly unremarkable—it merely reflects a 
difference in “natural disposition” (327c).  However, Protagoras also admits that the most 
able, i.e., the richest, “start going to school at the earliest age and quit at the latest age” 
(326c-d).  If this is the case, then it is also the case that the failure of the sons of good 
fathers to learn civic virtue must be at least somewhat attributable to their fathers’ 
inability to teach or their sons’ inability to learn. 
As it turns out, then, the ability to instruct is relevant to inculcating political virtue 
in individuals.  Unsurprisingly, Protagoras describes himself as “uniquely qualified to 
assist others in becoming noble and good” because he is “the least bit more advanced in 
virtue” (328a-b).  He promises to teach the young Athenian elite present that by 
following his teaching they may become worthy leaders of what Pericles, Protagoras’ star 
pupil calls the “school of Hellas.”  Protagoras will teach them how to teach civic virtue to 
their subjects.   Plato seems, then, to question what Thucydides’ Pericles suggests—that 
the Periclean combination of optimistic rhetoric and opportunistic practice left Athens ill 
prepared for the great struggle with Sparta.  Filled with exaggerated notions of their 
destiny to rule, many ambitious young Athenians felt that the virtues of boldness and 
innovation would be sufficient to withstand the enormous resentment that their arrogant 
imperialism generated throughout Greece.  The great speech of Protagoras echoes 
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Pericles’ Funeral Oration; both speeches support Thucydides’ suggestion that the 
Athenians believed themselves to be beyond morality.  They were the measure of virtue. 
Plato again directs us to look to Thucydides’ Pericles.  After Protagoras’ great 
speech, Socrates says: “you could hear a speech similar to this from Pericles or some 
other competent orator if you happened to be present when one of them was speaking on 
this subject” (329a).  As it happens, in perhaps the most famous speech from the History, 
Thucydides recounts a funeral oration given by Pericles that gives an account of Athenian 
exceptionalism or virtue.233  It is a paean to a conception of Athens and Athenian 
imperialism that is remarkable for the way Pericles idealizes the polis.  And we should 
not be surprised that Plato directs us to Pericles, for he claims to teach just like his 
mentor.  In this oration, he calls Athens herself a “school” or “education for Hellas” 
(paideusis Hellados), and that education produces individuals “self-sufficient for the 
most varied forms of conduct, and with the most attractive qualities” (2.41).  More 
significantly for our purposes, he describes his oration as a “lesson” (didaskalia) or an 
example of what Athens teaches (2.42).234  As Michael Palmer points out, the Funeral 
Oration is the only significant speech in Thucydides’ narrative that does not urge its 
audience to political action; rather, it exhorts its audience to a political understanding.  
For this reason, the Funeral Oration is important not because of any actions resulting 
                                                
233 The Funeral Oration is not, in my view, a theoretical defense of democracy.  It is, rather, a speech in 
praise of Athens.  Athenagoras’ speech in reply to Hermocrates is the most sustained defense of democracy 
in the History (6.36-40). 
234 Liddell, Scott and Jones use this very passage in their definition of didaskalia, and render it: “serve as a 
lesson.” Lattimore and Woodruff translate didaskalia differently than I do here.  Lattimore renders it “to 
explain” and Woodruff “to show.” By rendering didaskalia in this way, Woodruff’s translation nicely 
brings out the sense of Pericles’ address as a dramatic performance—which is another common use of the 
term.  From this vantage point, Pericles’ claim that Athens is an instructional “show” for the rest of the 
Greek world is particularly ironic in light of the remainder of Thucydides’ History. Liddell et al., "A Greek-
English Lexicon," s.v. "didaskalia". 
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from it, but because of the understanding of political or civic virtue that it attempts to 
inculcate.  Let us examine the famous speech. 
Thucydides briefly sets the stage by describing the public funeral ceremony for 
those slain during the first year of the war and remarking that this rite was a custom from 
ancient Athens.  Pericles’ speech occurs very early in the war.  In the winter immediately 
following the Athenian abandonment and subsequent Spartan ravaging of the Attic plain, 
Athens held a state funeral for the individuals who died in the war’s early skirmishes.  
Following their ancestors’ wont, war dead were buried in a designated section of the city 
(with the notable exception of those killed at Marathon who, because of their outstanding 
virtue, were buried on the battlefield).  Thucydides informs us that Pericles was chosen to 
deliver this first funeral oration due to his exceptional intelligence and renown (2.34).  
Pericles begins his speech by explicitly challenging tradition.  Rather than praising the 
lawgiver who established the oration as part of the funeral assembly, Pericles reproaches 
him (2.35).  Just as one of the first things Plato’s Protagoras, the wisest man in Greece, 
does is to criticize his ancestors—the early “sophists” that included Homer and Hesiod—
the very first thing that the most famous and intelligent Athenian does is to criticize his 
predecessors.  Why might Pericles do this?  Palmer suggests an answer: “Pericles regards 
himself as wiser than the laws and the ancestors who made them; he will nevertheless 
render obedience to the laws and endeavor, to the best of his ability, to satisfy the wishes 
and opinions of everyone in his audience.”235  As we’ve seen, Pericles reason for doing 
so is remarkably similar to Protagoras’.  Pericles also draws our attention to the contrast 
between the ideal presented in his speech and the reality of the deeds of Athenians and of 
                                                
235 Michael Palmer, Love of Glory and the Common Good: Aspects of the Political Thought of Thucydides  
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), 22.  Jeffry Ruston makes a similar point, noting that 
Pericles subordinates “all these themes to the glorification of contemporary Athens itself.” Thucydides, The 
Peloponnesian War, Book II, ed. Jeffrey S. Rusten (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1989), 136. 
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the city herself: “I myself would have thought it sufficient that the honors for those who 
proved good in deed be bestowed by deed as well…rather than that the virtues of many 
men depend for their credibility on whether a single man speaks well or badly” (2.35). 
Ober argues that “by pointing out that his logos [speech] is not an ergon [deed] 
Thucydides’ Pericles alerts his audience to the element of idealization in his portrait of 
Athens.”236  
Pericles continues with his ancestral theme: “I will begin with our ancestors, since 
it is right and also appropriate on such an occasion as the present that the honor of this 
remembrance should be given to them” (2.36). Pericles begins his oration by honoring 
the ancestors who, “occupying the land through the succession of generations…handed it 
down in freedom until the present time” (2.36).  However, Pericles praises the generation 
of “our fathers” even more for not merely “occupying” their land, but adding to it—that 
is, for acquiring the empire.  Following this logic, the present generation merits the most 
praise because it has enlarged the empire, giving Athens the resources that make her self-
sufficient in matters of war and peace.  While Pericles does in fact praise his ancestors, he 
deems them less praiseworthy than the immediately preceding generation, who were 
themselves less exemplary than those of Pericles’ generation.  If the city fathers deserve 
praise for acquiring the empire and Pericles’ generation deserves praise for adding to it, 
what must the forthcoming generations do to merit such honors?  The logic of Pericles’ 
account is that—when it comes to being praiseworthy—future generations will be 
required to unleash an appetitive, acquiring spirit sufficient to further Athenian 
domination.  Pericles seems unaware of any limits or diminishing returns implied by his 
account.     
                                                
236 Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule: 84-85. 
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Pericles’ next move is surprising.  He will not detail the actions (presumably 
violent ones) that gave rise to Athens’ standing and repute.  Instead, he says that he will 
describe the “principles by which we came into this position and the form of government 
from which its greatness resulted” (2.36).  Only after this will he praise the dead.  Adam 
Parry is, as usual, insightful here, explaining that Pericles’ move to principles allows him 
to give “a sustained and realized attitude of the mind, expressing itself in a manner of 
living, in daily practices, in laws both written and unwritten, and in essential, native 
courage.  And it finds its being not in actuality, but in the minds of men.”237  Pericles 
argues that the goodness of individual Athenians is inextricably linked to the Athenian 
regime and way of life.  He notes that though Athens is called a democracy because it is 
governed by the many, not the few, and because all men are considered equal before the 
law in private disputes, men only receive honors in proportion to the virtue they exhibit.  
In Athens, democratic equality is understood to be equality of opportunity rather than 
equality of outcome.  The Athenian polis does not place limits on men’s virtue—nature 
herself is the only thing that constrains Athenian men.238  According to Pericles, then, 
Athens is especially great because it recognizes and even celebrates natural inequality.  
While Athens is administered by the many, the best men still rule her.  Pericles adds that 
Athenians are tolerant in both public and private life (unlike Sparta, where coercive 
discipline is the means for bringing about civic virtue).  Yet, though they are tolerant, this 
does not mean that they are lawless—Athenians still fear authority.  
Athenians are superior to others in education and military training.  According to 
Pericles, they are superior because they love the beautiful or noble without extravagance, 
and love knowledge but are not made weak because of it.  As for wealth—Athenians use 
                                                
237 Parry, Logos and Ergon in Thucydides: 160. 
238 Pericles is gender-specific. 
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it for “opportune action” rather than “boastful speech” (2.40).  Athenians are politically 
active and astute, respect public service, and are unique among cities because they 
consider those who “take no part in these to be not apolitical but useless” (2.40).  What’s 
more, Athenian men are daring and calculating thinkers, deciding things for themselves, 
and, in so doing, consider “instruction by speech” essential for bringing about the best 
actions.  Unlike others whose daring results from their ignorance, Athenian daring results 
from thought.  Thus, Athenian daring is doubly impressive because it combines courage 
with a full understanding of the risks and dangers involved in actions.  Furthermore, no 
one surpasses Athenian virtue because Athenians make friends not by receiving favors, 
but by doing them.  This, according to Pericles, makes Athenians firmer friends.  Those 
who give are more faithful friends than those who receive because receivers know that 
any favors they grant in return will be considered payment of a debt rather than a gift of 
kindness.  Athenian friendship, says Pericles, does not spring from “calculation of 
advantage” (2.40).  Here, Pericles hints at the relationship between Athenian liberality 
and the empire: “We are unique in being benefactors not out of calculation of advantage 
but with the fearless confidence of our freedom” (2.40).  According to Pericles, Athens 
was neither compelled to create the empire nor did she do so out of interest.  If we flip 
this around, Pericles appears to argue that the source of the Athenian allies’ resentment is 
the burden of their gratitude.  Since they are debtors, they cannot hope to benefit Athens 
as much as Athens benefits them.  This is not to say, as Jacqueline de Romilly does, that 
Pericles is admitting here that the empire is unjust.239  Rather, the ends of the empire are 
simply Athenian ends, not those of her allies.  The empire is an extension of the city, 
created for the city’s benefit.        
                                                
239 Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism: 138-39.  It does, as we saw in the Melian Dialogue, 
make a genuine common good problematic. 
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Pericles continues, arguing that Athens allows the complete flourishing of each 
individual.  Athens is the school of Greece, and every Athenian is himself sufficient and 
versatile enough to adapt to any circumstance requiring action.  Evidence of this self-
sufficiency is seen in the fact that Athens’ power was brought into being precisely 
because her citizens lived in this manner.  Of all cities, only Athens is superior in actions 
than in speech.  Because of this, there is no shame in being defeated by her and, in fact, 
no enemy is indignant following an Athenian victory because there is no shame in being 
defeated by the best.  Similarly, no subject complains that the Athenians are unworthy 
rulers.   It is important to note that, for Pericles, Athenian power testifies to her virtue: 
unlike other rulers, Athens deserves to rule.  Athens is so beautiful, great and powerful, 
says Pericles, that she does not need any poet—even Homer—to sing her praises.  The 
reality of Athens needs no embellishing: her accomplishments—or at least the memory of 
them—will serve as everlasting monuments to her greatness.    
Up to this point, Pericles has discussed the self-sufficiency of individual 
Athenians and the immortality of Athenian imperialism.  Yet, for Pericles’ portrait to be 
true, Athens’ empire must be continual and universal, as generation upon generation of 
Athenians seek to increase it.  If civic power is the vehicle through which individual 
virtue is obtained, then Athens must perpetually be at war.  And, since the Athenian 
empire is not yet universal, it must continue to be expanded.  Perhaps this is why Pericles 
concludes his praise of Athens by demanding that those who still live be prepared to 
make a similar sacrifice.  
Having finished his praise of the city and the Athenian regime, Pericles turns his 
attention to the dead, remarking that “the most important part of the eulogy has been said.  
For it is their virtues, and those of men like them, that have given honor to the qualities I 
have praised in the city” (2.42).  However, what Pericles actually says about the dead is 
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that for some of them “who were worse in other ways it is right that first place be given 
to valor against enemies on behalf of country; by effacing evil with good, they became 
public benefactors rather than individual malefactors” (2.42).  Pericles extols the fallen 
because they chose vengeance on their enemies over personal wealth or the prospect of 
future enjoyments.  As Pericles puts it: “recognizing that it meant resisting and dying 
rather than surviving by submission, they fled disgrace in word but stood up to the deed 
with their lives and through the fortune of the briefest critical moment, at the height of 
glory rather than fear, departed” (2.42).  Thus, according to Pericles, the dead are notable 
because they preferred honor to wealth—even the hope or prospect of future wealth.  It is 
no accident that the requirements of personal honor and Athenian honor are one and the 
same: Pericles harmonizes the tension between private interests and the public good.  
Specifically, death in battle—in service of Athens—is an individual’s gain rather than a 
loss.  This is so because there is no greater glory than dying in battle, and glory is 
something far more valuable than wealth or personal safety—in no small part because it 
is more dependable than these things.  This raises the following question: while it is 
obviously good for the city to have its citizens be willing to sacrifice themselves when 
necessary, how is it that, for an individual, the glory that arises from death while serving 
the city becomes the greatest of all goods?    
According to Pericles, the mechanism through which the private and the public 
become identical is love (eros).  Pericles calls upon Athenians to wonder “at the city’s 
power as you actually see it each day and becoming her lovers, reflecting whenever her 
fame appears great to you” (2.43).  The word Pericles uses here, erastes, means “lovers” 
in sense of erotic desire.240  As Clifford Orwin describes it, Pericles “presents the city as 
                                                
240 Lattimore notes Thucydides’ startling choice of words: “‘lover’ is overtly sexual and denotes the 
aggressor in relationships, so that Athens (whose power has just been mentioned) becomes a passive 
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satisfying the deepest yearnings of the citizen…[and] would transpose to the public 
sphere that which is most intensely private.”241  Moreover, for Pericles, it is not simply 
collective sacrifice in order to preserve the city—a kind of Hobbesianism—rather, glory 
is in fact the greatest good for individuals.  The city is the vehicle through which the best 
kind of glory—eternal or remembered glory—can be obtained.  Thus, there is no conflict 
for the citizen between private interest and public good—the two are functionally 
indistinguishable.242  Pericles’ position seems to be that there are no bounds to Athenian 
power—and, therefore, her empire.  He remarks that “we have compelled every sea and 
land to become open to our daring and populated every region with lasting monuments of 
our acts of harm and good” (2.41).  Pericles does not mention any restraints or discuss the 
need of temperance, self-discipline or self-rule—there are no checks or balances to 
Athenian pleonexia.  Pericles announces the totality of his conception of empire:  
For in giving their lives in common cause, they individually gained imperishable 
praise and the most distinctive tomb, not the one where they are buried but the 
one where on every occasion for word and deed their glory is left after them 
eternally.  The whole earth is the tomb of famous men, and not only inscriptions 
set up in their own country mark it but even in foreign lands an unwritten 
memorial, present not in monument but in mind, abides within each man.  
Emulate them now….(2.43) 
Given the traditional understanding that tombs mark homeland and citizenship—
the very reason that Thucydides points out the exception for the fallen at Marathon—
Pericles here suggests that the “whole earth” belongs to the Athenians, if only they will 
                                                                                                                                            
object.”  It is indeed unclear whether Pericles wants the Athenians to love Athens or her power.  Perhaps 
for Pericles the two are indistinguishable.  
241 Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides: 23. 
242 Palmer correctly points out the odd fact that, if it is the case that every Athenian killed in battle will win 
eternal glory, Pericles doesn’t name even one of the dead in his oration.   Indeed, the relatively small losses 
makes the eulogized anonymity even more conspicuous.  Perhaps this suggests that what the Athenians 
really want is individual glory, which more difficult to come by if they subjugate themselves to the city.  
Whether the Athenians (or anyone, for that matter) can, strictly speaking, love power is debatable.  It may 
be that the Athenians instead love what flows from their power and that defending their empire is the only 
way to ensure the virtue of every Athenian.     
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take it.  The polis is, then, wherever the Athenians happen to be.  Socrates’ criticism of 
Pericles in the Gorgias and Protagoras is, therefore, wholly unsurprising from this 
vantage point.  But even on Pericles’ own terms, can his idea of the polis work?  Can 
glory and shame really overcome people’s attachment to the physical, the private, and the 
traditional?   Is it possible for people to care more about glory than, say, safety or wealth?  
In his Funeral Oration, Thucydides has Pericles articulate an understanding of Athens 
that, while incredibly imaginative, is a comprehensive challenge to the traditional 
Athenian value of temperance.  It is no accident that Thucydides never uses the Greek 
word for temperance (sophrosune) or any related word to describe Pericles (or any of the 
Athenians), nor does he allow Pericles to use the word in any of his speeches.243  
Thucydides uses his narrative to question Pericles’ imagined polis by placing his 
account of the devastating plague that ravages Athens in the chapter immediately 
following the Funeral Oration.  The juxtaposition suggests that Pericles may be foolish in 
encouraging the Athenians to unbridle their greed and make the whole world their polis. 
Right after Pericles closes his mouth, his city becomes sick.  The physical, real polis, it 
seems, demands more attention and respect than Pericles wants to bestow.  As opposed to 
the handful of dead over whom the oration is spoken, several thousand die from the 
plague, and, in striking contrast, many of these dead go unburied or without proper 
funeral rites, and certainly without a glorious oration spoken over them.244  Thucydides 
tells us that the “most terrible” thing the plague brought about was not the disease itself.  
Rather, it was “the despair when someone realized he was sick (for immediately forming 
                                                
243 Lowell Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)," Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philology 79(1975): 76. 
244 Palmer suggests that: “Having presented Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in his account of the plague, 
Thucydides, we might say, presents his own…we might say that what Pericles’ Funeral Oration and 
strategic policy do to ancestral Athens prepares the way for what the plague does.” Palmer, Love of Glory 
and the Common Good: Aspects of the Political Thought of Thucydides: 30-31. 
 143 
the judgment that there was no hope, they tended much more to give themselves up 
instead of holding out), and the fact that from tending one another they died like a flock 
of sheep” (2.51).  And the ideal or imaginary Periclean hope that honor or glory would 
trump safety or advantage to become the summum bonum was dashed on the pallets of 
the sick, since it was these very individuals who were killed by the disease: 
If they were unwilling, in their fear, to approach one another, they perished in 
isolation, and many homes were emptied for want of someone to give care; if they 
drew near, they were destroyed, especially those making some claim to virtue.  
For out of honor, they did not spare themselves in visiting friends, since even 
relatives, overcome by the prevailing misery, finally grew tired of the 
lamentations of the dying. (2.51) 
As with the Corcyraean stasis, the capriciousness of death brought about by the 
plague “was the starting point for greater lawlessness in the city” (2.53).   A bold 
selfishness began to take hold, and traditional restraints on behavior dissolved.  
Thucydides’ description is worth quoting in full: 
For, as the rich suddenly died and men previously worth nothing took over their 
estates, people saw before their eyes such quick reversals that they dared to do 
freely things they would have hidden before—things they never would have 
admitted they did for pleasure.  And so, because they thought their lives and their 
property were equally ephemeral, they justified seeking quick satisfaction in easy 
pleasures.  As for doing what had been considered noble, no one was eager to take 
any further pains for this, because they thought it uncertain whether they should 
die or not before they achieved it.  But the pleasure of the moment, and whatever 
contributed to that, were set up as standards of nobility and usefulness.  No one 
was held back in awe, either by fear of the gods or by the laws of men: not by the 
gods, because men concluded it was all the same whether they worshipped or not, 
seeing that they all perished alike; and not by the laws, because no one expected 
to live till he was tried and punished for his crimes. (2.53)245 
The idealistic erotic or love relationship Pericles encourages the Athenians to have with 
their city cannot withstand the limits of the real flesh and blood of the world.  Through 
                                                
245 Woodruff translation. 
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his account of the plague, Thucydides shows the fragility of the civil society and the 
weakness of political solutions that ignore or pretend to ignore it.  For Thucydides, 
Pericles’ city in speech is akin to Sir Thomas More’s Utopia in that it is a “no-place.”  
Except that, unlike More, Pericles convinced the Athenians to embrace his—with 
disastrous consequences.  Like Plato, Thucydides encourages us to rethink the ideology 
of Athenian imperialism, but for different reasons.  Whereas Thucydides believes that 
Pericles has too high a view of human nature, Plato (as we have seen) believes that 
Pericles’ summum bonum is vastly too low.  Thucydides argues that if people are not 
forced to care about the common good, then they likely will not—or at least will not do 
so very reliably.  If we are correct that the Protagoras is Plato’s critique of the Periclean 
Age as a whole, then Pericles’ last speech contains useful insight into the content and 
force of Plato’s analysis.  Let us briefly examine Pericles’ final argument to the 
Athenians.  
 Pericles delivers his last speech in the History after the plague ebbs and after 
Sparta ravaged the Attic plain for a second time.  Thucydides says that the confluence of 
these two disasters caused the Athenians to undergo a “change in their attitude, and they 
blamed Pericles as the one who persuaded them to go to war, and they had fallen into 
misfortunes because of him” (2.59).  As a result, they sent ambassadors to Sparta to sue 
for peace, who returned empty handed.  The Athenians’ “minds…[were] reduced to 
despair on every account, [and] they railed against Pericles” (2.59).  As a result, Pericles 
called an assembly to encourage and calm them.  Pericles’ advice changes somewhat in 
his final address.  To give the Athenians hope, he suggests to them that they have an 
advantage over the Spartans that they had thought of before and which he has not 
mentioned in any of his speeches.  Indeed, he says that the only reason he shares it with 
them now is because they are unreasonably discouraged.   
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You believe that you rule only over the allies, but I declare that of two realms 
available for use, land and sea, you are completely in control of one in its entirety, 
both as far as you occupy it now and as much farther as you wish.  And there is no 
one, neither king nor any other people in existence, to prevent you from sailing 
with the naval forces you have at your disposal.  Now then, the manifestation of 
this power is not related to the use of your houses and land, whose loss you 
consider serious; nor is it reasonable to be angry on their account, but rather to 
deprecate them by thinking of the latter as a garden and the former as ornaments 
of your wealth in comparison to this power. (2.62) 
Pericles claims that the Athenians are already “masters” of one half of the 
world.246  The Athenians are mistaken to think that their rule is restricted to only their 
allies.  They are currently “complete masters” of all territory subject to sea power.  
Compared with this, their houses and land are worth nothing, because it is their naval 
power that will preserve their freedom and, in the long run, their houses and land.  
Furthermore, Pericles maintains his insistence that the Athenians can have “as much as 
you use now, and more if you want” (2.62).247  For Pericles, all parts of the existing 
empire are of equal worth, and (once things settle down), they can have or take more—
they are not to be bound by anything other than the vastness of the sea.  This view is 
consistent with the account of the pleonectic Athenian ethos given by the Corinthians at 
the Congress at Sparta, where in the attempt to persuade the Spartans to fight, they charge 
them with ignorance about the Athenians: 
Any failure to carry out what they plan they regard as a deprivation of their own 
property, and anything they set out after and achieve, as a small actual 
accomplishment compared with what remains to be done.  And if they do fail in 
some attempt, they fill the need by their hopes of new alternatives.  For they alone 
possess and hope as a single undertaking, on account of their speed in acting on 
their resolutions.  In hardship and danger they toil throughout their lives for such 
ends, and least enjoy what they have on account of always acquiring and thinking 
that there is no holiday except in doing what the occasion demands, and that 
leisure without accomplishment is more of a misfortune than burdensome activity.  
                                                
246 Presumably, if he knew the Earth was composed of seventy percent water, Pericles would have rounded 
up.   
247 Woodruff translation. 
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And so, if someone were to sum them up by saying that they were born to have no 
peace themselves and allow it to no one else, he would be right. (1.70)  
The outcome of Pericles’ wish in his first speech—that if he thought he could 
persuade the Athenians, he would have told them “to go out and lay waste” to their own 
property—has now come to pass: their houses and fields are destroyed (1.44).  Pericles’ 
advice, however, is the same—pleonexia is the solution to Athens’ problem and, 
moreover, is his way of harmonizing the public and private good.248  As in the Funeral 
Oration, Pericles appeals to the Athenians’ sense of honor to ground the pleonectic drive.  
But here, in his final speech, Pericles ties this honor of ruling an empire to fear and 
security.  He says that, “you have reason…to support the dignity our city derives from 
her empire, in which you all take pride; you should not decline the trouble, unless you 
cease to pursue the honor, of empire” (2.63).  Losing the empire, however, will bring 
with it the former allies’ anger for the ruthlessness of Athenian imperialism.   Pericles 
warns that the Athenians cannot relinquish their empire even if they wished: “You see, 
your empire is really like a tyranny—though it may have been thought unjust to seize, it 
is now unsafe to surrender” (2.63).249  Doing so will only lead to Athens’ quick 
destruction.  There are only two choices—empire and freedom, or slavery by the “envy 
and hatred” of the Greeks they ruled.  We can see, therefore, that the Athenian acceptance 
of Pericles’ ideal polis, and the pleonexia that supports it, leads directly to the argument 
of the Athenian Ambassadors at Melos. 
Pericles last speech, then, encourages the Athenians to adopt the idea that “they 
hadn’t yet thought of” and of which Pericles had not previous spoken—an endless 
                                                
248 Pericles does seem to recognize a prudential need to restrain Athenian pleonexia until the Spartans have 
decided that the war is unwinnable.  Perhaps he believes so fervently in the power of imagination that he 
thinks it possible for the Athenians to briefly shift their pleonectic desires into their imaginations during the 
time it takes for the Spartans to give up the fight. 
249 Woodruff translation. 
 147 
expansion of imperialism and pleonexia.  As Pericles exits the scene, Thucydides gives 
him a brief epitaph that details how, in his absence, the Athenians fail to hold onto his 
imaginative understanding of the polis and its respective military policy.  Many 
commentators understand Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles to be one of endorsement.  
For example, Jacqueline de Romilly argues that Thucydides considers Pericles’ 
imperialist ideal both sound and productive (though undermined by his incompetent 
successors).250  Lowell Edmunds argues that, for Thucydides, Pericles embodies political 
intelligence.251  Josiah Ober suggests that Thucydides considered Pericles skillful enough 
to keep the structural problems with Athenian democracy under wraps.252  None of these 
accounts takes seriously enough the idea that Thucydides considers Pericles’ intelligence 
and imagination—his philosophy as it were—as containing the virus that would 
eventually destroy Athens.  I believe that this is because most commentators pay 
insufficient attention to the way Thucydides argues—through his arrangement of the 
narrative, the juxtaposition of speeches, his use of patterns, and his infrequent authorial 
opinions.253  While Thucydides does hint that, had Pericles lived, the Athenians might 
have been able to win the war,254 he also raises the question of whether Pericles’ radical 
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reimagining of the traditional, conventional attitudes of the polis was an act of hubris that 
set Athens’ destruction in motion.  Specifically, he raises the question of whether Pericles 
overestimated his capacity to control the Athenians and overlooked the centrality of his 
own role to his strategy’s success.  This is more than merely poor succession 
management practices—Thucydides seems to argue that Pericles’ view was so 
imaginative and un-moored from traditional understandings that no one could replace 
him.  Indeed, Thucydides tells us that it did not take long for things to unravel after 
Pericles’ death:    
[After Pericles, the Athenians] managed all these affairs in the opposite way, and 
in accordance with personal ambition and personal gain they pursued other 
policies that seemed unrelated to the war, to the detriment of both themselves and 
the allies, since, when these succeeded, they brought honor and benefit more to 
individuals but, when they failed, they did damage to the city regarding the war. 
(2.65)255 
Thucydides, then, raises the question of Pericles’ culpability for the eventual 
Athenian defeat.  Let us not forget that in Book VIII Thucydides will, in his own voice, 
argue that the best Athenian regime during his lifetime was the Five Thousand, which 
consisted of everyone who could afford a suit of hoplite armor, and “which first lifted the 
city out of the terrible…condition of its affairs” (8.97).  His reason for this is that the Five 
Thousand was “a moderate blending between the few and the many” (8.97).  Since 
Thucydides also lived during Pericles’ rule, this means that he considered it superior to 
the “democracy” under Pericles.  Yet, even this “moderate” government reveals the 
Athenians’ underlying pleonectic addiction.  Thucydides tells us that they only voted the 
Five Thousand into power because they lost the nearby island of Euboea, where they kept 
their cattle during the war.  They viewed this loss as more calamitous than the loss of 
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their army and fleet in Sicily (8.96).  Thus, Thucydides implies that extreme fear and 
duress are the only ways to moderate Athenian desire.  Pericles’ reconceptualization of 
the city required a re-education program that only he could manage.  Thucydides’ 
narrative juxtaposition of Pericles’ Funeral Oration and the plague suggest that Pericles’ 
ideas and policies were too immoderate when faced with the brute realities brought on by 
the war.  He failed to appreciate how important traditionally shared beliefs are to 
ensuring civic harmony.  If we understand Pericles’ teaching as representing the Athenian 
political education, to what extent is the rapid collapse of Athenian political life a result 
of this instruction?  Furthermore, if we think of Alcibiades—Pericles’ ward and 
participant in the Protagoras—as the heir and culmination of Pericles’ (and, for Plato, 
Protagoras’) instruction, we can see that what the “school of Hellas” taught was 
pleonexia and its political extension, tyranny.    
During the Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta, Alcibiades advanced 
Athenian interests by tricking Nicias and the Spartans and forming an alliance with 
Argos, Sparta’s enemy.  Thucydides tells us that he was motivated to make the alliance in 
large part out of personal ambition and jealousy that the peace with the Spartans was 
made by his rival Nicias (5.43).  Even the most pious and tradition-minded Athenian was 
not immune to Pericles’ teaching, for Nicias’ motives were equally personal—he wanted 
to secure his own reputation by preserving the peace that carried his name.  From a 
strategic standpoint, Alcibiades’ move was brilliant—Sparta and Argos end up risking 
both of their armies in a decisive battle at Mantinea.  Were the Spartans to have lost, 
Athens’ enemy would have been destroyed and she would essentially rule Greece without 
risking anything.  However, Thucydides draws our attention to the fact that, for both 
Alcibiades and Nicias, it is personal interest rather than moderation that drives their 
decision-making.  Consider the remainder of Alcibiades’ life; he became the foremost 
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advocate for the Sicilian Expedition.  Just before the fleet sailed, a great many religious 
statues (herms) were vandalized.  This sacrilege was an ominous omen to the Athenians.  
Alcibiades was suspected of participating in this act.  Instead of standing trial in Athens, 
he fled to Sparta where he gave the Spartans advice that helped them defeat the 
Athenians at Sicily.  He compounded his treason by advising the Spartans to establish a 
fort at Decelea, on Athens’ doorstep, which Thucydides says was “foremost in damaging 
their [the Athenians’] affairs” (7.27).  Alcibiades was later forced to flee from Sparta 
after seducing the wife of one of the Spartan kings. He then turned on the Spartans, 
successfully obtaining Persian support for the Athenians.   
This, then, is what Pericles’ teaching unleashes, and it had disastrous 
consequences for Athens.  In Sicily, for example, nearly the entire Athenian fleet was 
destroyed, and most of the army was slaughtered. The approximately 7,000 troops who 
surrendered were imprisoned in the Syracusan stone quarries and left to die of starvation 
and disease.  Thucydides’ description of the suffering is harrowing: 
The Syracusans treated the men in the quarries harshly…For since there were 
many in a deep and narrow space, the sun and the suffocating heat were still 
distressing them at first, and the contrasting autumnal nights that ensued 
weakened their condition by the change, and since they had to do everything in 
the same space because of close confines, and furthermore the corpses were piled 
together on one another, dead from wounds and because of the change and so 
forth, there were unbearable smells, and at the same time they were afflicted with 
hunger and thirst…and of all the other miseries men thrust into such a place were 
likely to suffer there was not one that they did not encounter. (7.87) 
The externally directed pleonexia that Pericles preaches in final speech becomes 
internally directed in the next generation.  Thucydides’ narrative suggests that Pericles’ 
teaching is perhaps a beautiful and imaginative logos, but it becomes self-defeating in the 
world of deeds (ergon).     
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We can now begin to see why Plato directs our attention to Thucydides’ Pericles.  
Thucydides shows the folly of Pericles’ and Protagoras’ conception of virtue embodied in 
their respective teachings. “Man is the measure” tends to lead to an ethos of pleonexia 
and tyranny.  To undermine this, Plato must replace it with an account of virtue with an 
external evaluative standard.  Man cannot simply be the measure—the standard must 
transcend Protagoras’ weak relativism that permits Pericles’ love of glory to stand as a 
moral principle.  Returning to the dialogue, Protagoras’ muthos and logos show that: (1) 
there is a natural difference in human beings’ dispositions and capabilities for virtue, (2) 
that virtue is acquired through instruction, (3) instruction in virtue is done by every 
citizen (and, hence, does not require any particular expertise), and (4) teaching virtue 
consists primarily of conditioning through observation, practice, and discipline.  
Socrates’ immediate response to Protagoras’ myth and argument seems at first peculiar in 
that it appears to ignore the larger point of Protagoras’ great speech.  Socrates notes that 
Protagoras discusses a variety of different virtues and asks whether the virtues Protagoras 
has mentioned are one thing or different things.  Protagoras claims that they are indeed 
one thing, but that they represent different parts of the larger whole.  Socrates then asks 
him if the different parts are akin to the parts of the face (e.g., nose, mouth, eyes, ears) or 
whether they are more like parts of gold.  Protagoras answers that each of the parts is 
different or unique but together they comprise the larger concept of virtue.  In contrast to 
Protagoras’ view, Socrates will argue for the unity of the virtues—specifically, that all 
the conventionally understood virtues are nothing other than knowledge or wisdom. 
Socrates argument runs along the following lines.  He begins by asking 
Protagoras whether he accepts the proposition that justice and piety are identical.  Despite 
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his misgivings, Protagoras agrees.256  His agreement is interesting because Socrates’ 
argument here is that the various virtues cannot simultaneously be both themselves and 
their opposites (331a).  This is odd because this position is a logical extension of the 
situational relativism that Protagoras has previously maintained.  Indeed, this ends up 
being all Socrates needs to force Protagoras to abandon his earlier position and state that 
the goodness or badness of a thing is a product of context or necessity, which is to say 
convention or nomos.  Socrates then moves from piety to temperance and, after a long 
argument, gets Protagoras to agree that these are also the same.  Socrates then attempts to 
show that wisdom and temperance are the same thing since, if he can establish this, he 
will be able to claim the unity of justice, temperance, piety, and wisdom.   
At this point, Protagoras gets irritated and refuses to curb the length of his 
responses.  His rationale is worth pausing over: “Socrates, I have had verbal contests with 
many people, and if I were to accede to your request and do as my opponent demanded, I 
would not be thought superior to anyone, nor would Protagoras be a name to be reckoned 
with among the Greeks” (335a).  Though not an Athenian himself, Protagoras is now 
behaving as one and, in this sense, is literally practicing what he preaches.  For 
Protagoras, the issue is victory, honor, and glory—not the search for knowledge or truth.  
Furthermore, Protagoras acknowledges that what really distinguishes him is not 
knowledge or wisdom, but his success in “verbal contests.”  Plato presents him as the 
very opposite of Socrates.  As Socrates will show, Protagoras’ pretense to wisdom 
depends on denying the underlying wholeness of virtue.  Protagoras’ wisdom derives 
from his “knowing” that truth is merely a phantom.  Furthermore, even if Protagoras 
actually understood the political art, the Protagoras seems to indicate that when logos is 
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used with a view toward victory rather than knowledge, incoherence follows.  Since 
Protagoras refuses to accede to Socrates’ request for short, pithy responses, Socrates 
starts to leave, but is restrained by Prodicus and Hippias.  This is, as T. K. Seung notes, 
the moment of political crisis in the dialogue.257  The conflict centers on tolerance: 
Protagoras will not tolerate the use of the Socratic method and Socrates will not tolerate 
the Protagorean method.  Callias gently points out that the thing most needful is the virtue 
of reverence or respect (aidos), insofar as a discussion is necessarily a shared 
endeavor.258   
Unsurprisingly, Protagoras challenges Socrates on terrain he is more comfortable 
of victory: the interpretation of poetry.  While the song remains the same (virtue), the 
context moves to what is perhaps the most conventional Greek forum for discussing it—
interpreting the wisdom of the poets.  For our purposes, the most important observation 
about the contest are Socrates’ outlandish (and hilarious) remarks about Spartan wisdom.  
He claims that philosophy “has its most ancient roots and is most widespread among the 
Greeks in Crete and Lacedaemon” (342a).  However, if we are right about Plato’s 
invitation for us to link Protagoras and Pericles, we should not be surprised by Socrates’ 
remarks because in the dialogue Protagoras represents the headmaster of Pericles’ 
“school of Hellas.”  Socrates argues that Spartan virtue is not simply a matter of courage 
and “their brave fighting men,” but on wisdom, which they disguise in laconic sayings 
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out of their fear that if others discovered that their power was due to wisdom—rather than 
“lacing on leather gloves, exercising fanatically, and wearing short capes”—they would 
begin to cultivate it themselves (342b).  The “distinctive kind of Spartan wisdom in their 
pithy, memorable sayings” is what enables them to be fearless and composed in battle, as 
well as practice individual virtue.  Socrates cautions that: 
You would know that what I say is true and that the Lacedaemonians have been 
best educated with a view to philosophy and speeches, by the following: if 
someone is willing to get together with the paltriest of Lacedaemonians, he will 
discover that, for the most part, the Lacedaemonian does indeed appear to be a 
paltry fellow when it comes to speeches.  But then, at a certain point in what’s 
being said, he throws out a brief and pithy utterance, one worthy of account, just 
like a terrific javelin [akontistes] thrower. (342d-e)259 
Socrates uses his ironical humor here to warn the Athenian elite that their love of 
Periclean rhetoric will be insufficient to defeat Sparta.  And Socrates’ mention of a 
javelin thrower is perhaps no accident.  Plutarch reports that Pericles’ son Xanthippus—
who is present in the Protagoras, told others: 
what Pericles got up to at home and the conversations he used to have with the 
sophists. For instance, when a competitor in the pentathlon accidentally hit 
Epitimius of Pharsalus with a javelin and killed him, Pericles spent a whole day 
discussing with Protagoras whether the javelin or the person who threw it or the 
organizers of the games should, speaking absolutely strictly, be held responsible 
for what had happened.260   
If this story was indeed spread around Athens, it is no wonder Plato puts it to use here.  
To borrow one of Thucydides’ favorite antilogies, it illustrates how laughably ineffectual 
sophistic speech or rhetoric (logos) is when confronted with the harsh reality of deeds 
(ergon).  When faced with the deed of an impaled corpse, Pericles and Protagoras cannot 
                                                
259 Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). The 
Greek word akontistes means javelin-thrower.  Liddell et al., "A Greek-English Lexicon," s.v. "akontistes". 
260 Plutarch, Greek Lives : A Selection of Nine Greek Lives, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 176-77. 
 155 
escape from their logos, and spend the day in presumably pleasant and imaginative 
debate.  Socrates seems here to be laying the groundwork for his position that Protagoras 
and Pericles are relativists.  Their concern with rhetoric or speech is notable in that 
grammar is perhaps the quintessential example of nomos.  By their understanding, 
languages, like justice, will vary from place to place.  At a minimum, this implies 
different kinds of justice in different places, and Plato invites us to consider whether the 
“school of Hellas” is nothing other than a master class in relativism that ended up 
damaging the souls of Athenians.  Their habituation to injustice damaged their souls 
because it damaged their ability to know genuine pleasure and, hence, their ability to 
enjoy lives of happiness (eudaimonia) through virtue, of which justice is a part.   
Protagoras argues that good is a relative term—that the same thing can be good 
for one species (humans) and bad for another (horses), and uses the example of oil to 
make his point: “But the good is such a multifaceted and variable thing that, in the case of 
oil, it is good for the external parts of the human body but very bad for the internal parts” 
(334b-c).  Socrates reports that Protagoras’ speech on the relativism of the good received 
such applause that he had to wait until it “died down” to respond (334d).  As Paul 
Woodruff points out: “Such relativism may have furthered in some minds the 
independent idea that there is no such thing as an absolute good or an absolute evil.”261  I 
believe Plato intends to show us that Protagoras’ position was not simply that the same 
thing can be equally useful depending on the circumstance, but that Protagoras believed 
the same thing can be equally true.  Protagoras’ position was significant enough for Plato 
to take it up again in the Theaetetus: 
                                                
261 Woodruff, "Rhetoric and Relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias," 301.  Woodruff goes on to say that this 
view “does not in itself entail extreme relativism.”  I agree with Woodruff that Protagoras’ account here 
does not necessarily entail the denial of the possibility of absolute truth (but it might be eikos).   
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Socrates: But look here, this is no ordinary account of knowledge you’ve come 
out with: it’s what Protagoras used to maintain. He said the very same thing, only 
he put it in a rather different way.  For he says, you know, that “Man is the 
measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things 
which are not, that they are not.”  You have read this, of course? 
Theaetetus: Yes, often. 
Socrates: Then you know that he puts it something like this, that as each thing 
appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you (152a). 
According to Socrates, Protagoras claims that no opinion can ever be considered false, 
and every opinion is true for the person who holds it.  Now, this weak relativism with 
respect to truth also implies that opposing views are also equally true.  And this means 
that contrary or opposed views can both be true at the same time.  But if this is the case, 
then “contrary” or “opposed” has no meaning and, therefore, there can be no common 
truth (or, presumably, a shared reality that it corresponds to). 
After the interlude where Protagoras and Socrates give varying interpretations of 
Simonides’ poem about Pittacus’ maxim that it is difficult to be good, Socrates turns the 
discussion back to the question of the unity of the virtues, and adds courage to the other 
four.  Protagoras claims that, even though the other virtues they have been discussing are 
“reasonably close to each other,” courage is another matter entirely.  For Protagoras, 
courage is qualitatively different from the others and cites as proof the fact that “you will 
find many people who are extremely unjust, impious, intemperate, and ignorant, and yet 
exceptionally courageous” (349d).  Socrates objects to this understanding by introducing 
the role of confidence.  According to him, though courageous men are often called 
confident, their confidence can arise from either knowledge or ignorance and, since 
confidence based on ignorance is “contemptible,” courage must be knowledge-based.   
But Protagoras distances himself from this last claim.  He is comfortable accepting that 
the courageous man is bold, and that virtue is noble or beautiful, but not that the 
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difference between courage and confidence is based on knowledge.  Socrates pushes on 
nevertheless.  The specific knowledge that is required for courage to be virtuous is 
knowing how to “live well” or “live badly”—which is nothing less than a knowledge of 
good and evil (351a-b).  Socrates then introduces his famous hedonistic calculus: he 
equates good with pleasure and evil with pain.  The specific knowledge in question turns 
out to be the knowledge that living well means living pleasurably and living badly is 
living in pain.   As the hedonistic calculus goes, all pleasures are good and all pains are 
bad. 
Protagoras does not accept Socrates’ hedonism because he believes that there are 
pleasurable things that are bad and painful things that are good (and some things which 
are neither good nor bad).  This is a highly conventional view—which Socrates skewers 
Protagoras for embracing, asking Protagoras why he cares so much about the opinions of 
the masses that, as we’ve seen, he derides.  Socrates claims that the masses that 
Protagoras now seems to care so much about use pleasure and pain as their standard for 
determining whether something is good or bad.  He continues, asserting that, on this 
basis, we need an arithmetic art of measurement to determine the goodness of “our 
actions and choices with respect to things large and small” (356d).  Socrates suggests that 
courage is this art, since it deals with men’s hopes and fears—which naturally involve 
calculations of pleasures and pains.  As Socrates explains: “what one fears one holds to 
be bad; no one goes toward those things which he holds to be bad, or chooses those 
things willingly” (358e). Socrates argues that since the art is measurement, it must be 
knowledge and, since it is knowledge, courage must be identical to wisdom.  After 
Protagoras agrees in order to conclude the discussion, Socrates asserts that: “everything is 
knowledge” (361b).  All virtue, then, reduces to wisdom.  Despite Protagoras’ faux 
consent, he and Socrates put forth two very different understandings of virtue. As we’ve 
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noted, Protagoras’ approach is purely conventional—indeed, he names and describes 
virtues as given by convention.262  This is why he is so interested and careful about the 
opinions and conventions of the masses, particularly on matters of good and evil.  
Protagoras cannot embrace Socrates’ thesis of the unity of the virtues because this would 
entail accepting a transcendent or absolute standard of goodness that would undermine 
his understanding of various communal or conventional moralities that operate through 
the division and severability of the virtues.  For Protagoras, a man is virtuous by 
reference to the norms or conventions of his community.  It is incomprehensible to him 
that a community might exist to help its citizens ascend toward transcendent virtue—as 
we saw in his myth, virtues exist only to preserve human kind.   
Socrates’ understanding could not be more different.  As we saw in our discussion 
of the Gorgias, Socrates rejects conventionalism and argues for a transcendent standard 
for determining good and evil.  His arithmetic art of measurement or hedonistic calculus 
is an attempt to move beyond or outside of convention as a standard for determining good 
and evil.  Their different approaches to virtue reflect different understandings of 
education and of politics.  Protagoras argues for instruction as indoctrination and 
submission to convention—an understanding of conventional beliefs and behavior are the 
ends of his educational program.  Students need not understand or even question whether 
their conventions are good or evil; the conventions themselves will do this for them (and 
will be internalized in their souls through conditioning or “education”).  In contrast, 
Socratic education begins with convention, but it does not end there.   The end of Socratic 
education is knowledge and, as we shall see, this becomes one of the central themes of 
the Republic.  Thucydides shows and rejects Pericles’ imaginative, sophistic 
                                                
262 The consequences of this kind of conventionalism, specifically, the confluence of pleonexia and 
tyranny, is what Thucydides points out through his narrative structure. 
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understanding of the polis through the shaping of his narrative.  Plato directs us to 
Thucydides’ account not only because it supports his position, but because it provides 
him with the opportunity to deepen the account by connecting it to what he believes is its 









Chapter 4: Thucydides’ Archaeology and Plato’s Republic  
The Republic can be seen as the culmination of Plato’s response to the challenge 
represented by Callicles.  In the Gorgias, Socrates responds to Callicles’ ethos of 
aggression, greed, and tyranny with a primarily individual solution: the happy life 
devoted to individual virtue.  This solution is inadequate because a happy life based 
exclusively on individual virtue ultimately requires a just city.  So, while Socrates argues 
in the Gorgias that a virtuous individual would be happy even if beaten, tortured and 
defamed by unjust individuals, in the Republic, Socrates softens this position, saying 
instead that virtuous individuals confronted with “general savagery” should “lead a quiet 
life and do their own work” (496d).   
Put another way, Socrates’ solution in the Gorgias is a necessary, but not 
sufficient response to the problem of Callicles.  It is a psychological rather than a civic 
solution.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how a reformed Callicles could be enlisted in the 
service of the common good on the basis of the Gorgias alone. This is because, for Plato, 
the good is not something that be exclusively possessed by an individual—it is 
qualitatively different from property.  Socrates makes this point to Callicles in reverse by 
showing that for good leaders to make their citizens’ virtuous, they must first know virtue 
as individuals (515a-d).  To the extent, however, that individual virtue conflicts with civic 
virtue or the common good, focusing on the individual alone can exacerbate the problem 
by introducing a selfish understanding of the good.  This is, of course, why it is so 
important for Socrates to show why justice is good for the individual.  Taken too far, this 
selfishness transforms into tyranny and, as we saw in the Protagoras, is what explains the 
need for justice—it serves to moderate the conflict between selfishness and the common 
good.  Thus, individual and civic virtue must be harmonized, and it is in the Republic 
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where Plato has Socrates undertake this project in detail.  In order to effectively do this, 
Plato will need to shift the focus of the Greek Enlightenment away from teachings that 
support pleonexia and re-educate the people.  While perhaps not entirely fair—for 
example, Protagoras did not claim that pleonexia or tyranny was a logical implication or 
consequence of his anthropological teaching on human nature—Plato seems to believe 
that these are, in fact, the moral and political positions most likely to result from the 
sophistic point of view.  As we shall see, Plato takes the Protagorean position seriously in 
the Republic by pointing out that resenting injustice is the starting point on the way to 
wisdom about justice.  
Plato foreshadows this purpose in the dialogue’s frame scene.263 The Republic 
begins with Socrates “going down” (kateben) to the Piraeus with Plato’s brother Glaucon 
for the festival of Bendis, a new goddess from Thrace whose cult is being introduced to 
Athens.264  As many commentators have observed, the very first word of the Republic 
reveals a descent.265  Homer uses the same word, kateben, in Book XXIII of the Odyssey.  
After killing Penelope’s suitors, Odysseus tells Penelope that his work is not yet finished:  
 
There is still a long, hard task for me to complete, 
As the spirit of Tiresias foretold to me 
On the day I went down to the house of Hades 
To ask him about my companions’ return 
                                                
263 As Seth Benardete wonderfully puts it: “Symbolism is shorthand for an argument.” Seth Benardete, 
Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 9. 
264 It often goes unremarked that Socrates reports that the action of the Republic took place “yesterday.”  
This is an astonishing display of endurance.  Socrates walks 5 miles, stays up all night in conversation, 
walks another 5 miles uphill, and then is so interested in relaying what happened in the house of Cephalus 
that he reports the conversation in detail, without a break, and presumably before sleeping.  I conducted an 
an-hoc experiment to see how long it would take to perform the dialogue by taking a small random sample 
of pages and reading them aloud as if in performance.  Done in this fashion, it would take over twelve 
hours to perform the Republic.  This kind of stamina is also seen in Socrates’ behavior after the Symposium, 
where, after staying up all night, he washes up and spent the rest of the day “just as he always did, and only 
then, as evening was falling, went home to rest” (223d). 
265 Eric Voegelin takes this one step further, claiming that the Piraeus represents Hades.  Voegelin, Order 
and History, 3. 
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And my own. (23: 255-260)266 
The word kateben will reappear later in the Republic, during Socrates’ famous parable of 
the cave.  In response to Glaucon’s concern that they will be doing an injustice to the 
philosopher-kings by making them descend back into the cave to rule, Socrates says that 
they will tell the philosopher-kings:  
each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the 
others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark…Thus, for you and for us, the 
city will be governed, not like the majority of cities nowadays, by people who 
fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule—as if that 
were a great good—but by people who are awake rather than dreaming, for the 
truth is surely this: A city whose prospective rulers are least eager to rule must of 
necessity be most free from civil war. (520c-d)    
The very first word of the dialogue, then, anticipates Socrates’ instruction on the 
relationship between justice and the common good: 
It isn’t the law’s concern to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy 
but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens 
into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making 
them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the 
community.  The law produces such people in the city, not in order to allow them 
to turn in whatever direction they want, but to make use of them to bind the city 
together. (519e-520a) 
Socrates descends from Athens to its port approximately five miles away.  The 
Piraeus is the military and commercial seaport of Athens and, in the civil strife (stasis) 
following Athens’ eventual defeat, will be the site of a critical battle.  The Athenian 
democrats led by Thrasybulus will seize control of the Piraeus and defeat the Thirty 
Tyrants in a pitched battle by the temple of Bendis.267  Before the construction of the 
Piraeus, the Athenian seaport was Phaleron, but it was too small and shallow to support 
the imperial navy, so Themistocles built fortifications around the Piraeus.  Most of the 
                                                
266 Homer, Odyssey, trans. Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2000). 
267 G. R. F. Ferrari, "Introduction," in The Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), xi-xii. 
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people who lived in the Piraeus were foreigners who conducted business in Athens, like 
Cephalus, whose family of shield makers were invited to Athens from Sicily by none 
other than Pericles himself.268  Naturally, given the foreign influence, the Piraeus was a 
place of innovative ideas and unusual practices.269  But the Piraeus was more than simply 
an interesting diversion—it was the lifeblood of Athens.  Athens had grown so large that 
she could not produce enough grain to feed herself.  Her reliance on imports was 
exacerbated during the Peloponnesian War when the entire Athenian population lived 
within her protective walls rather than in the countryside.  The Piraeus grew to become a 
great city in its own right and was designed by “the world’s first professional urban 
planner, Hippodamus of Miletus.”270  With its three protected harbors and massive 
storage sheds for the ships, Piraeus was unquestionably the center of the Athenian navy—
the basis, as John Hale shows, of both Athens’ empire and her democracy.  His 
description of Hippodamus will resonate with readers of the Republic: 
No mere surveyor of streets, Hippodamus was in fact a utopian theorist.  His quest 
led him in search of a physical setting for the perfect human community: social, 
spatial, and spiritual.  Along with his own mastery of philosophy, meteorology, 
and architecture, Hippodamus seemed to see threefold divisions everywhere.  In 
his ideal city the population would be divided into three classes: craftsmen, 
farmers, and warriors.271 
It is fitting, then, that the inaugural festival of Bendis takes place in the seaport—
the Athenians are importing a goddess just like they import their grain from the 
Hellespont and, as Thucydides tells us, the plague that would ravage the Athenian 
                                                
268 According to Nails, Pericles “persuaded Cephalus to settle in Athens, probably in the late 450s, when 
the economy of Athens welcomed foreign residents, and before any backlash…. having established a 
successful shield factory that had over a hundred slaves by 404.” Nails, The People of Plato: A 
Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics: 84. 
269 Allan Bloom notes in his translation that the Piraeus “seems to have been a center for innovations in 
everything, including religion.” Plato, The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 441. 
270 John R. Hale, Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy  (New 
York: Viking, 2009), 115.  
271 Ibid. 
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population.  The theme of innovation—the death of the old and the birth of the new—
runs through the Republic. On the same night the Athenians introduce a new cult 
goddess, Socrates invents the Kallipolis, and will introduce new ideas of the soul and the 
gods that, according to Walter Burkert, will revolutionize Greek religion: 
Since Plato and through him, religion has been essentially different from what it 
had been before….It is Plato who brings about a revolution in religious language 
and in piety at one and the same time.  Thereafter we find faith supported by 
philosophy, love transcending the world, and hope for an afterlife; there is 
humility, service of the gods, and at the same time the goal of assimilation to 
god.272 
What’s more, according to Christopher Planeaux’s recent review of the evidence, the date 
of the first Bendis celebration in Attica was early June 429, during the second summer of 
the plague and, as Thucydides describes, a desperate time for Athens.273  In the Republic, 
then, Plato has Socrates introduce a new teaching designed to save what truly sickens 
Athens on the same evening the Athenians look to Bendis—the goddess of moon and the 
night—in their time of need.  The Athenians are so turned around that they choose to 
remain in the darkness of the cave and desperately need the light of philosophy.274  Plato 
situates the Republic in the center of Athenian decadence and empire on the day where its 
people celebrate their desire to remain chained in the cave by choosing to celebrate the 
goddess of the night.   
                                                
272 Burkert, Greek Religion: 322, 275. 
273 Christopher Planeaux, "The Date of Bendis' Entry into Attica," The Classical Journal 96, no. 2 (2000). 
274 It is said that Plato rewrote Book I of the Republic many times.  See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers, III.37, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De compositione verborum, 25.209.   If this 
is correct, then it is likely that he thought Book I was very important and, as a result, it is worth spending 
some time trying to determine Plato’s purpose in staging the Republic the way he did.  See Francisco 
Gonzalez’s illustration of this point in Francisco Gonzalez, "How to Read a Platonic Prologue: Lysis 203a-
207d," in Plato as Author : The Rhetoric of Philosophy, ed. Ann N. Michelini (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Gerald 
Press is similarly insightful in Gerald A. Press, "Principles of Dramatic and Non-dogmatic Plato 
Interpretation," in Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations, ed. Gerald A. Press (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1993). 
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I think there is solid evidence for believing that the conversation of the Republic 
occurs in the context of the cave that is imperial Athens.  If this is so, then we should 
attend to Socrates’ instruction in Book VII to apply the image of the cave “as a whole to 
all that has been said” (517a-b).275  In his initial description of the cave and its dwellers, 
Glaucon says that: “It’s a strange image you’re [Socrates] describing, and strange 
prisoners” (515a).  Socrates ignores Glaucon’s concern about the image of the cave and 
turns immediately to what he sees as Glaucon’s more fundamental misunderstanding of 
its inhabitants, saying that: “they’re like us” (515a).  The allegory of the cave is not 
meant as some kind of fantasy divorced from the real world, it represents what a 
community looks like when it is not ruled or grounded by philosophy.276   
The cave is dominated by images of violence and compulsion.  Socrates uses the 
word compel (ananke) ten times during his parable (515a-517a), the same word that 
Thucydides reports the Athenians used in their speech at Sparta to explain their 
imperialism and attachment to empire (1.76).  Socrates says that a man returning to the 
cave having been in the light of day would argue with the prisoners like in a courtroom, 
one of the most famous Athenian inventions (517d-e).  And, were he to try to free the 
cave’s prisoners and lead them upward, the prisoners would “kill him” (517a).   Like the 
description of the cave, the Republic’s opening scene is also characterized by images of 
force and threats of violence.  When Socrates and Glaucon start their return to Athens, 
they are physically restrained by Polemarchus’ slave, who grabs Socrates’ cloak. After 
Socrates says that he and Glaucon are heading home, Polemarchus (who will later be 
killed by the Thirty) increases the stakes, saying: “Do you see how many we are?...Well, 
                                                
275 Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935). 
276 Dale Hall, "Interpreting Plato's Cave as an Allegory of the Human Condition," Apeiron 14, no. 2 
(1980): 74-86.  
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you must either prove stronger than we are, or you will have to stay here” (327c).  When 
Socrates suggests that he and Glaucon might persuade them to let he and Glaucon go 
free, Polemarchus replies that it will be to no avail because, like the prisoners in the cave, 
“we won’t listen” (327c).  Since Glaucon’s brother Adeimantus is among Polemarchus’ 
gang, we are reminded of Thucydides’ account of the Corcyrean stasis where family 
members killed each other (this will resurface in our consideration of Thrasymachus).  
While Socrates and Glaucon capitulate, it is interesting to note that the word Socrates 
uses to indicate his capitulation is identical to that used by the Athenian Assembly to 
indicate the passage of a law.277  
If we examine the way Book I unfolds with the cave allegory in mind, we can see 
that the entire discussion of the nature of justice takes place underground.278  Socrates’ 
three arguments—with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus—follow the same 
pattern.  Each of his interlocutors puts forth a view of justice, which Socrates is able to 
undermine through his questioning.  None of the three views are ever said to constitute 
knowledge.  They are, rather, three opinions or images of justice.  Cephalus thinks of 
justice in terms of rewards and punishments—giving back what you’ve taken and telling 
the truth—and understands these in terms of obeying divine commands.  Socrates shows 
that this understanding of justice as honestly adhering to rules is problematic because 
sometimes giving things back and telling the truth are bad for everyone concerned, and 
justice must be something good.  Polemarchus transforms Simonides’ maxim that justice 
                                                
277 Allan Bloom describes this scene as “a dramatic prefiguration of the whole political problem.” Plato, 
The Republic of Plato: 441n6. 
278 Kimon Lycos argues that the purpose of Book I is to “turn the soul around…[to see] the realities of 
justice…rather than merely considering its conventionally recognized ‘appearances.’” He also suggests that 
“the relation of Book I to the rest of the work corresponds somewhat to the powerful and highly influential 
image of the Cave Plato describes in Book VII.” Kimon Lycos, Plato on Justice and Power: Reading Book 
I of Plato's Republic  (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), 6. 
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is giving each his due into justice as helping friends and harming enemies.279  Socrates 
shows that this understanding of justice as a kind of crude patriotism is insufficient 
because it can sometimes mean harming good individuals, and the idea of justice as 
virtue is incompatible with harming anyone because it makes them unjust.280  
Thrasymachus argues that justice is merely the advantage of the stronger and makes an 
unabashed appeal to pleonexia.  Thrasymachus seems to represent what is found at the 
back or bottom of the cave—pure appetite, raw power, and greed.  Plato’s setting of the 
Republic, then, invites us to consider that, in a world without the love of wisdom, 
Thrasymachus’ victory is perhaps inescapable.  As Julia Annas puts it, Plato intends to 
demonstrate that the “void [of Cephalus and Polemarchus] is all too plausibly filled by 
his [Thrasymachus’] skepticism.”281  
 Let us now turn our attention to Thrasymachus.  Thrasymachus was a famous 
sophist orator from Chalcedon who traveled from city to city teaching the art of 
persuasion.  He was especially well known for his stylistic innovations.282  According to 
Stephen A. White’s recent investigation into his activities and beliefs, Thrasymachus was 
also an experienced diplomat.283  White persuasively argues that after Chalcedon’s failed 
                                                
279 Indeed, we might say that the entire argument of the Republic is Plato’s attempt to find meaning in 
Simonides’ maxim.  It is worth noting as well that the conversation or contest between Polemarchus and 
Socrates over the meaning of Simonides’ maxim parallels that between Protagoras and Socrates in the 
Protagoras, and links the dialogues.   
280 The Polemarchean idea of justice remains alive and well.  Presidential candidate Herman Cain recently 
articulated this understanding of justice, saying that: “We must clarify who our friends are, clarify who our 
enemies are, and stop giving money to our enemies.'' Trip Gabriel, "Tested Again and Again, Cain Takes 
Comfort in His Rise in the Polls," The New York Times, 2011/10/31/ 2011. 
281 See Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 21.  It is 
worth noting here that, though Socrates shows how each of these views about justice is inadequate, he 
never puts forth his own definition of justice, pleading ignorance (337e).  As we shall see, justice is built 
into Kallipolis as the virtue necessary in the design of the city.  We might, therefore, consider the 
construction of Kallipolis as a thought experiment designed to reveal the truth about justice. 
282 Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics: 288-89. 
283 Stephen A. White, "Thrasymachus the Diplomat," Classical Philology 90, no. 4 (1995): 324. White 
argues that it is almost certainly Thrasymachus the sophist who Aristotle mentions in the Politics (1305a1) 
as having overthrown the Cymean democracy.  
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revolt against Athens in 407, Thrasymachus came to Athens as a diplomat on 
Chalcedon’s behalf, hoping to persuade the Athenians to allow his native city to retain 
much of her autonomy, and to prevent harsher sanctions against her.284 Though it is not 
difficult to find inconsistencies in his argument, failing to take Thrasymachus seriously is 
a mistake.285  He is perhaps the most brazen immoralist in all of Plato’s dialogues and, as 
we’ve seen in previous chapters, his views were reasonably widespread.  As he did in his 
portrayals of Callicles and Protagoras, Plato again signals us to look to Thucydides to 
better understand the practical consequences of Thrasymachus’ position.  As we saw in 
Chapter One, the most famous articulation of Thrasymachus’ view that justice is merely 
the advantage of the stronger is put forth by the Athenian Ambassadors on Melos.286  Yet, 
this is not the passage of Thucydides that Plato directs us to, probably because the 
arguments of the Athenian Ambassadors are more similar to those of Callicles, who uses 
nature as a standard to ground his theory of justice.  Instead, Plato ties Thrasymachus’ 
position to the stasis on Corcyra.  This is most clearly revealed in the Republic’s cast of 
characters and staging, which suggestively foreshadow the Athenian stasis.  Let us look 
at the specific linkage in the context of Thrasymachus’ argument.   
Thrasymachus twice mocks Socrates “simple-mindedness” (euethes), saying that 
only “those who are simple (euethes)” take justice seriously (343c-d).287  This same word 
                                                
284 White argues that the historical Thrasymachus did not endorse an account of justice as force.  Rather, 
Thrasymachus is simply describing the hated practices he associated with Athenian imperialism.  For 
White, Thrasymachus is not a “realist” like the Athenian Ambassadors at Melos, but is “an idealist… 
[expressing] the outrage of a man disillusioned and embittered by the brutal realities of fifth-century power 
politics.” Ibid., 322. 
285 As we shall see, he argues that justice is the advantage of the stronger, but calls tyranny the most 
complete injustice, when his argument should have this be the peak of justice (344a-c).   
286 It also appears as an unstated assumption during the Mytilenean Debate (over what the Athenians 
should do with the Mytileneans), where Diodotus reminds the Athenians that: “Our dispute, if we are 
sensible, will concern not their injustice to us, but our judgment as to what is best for us” (3.44, Woodruff 
translation).  
287 The first instance of euethes is at 336c. 
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appears again at 348c-d, when Socrates asks Thrasymachus to recapitulate his position on 
justice “from the beginning.”  The interchange runs as follows: 
Socrates: You say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete 
justice? 
Thrasymachus: I certainly do say that, and I’ve told you why. 
Socrates: Well, then, what do you say about this? Do you call one of the two a 
virtue and the other a vice? 
Thrasymachus: Of course. 
Socrates: That is to say, you call justice a virtue and injustice a vice? 
Thrasymachus: That’s hardly likely, since I say that injustice is profitable and 
justice isn’t. 
Socrates: Then, what exactly do you say? 
Thrasymachus: The opposite. 
Socrates: That justice is a vice? 
Thrasymachus: No, just very high-minded simplicity (euetheia) 
Socrates: Then do you call being unjust low-minded? 
Thrasymachus: No, I call it good judgment (euboulia)288 
This exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus presents in miniature the horror 
Thucydides described on Corcyra.  In Greek, euethes is a combination of eu (good) and 
ethos (habit or custom).  It, therefore, illustrates etymologically the virtue of being good 
out of habit rather than calculation.  Socrates articulates the traditional understanding of 
euethes and euethia as having a positive connotation, meaning “simple,” “good-natured,” 
or “well-meaning,” whereas Thrasymachus, to borrow Nietzsche’s term, transvalues it to 
                                                
288 Note that euboulia is what Protagoras claims to teach and what is, in the most elevated sense, the 
wisdom of Plato’s Guardians. See Protagoras 319a. 
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a negative, meaning “foolish,” or “stupid.” The term euethes provides the specific 
thematic link to Thucydides, for he tells us that the meaning of euethes changed from 
positive to negative during the stasis on Corcyra: “Thus was every kind of wickedness 
afoot throughout all Greece by the occasion of civil wars.  Simplicity (euethes), which is 
the chief cause of a generous spirit, was laughed down and disappeared” (3.83).289  Recall 
that in Chapter One, we examined Thucydides’ account of the Corcyrean stasis and found 
that he corroborates Thrasymachus’ account: words changed their meaning because 
men’s judgment or minds were no longer sound; they became twisted by their passionate 
desire to rule based on greed and ambition.  The meaning of words, therefore, changed to 
fit the interests of the dominant faction (3.82).  More important that this, however, is that 
for Thucydides, euethes is the animating cause of generosity.  As Martha Nussbaum 
observes: “Thucydides stresses that virtuous character rests on a foundation of confidence 
in conditions that exist outside the self.”290  That is, to the extent that justice is an 
externally-facing or other-regarding virtue, the loss of the traditional understanding of 
euethes cripples the generosity or other-regardingness that habits of justice require. 
Furthermore, if we think of language as the quintessential nomos, then linguistic 
stability is a reflection of social and political stability.   I believe that Plato draws our 
attention to Thucydides here to signal that the Republic is Plato’s solution to the problem 
of stasis.  Longing for the “ancient simplicity” or tradition, as Thucydides does, is an 
inadequate solution for Plato.291  After all, Thucydides himself has already shown the 
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291 Crane, Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political Realism.  Crane cites the Crawley 
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instability of language and social norms when they are understood in an exclusively 
positivist (or Thrasymachean) manner. There is ultimately no solution to the challenge of 
Corcyra or Thrasymachus at the level of positive norms—tradition or convention is 
simply too unstable when put to the test of war and plague (or violence and death).  When 
these are unleashed, nomos fails and consistency is the best we can hope for.  Indeed, if it 
were merely a matter of correct grammar or usage, the argument with Thrasymachus 
would be extremely brief and would simply consist of correcting his use of to euethes.  
Instead, Plato saw that the normative positivism of Thrasymachus and Protagoras could 
never provide a durable solution to the problem of pleonexia because normative 
positivism can never subject itself to critical evaluation (other than mere internal 
consistency)—it lacks the ability to take an external perspective to examine or assess 
positive norms.  
Returning to the dialogue, the manner in which Thrasymachus enters into the 
dialogue represents the cloud of violence, imperialism, and greed that hangs over Book I.  
Socrates recounts that: 
While we were speaking, Thrasymachus had tried many times to take over the 
discussion but was restrained by those sitting near him, who wanted to hear our 
argument to the end.  When we paused after what I had just said, however, he 
couldn’t keep quiet any longer.  He coiled himself up like a wild beast about to 
spring, and he hurled himself at us as if to tear us to pieces. (336b)  
Before announcing his view on justice, Thrasymachus begins by attributing bad motives 
to Socrates.  After indicting Socrates and Polemarchus for being “naïve” or simple-
minded (euethes), Thrasymachus charges Socrates with asking rather than answering 
questions on the grounds that it is easier to ask than answer. He further claims that 
Socrates’ motive for doing this is that he is motivated by a “love of honor” (philotimia, 
336c).  In Thucydides’ account, philotimia is one of the two drivers of the transvaluation 
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of language at Corcyra (of which euethes is the prime example).  Thrasymachus accuses 
Socrates of taking lessons from others without giving anything in return (338b). And, 
finally, he says that he thinks that Socrates is trying to “overpower” him (341a-b).  His 
experience with Athenian imperialism perhaps leads him to attribute these motives to 
Socrates.  Having been on the receiving end of Athenian power politics, Thrasymachus 
parrots back the restrictive initial demand of the Athenian Ambassadors at Melos: “And 
don’t tell me [justice] is the right, the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the 
advantageous” (336d).  Like the Melians, Socrates admits that his response would likely 
be “one of the forbidden answers” (337c). 
As we’ve noted, Thrasymachus begins his account with his claim that justice is 
the advantage of the stronger (338c).  He expands on this maxim, pointing out that in 
every city, some individual or group rules by some kind of forceful means—arms, will, 
cleverness, etc.  It is in this sense that they are stronger (kreitton).  Thus, in a tyranny, one 
individual is stronger; in a democracy, the many are stronger (338d-339a).  In each 
circumstance, the stronger establish laws to their own advantage, and the word “justice” 
is what they call adherence to these laws.  Thrasymachus, then, initially appears as one of 
the first legal positivists—for him, there is no such thing as justice other than the nomos 
that the rulers demand and the ruled observe.  And because the nomos are nothing other 
than the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus concludes that justice is a sham or a 
pretty name given by the rulers that disguises the underlying exploitative truth.   Socrates 
quickly (and cuttingly) points out some common ground as well as a significant 
difference between he and Thrasymachus, noting that he would have given a similar 
answer—that justice is advantageous—but that Thrasymachus wouldn’t permit it.  But 
the difference between their understandings—Thrasymachus’ addition of “of the 
stronger”—is significant to Socrates.  This addition circumscribes or relativizes justice’s 
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advantage.  Justice is advantageous, but it is advantage relative to “the stronger,” which is 
itself relative to “the rulers.”292  Socrates notes that in the course of his argument 
Thrasymachus has said two different things: (1) that justice is the advantage of the 
stronger—meaning the rulers—and (2) that justice is obeying the laws promulgated by 
the rulers.   Socrates raises the same serious concern with Thrasymachus’ view of justice 
as he did with Protagoras’ epistemology—the possibility of error.  What if the rulers 
make a mistake and establish laws that are not to their own advantage?  As we have seen, 
admitting the possibility of error involves accepting the existence of an external standard 
or measure.  Thrasymachus’ account of justice appears to exclude the possibility of an 
external standard because it relativizes the measure of justice to the individual and his 
strength or power.  As we shall see, Socrates shows that this understanding of justice 
becomes problematic as soon as any evaluative standard independent of the individual is 
introduced, because it entails that the stronger can be mistaken about what is to his or her 
advantage.  Cleitophon recognizes the power of Socrates’ objection and tries to rescue the 
argument by removing the standard, saying that what Thrasymachus “meant by what is 
advantageous for the stronger is what the stronger believes to be advantageous for him” 
(340b). 293  
Thrasymachus’ response to this is surprising.  If he really is a relativist, then 
Cleitophon’s clarification would help his argument and Thrasymachus should take it, 
because it keeps the standard of “stronger” at the level of how it appears to each 
individual.294  Instead, however, he insists on effectiveness as the standard for 
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293 Plato, Republic, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2004). 
294 This is another way of saying that Cleitophon may be a consistent relativist.  In his eponymous 
dialogue, Cleitophon is not convinced that knowledge can replace opinion.  For him, all Socrates is capable 
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determining relative strength, arguing that when rulers err, they are not rulers in the 
“precise” sense (340e).  Speaking precisely, Thrasymachus claims that rulers are like 
artisans and are guided by expertise.  Thus, when a doctor misdiagnoses an illness or an 
accountant makes a rounding error, we might say something like: “you’re no doctor (or 
accountant), you’re a hack!”  And what we mean by saying this is that when the doctor 
errs, he or she is not exercising the expertise that makes a doctor a real or genuine doctor.  
Strictly speaking, the name of a techne should only be applied when it is effectively 
carried out.  This principle extends to the art of ruling.  When a ruler makes laws that are 
not to his own advantage he is not, strictly speaking, a ruler.  Rulers who consistently 
make mistakes are not worthy of being called rulers—they are the functional equivalent 
of doctors who can’t tell whether someone is dead or alive or accountants who can’t 
add.295  Those without knowledge are merely imposters; they may wear the uniform or 
have the trappings of the expert, but, like the emperor in the Hans Christian Andersen 
tale, these experts have no clothes.  As an expert himself, Thrasymachus has great respect 
for knowledge and skill (and contempt for ignorance).296  Thus, for him pleonexia isn’t an 
issue, but ignorance, incompetence, or stupidity is.   
Thrasymachus’ claim that might makes right radicalizes Protagoras’ maxim that 
“man is the measure.”  This is why he rejects Cleitophon’s amendment—which is a 
consistent relativism based on subjectivism (where an individual’s belief of his or her 
advantage is the only standard).  Cleitophon’s position is that the ruler’s power ultimately 
                                                                                                                                            
of doing is urging individuals to embrace philosophy and justice.  He is not persuaded that Socrates has any 
grounds for this view. 
295 While the logic of Thrasymachus’ argument implies that infallibility is required to earn the term 
“ruler”—or any respective techne—it remains unclear how extreme his view is on this point. 
296 Interestingly, while Thrasymachus appears to flip-flop on many things, he never wavers from his belief 
that knowledge is good. 
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exists only in his own mind.297  Thrasymachus does not want to limit power in such a 
manner.  As Basil Mitchell and J.R. Lucas put it, accepting Cleitophon’s admission 
would have maintained Thrasymachus’ consistency of argument, “at the cost of making 
[his position] vacuous.”298  Thrasymachus would be sacrificing his valorization of power 
at the altar of internal consistency.  This is counter to what his position implies.  Both 
Socrates and Thrasymachus want to link truth and power.  Socrates will do this in his 
doctrine of the philosopher-king; Thrasymachus tries to do this by linking belief and 
power.299  When he identifies the ideal ruler as one who rules perfectly in his own 
interest, Thrasymachus subsumes truth into power.  For Thrasymachus, power is the 
standard to which everything else is relative. 
Socrates objects to Thrasymachus’ understanding, arguing that artisans and 
experts, strictly speaking, benefit the people they serve rather than themselves.  Using 
Thrasymachus’ examples, a doctor in the strict sense does not benefit himself but his 
patient.  Likewise, a ruler in the strict sense benefits the ruled.  For Socrates, arts are 
understood in terms of their purposes or in what sense they are advantageous, beneficial, 
or good.  And Socrates argues that the benefits of the various arts are external or other-
regarding.  Unsurprisingly, this does not square with Thrasymachus’ desire to dominate 
or effectively impose power.  Thrasymachus again calls Socrates “simple-minded” or 
naïve (euethes), and shifts the discussion from a concern for truth to a discussion of 
advantage.  To make his point, Thrasymachus offers an example of the shepherd and his 
flock, arguing that the shepherd doesn’t fatten and tend his flock for the animals well 
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being, but because he wants their wool or meat (or the income from their sale).  The 
shepherd is no PETA activist—his interest in the animals is purely instrumental.  Justice 
gives the illusion that there is a common good, when, in truth, there is no such thing.  
Indeed, as soon as the shepherd’s interest goes beyond tending and selling wool and 
extends to killing the sheep for their meat, then there ceases to be a common good 
between the shepherd and the sheep.  For the ruled, acting justly is simply harming 
themselves for the happiness of their rulers (343c).300  Thrasymachus argues that rulers 
(since he believes they are artisans and experts) are no different from his shepherds; they 
care only for their own good.  And he extends this, saying the greatest good is being a 
tyrant, because tyrants are the most capable of overreaching (pleonexia) on a grand scale.   
Something unusual happens at this point in the exchange.  Thrasymachus is 
evidently quite worked up by this discussion because he claims that tyranny is the height 
of injustice.  Speaking of tyranny, Thrasymachus calls it the “most complete injustice, the 
one that makes the doer of injustice happiest and the sufferers of it, who are unwilling to 
do injustice, most wretched” (344a). This is a peculiar statement for Thrasymachus to 
make because, according to his own definition, tyranny should be the consummate form 
of justice, not injustice.  That is, if justice is “the advantage of the stronger,” and one man 
is “stronger,” then it is just for him to seek his own advantage and, in this example, 
become a tyrant if this is what he thinks is his interest or advantage.  This is nothing other 
than legal positivism.  Instead, Thrasymachus articulates here the conventional 
understanding of injustice—unfairly seeking one’s own advantage or unbridled greed, 
independent of the individual in question’s weakness or strength.  Socrates chooses to 
ignore this apparent slip-up, focusing instead on the craft (techne) analogy.  He argues 
                                                
300 Note that Thrasymachus admits that justice is other-regarding—it is “really the good of another” (343c). 
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that Thrasymachus’ shepherd actually practices two arts: (1) the shepherding art, which is 
directed toward the good of the sheep (assuming it is beneficial for sheep to be fattened) 
and (2) the wage-earner’s art, which is directed toward the good of the shepherd himself.  
So it seems that every art except wage-earning is directed toward the good of others.  
However, the introduction of the wage-earning art is a problem for Socrates insofar as it 
acknowledges that there is at least one art that is solely directed to one’s own benefit.  If 
ruling turns out to be an expanded form of the wage-earning art applied to politics, then 
Thrasymachus’ position would be vindicated.  Tyranny (and ruling generally) would 
simply be the quintessential self-beneficial art.  This evidently does not occur to 
Thrasymachus—just as it didn’t occur to him that, by his own understanding, the tyrant 
should be called just.   
Socrates’ position here is quite important and, in my view, too often passed over.  
He contends that people practice the other arts for the sake of earning wages, not vice 
versa.  Shoemakers make shoes in order to earn money.  They do not earn money in order 
to make shoes.  Socrates thinks this makes perfect sense—no one would go around 
benefitting others unless he or she benefits in some way (346d-e).  And, since ruling is 
simply caring for the well being of others, Socrates claims that no one with any sense 
would rule without some incentives (including compulsion).  Ruling requires voluntarily 
“taking other people’s troubles in hand and straightening them out” (346e).301  There 
seems to be, then, some common ground between Socrates and Thrasymachus.  If no one 
likes justice or serving others simply for its own sake, then their disagreement is over the 
goodness of justice.  For Thrasymachus, justice is simply unnecessary because it is 
possible to benefit yourself without needing to benefit anyone else.  In contrast, Socrates 
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argues that justice is necessary—you must benefit others to make it possible to get any 
benefit for yourself.  This is perhaps what provokes Glaucon to make his demand that 
Socrates defend justice as good for the individual as well as for its own sake at the 
beginning of Book II.  At this point, however, we might say that the difference between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus is this: for Socrates, the power of an art lies in its ability to 
serve others, whereas for Thrasymachus, the power of an art lies in its ability to acquire 
for oneself.  
The next exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus is, I believe, the most 
significant in the dialogue.  This is because, in the middle of it, Socrates remarks: “All 
the same, we must not shrink from pursuing the argument and looking into this, just as 
long as I take you to be saying what you really think.  You see, I believe that you really 
are not joking now, Thrasymachus, but saying what you believe to be the truth” (349a).302  
This implies that Socrates may believe that Thrasymachus wasn’t being entirely candid 
before (though his speech certainly gave the appearance of candor).  And, since 
Thrasymachus later says that he doesn’t consider what he is saying to be what he really 
believes, I think this exchange is particularly important (especially since it generates 
Thrasymachus’ famous blush).  As we’ve seen, Socrates begins by getting Thrasymachus 
to agree that injustice is good judgment (euboulia)303 and that the unjust—having good 
judgment—are also wise, good, virtuous and noble (348d-350b).  Socrates then solicits 
Thrasymachus’ belief (which contradicts his prior claims) that the unjust man “deserves 
to do better than everyone,” including other unjust men or actions (349c-d, italics 
mine).304  Thrasymachus’ belief is normative, not descriptive: the unjust man not only 
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does better than everyone else, he deserves to do better.  And this position implies an 
understanding of justice that contradicts Thrasymachus’ previous teaching.  The problem 
for Thrasymachus is that he believes that the wise deserve to win.  This is odd because 
his supposed wisdom is that there is no such thing as deserving.  It is at this point that 
Thrasymachus blushes because Socrates has exposed a contradiction in his soul.  
Thrasymachus denies that there is such a thing as justice or deserving, but his own desire 
for esteem (and the justness it implies) is too strong for him to overcome.   If 
Thrasymachus abandoned his belief in deserving—that pleonexia on a grand scale has 
nothing to do with deserving its spoils—he would be forced to relinquish any claim to 
deserve the respect he so desires.  However, he is unable to jettison the deeply human 
hope for happiness that rests on the belief that, if we are good, then we deserve and will 
someday receive the spoils (including happiness).   
On the other hand, Thrasymachus could abandon his denial of justice, arguing 
instead that it is something like wise injustice that makes men deserving, and that unjust 
men will defer to other unjust men.  This, of course, is unworkable because it would 
imply a kind of justice among thieves.  If unjust men recognized each other as deserving, 
they would be similar to conventionally just men.  And, were this to occur, these very 
men would no longer be deserving, because they would no longer be unjust.  The 
problem, then, is akin to the famous problem of evil that makes it unreasonable to believe 
in the existence of God.  The existence of God implies omnipotence, omniscience and 
perfect goodness, and the problem of evil implies that you can have two, but not all three.  
Similarly, in the case of Thrasymachus we have three things: injustice, wisdom, and 
deserving.  While Thrasymachus can put two of them together and remain consistent, he 
cannot add the third.  It is very difficult, then, to truly and consistently abandon justice.  
Socrates shows us here that the belief in justice is so powerful that even people who 
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claim to have arguments rejecting it remain captive to it.  Instead, it seems that what lies 
at the root of Thrasymachus’ account is something like righteous indignation or a deep 
belief in justice as deservingness.  Even though he may be deeply confused or has 
willfully pulled the wool over his own eyes out of self-protection (as Thucydides shows 
the Athenians doing), this is not what Thrasymachus teaches.  Instead, he argues for an 
unbridled pleonexia that Plato believes the Athenians have begun to internalize—it 
operates at an almost unconscious level. 
The word pleonexia is used throughout the Republic to denote the tyrant or the 
tyrannical regime.  This suggests that in Plato’s representation at least, pleonexia has 
become associated with the normative position of immoralists like Thrasymachus and 
Callicles, who explicitly advise abandoning the idea of distributive justice in the city in 
favor of unbridled self-interest.  As we’ve seen, immoralists ground their advice on 
various considerations—from manliness (andreia), natural over conventional justice 
(nomos/phusis), or simply as a form of self-gratification.  Thrasymachus, then, seems to 
endorse conventional injustice as a type of self-gratification since, as we’ve seen, he does 
not argue that tyranny and pleonexia are in fact just: “But when someone, in addition to 
appropriating their possessions, kidnaps and enslaves the citizens as well, instead of these 
shameful names he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens themselves, but 
by all who learn that he has done the whole of injustice” (344b-c).  According to 
Thrasymachus, pleonexia is a kind of outsized greed that exemplifies the apparently 
limitless appetite of the tyrant.  In constructing his ideal city, Plato does not deny the 
authenticity of strong desires to get more.305  Rather, he gives an account of such desires 
that explains when and how limits are to be placed on them.  He does this by elaborating 
                                                
305 This is an essential difference between the Republic and the Gorgias. 
 181 
a system of education, which trains his Guardians to grasp the eternal Forms that spring 
from the Form of the Good.  Conceived in this way, the Republic represents Plato’s 
attempt to circumscribe or re-educate the Athenian soul away from appetitiveness.  Like 
Thucydides, he recognizes the potentially fatal blow that the sophistic critiques will have 
on traditional Greek ways of circumscribing aggression and excess.306  As a result, 
Socrates will ascend from the Piraeus with a new civic “religion” that grounds morality in 
a non-religious (or at least not traditionally religious) framework.307  Let us examine how 
this occurs.   
Plato introduces the Form of the Good at the end of Book VI as a way of 
understanding justice analogically.  During the initial search for justice under the 
auspices of the analogy between the city and the individual soul, after founding the city-
in-speech and before looking for its virtues in Book IV, Socrates remarks that they need 
to “get an adequate light somewhere” (427d).  When they turn to the individual, Socrates 
says that “we will never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument—
although there is another longer and fuller road that leads to such an answer” (435d).  The 
Form of the Good provides the light they need to travel on the “longer and fuller road.”  
However, Socrates’ account of the good deals primarily with the problem of knowledge, 
the nature of reality, and how individuals can participate in it.   If Plato believes that the 
central books in the Republic—that is to say the digression or the “longer and fuller 
road”—represent the solution to Thrasymachus’ challenge (expanded on by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus), then he must believe that, at its core, the problem of justice is inextricably 
linked to the relationship between the individual soul and the nature of reality.  If this is 
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 182 
true, then Thrasymachus’ challenge is less an issue of character (though it is also this) 
than an issue of what Thrasymachus believes to be most real.  And, as we’ve seen, the 
things Thrasymachus thinks are most real are: power, greed, domination, and violence. In 
this sense, Thrasymachus and Callicles are similar and Plato must find a response 
adequate to both attacks on justice. 
Plato attempts to do this by having Socrates create a new metaphysics and 
epistemology that grounds his response to the immoralist challenge in the doctrine of the 
Forms.  The Form of the Good replaces the traditional theonomic perspective that 
grounded justice as a matter of the gods’ control and sanction.  Socrates puts forth the 
Form of the Good as a new standard that makes individuals and cities moderate and 
restrained in the face of pleonectic opportunities.  Instead of ruling according to base self-
interest, the philosopher-kings rule through their knowledge of the universe.  The 
analogies of the Sun, the Line and the Cave are the analogical means through which 
Socrates creates an edifice of knowledge with the Form of the Good as its fundamental 
object of desire.  Their ability to participate in the truth and knowledge that flow from the 
Forms is what ensures the Guardians’ virtue and legitimates their rule (484c-d, 502c-d, 
534d-e).  It is philosophy or the knowledge of nature that generates a set of transcendent 
norms and circumscribes political power to a small group of individuals whose desires 
are aimed at understanding the good.  Justice is built into Kallipolis in part because 
political power is grounded in philosophic education or wisdom.  And this education is 
only accessible to those few individuals with the ability to grasp the Form of the Good.  
The Form of the Good serves as a kind of transcendent philosophic sacred object that the 
philosopher-kings may apprehend through the education of their virtuous natures.  The 
Form of the Good even defines the goodness of the gods.  Human beings and the gods 
stand beneath the perfection and moral beauty of the forms.  By doing this, Socrates 
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transforms the traditional ways of thinking about political virtue.  Both human beings as 
well as gods are good and just because they are completely dedicated to virtue.   
The Kallipolis, then, simultaneously draws our attention to and serves as a 
refutation of the politics of pleonexia that characterize Athenian imperialism.  When 
Socrates initially lays out the analogy between the city and the individual soul, he begins 
with a very basic “healthy” city as a way of discovering justice in the relations between 
its inhabitants (368c-372d).  The defining attribute of this “true city” is not simply its 
minimalism or self-sufficiency, but the fact that its citizens have few desires for things 
other than basic sustenance.  Socrates description of the inhabitants’ lives in the “true 
city” is worth revisiting: 
They’ll produce bread, wine, clothes and shoes, won’t they?  They’ll build 
houses, work naked and barefoot in the summer, and wear adequate clothing and 
shoes in the winter.  For food, they’ll knead and cook the flour and meal they’ve 
made from wheat and barley.  They’ll put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds 
or clean leaves, and, reclining on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, they’ll feast 
with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods.  
They’ll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources 
allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war. (372a-b) 
When Glaucon asks about what “delicacies” the citizens in the “true city” will have, 
Socrates lists: “salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, and vegetables of the sort they cook in 
the country.  We’ll give them desserts, too, of course, consisting of figs, chick-peas, and 
beans, and they’ll roast myrtle and acorns before the fire, drinking moderately” (372c).   
Because the desires of the inhabitants are moderate and they have few temptations to 
behave unjustly—like the temptation to acquire wealth—it is likely that this city and its 
inhabitants are just. 
The desserts of the healthy and true city are inadequate for Glaucon (and 
presumably the other interlocutors), and he immediately characterizes this initial city as a 
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“city of pigs”—by which he means a city fit for animals rather than humans.  The reason 
Glaucon gives for its unfitness is that it lacks the “delicacies and desserts that people 
have nowadays,” by which he means, in particular, imperial Athens.  Many scholars have 
noted the importance of this point in the dialogue.  We can imagine that, were the 
Socrates from the Gorgias or the Protagoras present, he would attempt to persuade 
Glaucon that his desires for unnecessary luxuries damage both his own soul and his city.  
Here, however, Socrates encourages Glaucon to release his appetites and allows typical 
luxuries including ivory and gold into the city.  This is why Socrates emphasizes the 
importance of imports to satisfy the needs of the inhabitants.  Glaucon’s objection, then, 
serves to underscore the pleonexia that has infected the Athenian youth.  The luxurious 
city implies the need for expansion and, with it, war and conquest.  Thus, Glaucon’s 
objection carries with it the need for Guardians to protect the luxuries, and these 
Guardians will therefore require education about the manner in which this defense should 
occur.  They will require the education of the rulers Socrates describes in Books VI and 
VII. And this will provide Socrates with an opportunity to show the chasm between the 
values of the philosopher-kings who rule Kallipolis and those who currently rule Athens.   
There is no better example of how Socrates highlights this gap then in the 
requirement that the rulers have no private—that is to say individual—property (417a).  
Socrates’ argument for the requirement of communism is that: “if they acquire private 
land, houses, and currency themselves, they will become…harsh tyrants instead of 
partners in dealing with their fellow citizens, with whom they will live on terms of 
mutual hatred and suspicion” (417a-b).  For Socrates, private property is like anthrax—all 
it takes is a tiny bit of exposure to material goods in order to unshackle desire and corrupt 
those in charge of defending the city.  Communism is required because, without it, the 
Guardians will abuse their authority in order to satisfy their material urges.  Plato 
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emphasizes this point by having Adeimantus object that the Guardians will be less happy 
than other rulers because they will lack the accouterments that typically accompany 
power—“big houses [and]…furnishings to go along with them,” in addition to gold and 
silver “and all the things that are thought to belong to people who are blessedly happy” 
(419a-b).  Adeimantus here raises the fundamental moral and political problem with the 
pleonexia of imperial Athens—the use of power as a means to satisfy engorged material 
desires.  Socrates’ response to the challenge of pleonexia, posed in different ways by 
Callicles and Thrasymachus, is to exclude their desires from the social and political 
order.  Let us briefly examine how he proposes to do this. 
Socrates employs two primary vehicles to limit the rulers’ ability for material self-
aggrandizement: education and institutional arrangements.  As we’ve seen, the 
requirement that the rulers hold property in common is a purposeful attempt to 
institutionally address the problem that rulers are by nature materially acquisitive and that 
they will use their power to expropriate wealth from those they rule.  This concern over 
materialism is further reflected in Socrates’ stress on the moderation of the philosopher-
kings with respect to money (485e).308  These characteristics of the Republic testify to 
Plato’s concern over the relationship between rule and materialism.   Indeed, the Republic 
responds to Thrasymachus and Callicles’ lionization of power and pleonexia in part by 
requiring that rulers exercise their power not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of 
the ruled.  For Plato, the argument that individuals or groups either do use political power 
for their own advantage, or, more strongly, that they should acquire political power in 
order to satisfy their greed is demonstrably false.  Rulers, properly so called, and 
                                                
308 “A person like that [philosopher-king] will be temperate, then, and in no way a lover of money.  After 
all, money and the big expenditures that go along with it are sought for the sake of things that other people 
may take seriously, but that he does not” (485e, Reeve translation). 
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educated in knowledge of the Form of the Good, will avoid ruling if at all possible, but 
will rule justly and to the benefit of the ruled once in power.   
Plato underscores the uniqueness of his solution through his doctrine that holds 
the city as a whole responsible for the creation of destructive individuals.  As Socrates’ 
puts it:  
None of our present constitutions is worthy of the philosophic nature, and, as a 
result, this nature is perverted and altered, for, just as a foreign seed, sown in alien 
ground, is likely to be overcome by the native species and to fade away among 
them, so the philosophic nature fails to develop its full power and declines into a 
different character. (497b)   
Central to Plato’s education of just rulers is an environment in which their abilities and 
naturally virtuous characters can be effectively cultivated.  In highlighting the link 
between education and justice, Plato indicts Athens for improperly educating its citizens 
(as we saw in the Protagoras).  Because the Athenians live in a corrupt moral climate, 
they are unable to receive a true education—the external pleonectic influence is simply 
too pervasive.  Plato’s critique takes on a much sharper focus in connection with the 
Athenian dogma of pleonexia that we have seen in the previous chapters.  Specifically, 
Athens provided a poor education by instilling in its citizens a perverted understanding 
about the nature of goodness, justice and truth.   Throughout the Peloponnesian War, 
many of the Athenian elite embraced the view of their Ambassadors at Melos—that 
might makes right, power justifies the satisfaction of base desires, and that pleonexia is, 
at root, the fundamental truth of what’s good for cities and individuals.   And these 
lessons were likely well-learned and internalized by Athenians through their experience 
of empire.  The analogy between cities and individual souls, then, is a reasonable way of 
understanding analogically how individuals internalize an understanding of what things 
are of the highest value and what behaviors are noble by participating in their civic 
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culture.  For Plato, the Athenians have habituated themselves at the individual and 
collective level to believe in the goodness of power and greed through their experience of 
acquiring, governing, and dominating their empire.  Glaucon’s untamed desire for a 
luxurious city is a natural reflection of what happens to even the most noble youth in an 
environment of imperialism and greed.    
By letting in Glaucon’s pleonectic desire for more into the city, Socrates is able to 
introduce the need of an army to defend the city’s territory and luxuries, as well as the 
need to acquire more land: “Won’t we have to seize some of our neighbors’ land, then, if 
we are to have enough for pasture and plowing?  And won’t our neighbors want to seize 
part of ours in turn, if they too have abandoned themselves to the endless acquisition of 
money and overstepped the limit of their necessary desires” (373d)?309  The implication 
here is that the necessary or “natural” desires of the simple city are limited, whereas the 
pleonectic desires of the luxurious city are, as Thucydides’ Pericles instructs, limitless.  
Glaucon, representing the best of the Athenian youth, is nonchalant in response to the 
need to dominate, saying: “That’s completely inevitable” (373e).  Having been reared in 
the context of the empire, Plato believes that the adoption of this kind of worldview is 
equally inevitable.  That is, for Glaucon, the only city worth living in will, by definition, 
entail violence and greed.  Simple trading relationships based on mutual need or purpose 
do not appear as possible solutions to the problems raised by the desire for luxuries.  
Perhaps this is because Glaucon already recognizes the potential limitlessness of desire.  
Socrates immediately tries to draw out the implications of Glaucon’s view, linking 
pleonexia (especially its material manifestations) and war: 
Socrates: And the next step will be war, Glaucon, don’t you agree? 
                                                
309 Reeve translation. 
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Glaucon: I do. 
Socrates: Now, let’s not say yet whether the effects of war are good or bad, but 
only that we have now found the origin of war: it comes from those same factors, 
the occurrence of which is the source of the greatest evil for cities and the 
individuals in them. (374e)310 
This passage raises the familiar problem of the relationship between internal or 
domestic harmony and external greed.  As we saw in Chapter Three, Pericles’ solution is 
to unleash pleonectic desires, but to direct them toward other cities.  Socrates now reveals 
what this understanding fundamentally entails—turning the Guardians into “noble 
hounds” (375a).311  For Plato, this is the consequence of Pericles’ solution—a warping of 
human nature that cannot be expected to succeed (a point with which, I believe, 
Thucydides’ concurs).  Socrates’ solution is radically different.  In Book IV, he argues 
that justice is psychic health—understood as the proper ordering of the tripartite soul.  In 
both city and the soul, justice is the virtue that establishes harmony and internal strength 
through the proper ordering of the parts or classes.  However, the ordering itself is merely 
internal alignment, and Socrates doesn’t show that that the psychically healthy soul or the 
well-ordered city will be just in its relations with others until he sets down his 
metaphysics in Books V-VII.   The issue of rule (arche) is what helps guarantee this, for 
it is only when reason rules the city and the individual through its understanding of the 
Form of the Good that the individual or the city become just.  Without this critical 
amendment, individuals and cities might be powerful (dunamis) in their relationships 
with others, but not necessarily just. 
Interestingly, in his discussion of the characteristics of the Guardians, Socrates 
highlights the importance of the friend/enemy distinction.  The Guardians must have the 
“philosophic” nature of the guard dog, which is the ability to distinguish between friends 
                                                
310 Reeve translation. 
311 Reeve translation. 
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and enemies.  This is, of course, one of the oldest principles of Greek (though not simply 
Greek) ethics and, as we saw in our discussion of Book I, how Polemarchus spins 
Simonides’ maxim of justice as “giving to each what is owed to him” (331e).  Yet, for 
this principle to work for Socrates, he must redefine the distinction in a way that makes 
“friend” into the just or virtuous and “enemy” into the unjust or those lacking in virtue.   
This is why he organizes Kallipolis in such a way as to guarantee that its citizens 
demonstrate the virtues, because in this way he ensures that the Guardians will be 
internally gentle.   However, Socrates does not directly address how the Guardians will 
treat others.   Presumably, their indirect participation in the Form of the Good, as well as 
their self-control will prevent the Guardians from desiring (and trying to grasp) what is 
not theirs.   
However, Socrates’ original remarks about warfare and the creation of the army 
raise unsettling questions in the context of Athenian imperialism.  Returning to it in light 
of the Republic as a whole, it reads like a lament over the gap between the ideal of justice 
and the pervasive and very real injustice of Athenian imperialism.  And we are chastened 
(and perhaps a bit disgusted) by the ease or apparent thoughtlessness with which Glaucon 
moves toward injustice.  Nevertheless, Plato believes that this is the probable outcome 
from the Protagorean or Periclean political education.  I believe that the fact that this 
occurs early in the construction of the city in speech also reflects Plato’s view that 
knowledge of vice is a prerequisite for the ascent to virtue.  To borrow Protagoras’ 
metaphor, we must know how and in what direction the wood is bent in order to know the 
best way to straighten it.  Seen in this light, we can understand the Republic as an 
extended meditation on the struggle to balance individual freedom and virtue with the 
social and political need for virtue to be an externally-directed and shared activity in 
cities comprised of individuals with competing interests.  
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It is also instructive to recognize that Plato’s cultural critique is not merely 
confined to Athenian imperialism but is much more sweeping, taking in its grasp all 
existing cities.  After constructing Kallipolis, Socrates returns to the theme of materialism 
and pleonexia in his analysis of the “defective” individual and regimes types in Books 
VIII and IX. Plato explicitly details the underlying causes that generate political conflict.  
After Kallipolis is undermined through a mathematical error, its rulers begin to exhibit 
the virtues of character common to those with iron and bronze souls (in keeping with the 
myth of the metals.  This naturally leads to war, hostility and faction (stasis) over 
property and material goods as well as individual freedom, since the factions come 
together to “enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded 
as free friends…and occupy themselves with war and with guarding against those whom 
they’ve enslaved” (547b-c).  Each phase of individual and regime dissolution is 
characterized by control over private property and the instrumental use of power.  For 
example, the (older) timocrat becomes consumed with a lust for money, “passionately 
adoring gold and silver in secret” (548a).  This leads to the socially damaging 
concentration of wealth in a small number of individuals and families (548a-550d).   
Living in a city that loves wealth over all other things, the oligarch—in one of Plato’s 
more memorable images—elevates his appetite for wealth to a “throne” in his soul, 
subsuming all other considerations to his lust to acquire wealth “or what ever might 
contribute to getting it” (553d).  As the number of poor increase, they become an 
increasingly powerful force from their sheer numbers and eventually take power, 
establishing equality for those who are left, after “killing some of their opponents and 
expelling others” (557a).312  Under this democracy, the democratic leaders “take the 
                                                
312 We are, of course, again reminded of Thucydides’ description of the Corcyrean stasis. 
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wealth of the rich and distributing it to the people, keep the greater part for themselves” 
(565a).  Finally, the tyrant, elevated to power by the people against the rich, eventually 
turns on the people, enslaving them to satisfy his own greed.  Socrates argues that the 
tyrant lives the most unhappy life because he is “compelled” to be unjust to his people 
who, naturally, he comes to fear.  As a result, he lives “full of fear, convulsions, and 
pains throughout his life” (579d-e).  And there is no escape for the tyrant, because his 
utter lack of moderation and self-control make him a permanent “slave” to his desires  
(579d-e). 
We should read Plato’s analysis of the dissolution of individuals and regimes in 
light of his presentation of his most infamous immoralists (Thrasymachus and Callicles) 
and alongside his description of Kallipolis.  Plato rejects Thrasymachus and Callicles’ 
vision of a politics of unrestrained appetite and greed for one that grounds political power 
in those individuals who are the most fair-minded and self-controlled.  His discussion of 
regime dissolution is simply the flip side of the construction of Kallipolis.  Books VIII 
and IX show precisely why banishing pleonexia from the rulers as well as the ruling 
institutions of Kallipolis was necessary.313  Unlike Pericles, who sought to harmonize 
pleonexia with civic virtue and harmony, Plato directs his efforts toward eliminating 
pleonexia and its inevitably destructive consequences from his own political vision.    
With this in mind, let us see if we can, by way of conclusion, see how Thucydides 
approaches this issue. As with Plato, Thucydides is concerned with an analysis of the 
Athenian national soul or character: its fundamental impulses and traits, its characteristic 
weaknesses and strengths, and the relationship between its character and politics.  
Thucydides wanted to unearth the significance of the Athenian Empire to the Greek 
                                                
313 Note that material goods are not banished entirely from Kallipolis—Plato is most concerned with the 
effect of materialism on the rulers.  Materialism is particularly problematic when it comes to rule, but 
perhaps less so when it comes to life as a whole.  
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world—why and how it operated, and what it tells us about the political (and human) 
condition.  What, then, might he have to say in response to Plato’s critique?  Before 
beginning his narrative of the war proper, Thucydides gives a brief twenty-chapter 
account of the times before his own, the so-called “Archaeology.”  While part of his 
purpose here is to demonstrate the relative unimportance of the past when compared with 
the present, the underlying theme of the Archaeology, and its culmination, is the 
development of Athenian imperialism.  The past history of Greece is unimportant 
because it did not permit the flourishing of politics and large-scale powers.   
As Thucydides attempts to contrast the greatness of the Peloponnesian War with 
prior Greek wars, he focuses our attention in the History’s first paragraph on the 
magnitude of the Peloponnesian War: “This was certainly the greatest disturbance to 
affect the Hellenes and a considerable number of barbarians—one might say the majority 
of mankind” (1.1).  In setting off the Peloponnesian War from Homeric Epic and 
Herodotus’ History, Thucydides relies on the magnitude of the suffering as evidence of 
the war’s greatness: “But this war not only was great by its extended length but also was 
accompanied by such sufferings as never afflicted Hellas in any comparable period of 
time” (1.23).  Indeed, given what Thucydides chooses to focus on in the Archaeology, 
coupled with his later reports on early Greece, we can see that the purpose of the 
Archaeology is to focus the reader’s mind on imperialism from the outset.  Thucydides 
praises Sparta’s custom of putting down tyrannies and notes the unusual way in which the 
Athenians confronted the Persian threat: “resolving as the Persians advanced to abandon 
their city and embarking on their ships after they had cleaned it out, [the Athenians] 
became a seaborne people” (1.18).  When Thucydides discusses the events giving rise to 
the Peloponnesian (Spartan) and Delian (Athenian) Leagues, he carefully points out that 
the Spartans “did not dominate their allies by making them pay tribute” as opposed to the 
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Athenians’ policy of “taking over the fleets of the allied cities…and assigning money for 
each to pay” (1.19).  For Thucydides, this difference reflects Athens’ pleonectic nature.  
Right from the beginning, then, Thucydides draws our attention to the grasping, energetic 
character of Athens and the stable, motionless character of Sparta—which, as Victor 
David Hanson observes, represent “the poles of human and not just Greek experience.”314   
It is no accident that Thucydides’ whirlwind tour of Greek history highlights 
elements directly related to the rise of Athenian imperialism and the grasping desire that 
helped bring it into being.  More than this, however, Thucydides begins to focus our 
attention to the relationship between imperialism and justice.  In the Archaeology, 
Thucydides seems to be silent about the justice or injustice of the past.  The remote past 
appears innocent of questions of right.315  Indeed, the word justice arises only in the 
claims and counterclaims of the various combatants, and the supposed justice of prior 
wars is only due to the beautification of the poets.  Yet, as Thucydides tells it, progress in 
the Archaeology is progress with respect to justice (at least within cities).  Beginning with 
Greece at its most primitive (before it was even called Greece), Thucydides tells of 
frequent migrations, and tribes that often abandoned their homes “under pressure from 
anyone more numerous at the time” (1.2).  Of course, people had little reason to stay in 
one place, given that there was no stability, commerce, secure communication or much 
cultivation beyond subsistence.  People lived from day to day, providing for life’s 
necessities, which could be supplied in one place just as well as another.  This state of 
affairs was one in which the power of the stronger governed.  Nowhere was this better 
reflected than in the fact that everyone wore arms as a part of everyday life as an article 
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of clothing.  According to Thucydides, nothing of much import happened until the 
Greeks took to the sea.  By writing the history of naval power in Greece in the first 
chapters of the History, Thucydides foreshadows the coming power of Athens. 
For example, Thucydides begins the fourth chapter by noting that: “Minos was 
the earliest known in our tradition to acquire a navy, and he controlled most of the sea 
now called Hellenic, ruled the Cyclades, and…cleared the seas of piracy as far as 
possible to direct revenues toward himself instead” (1.4).  Minos used his navy, then, to 
help establish a tyranny, set up his sons as governors in the islands, and put down piracy 
in order to better acquire revenue for himself.  In other words, Minos needed capital.  For 
Thucydides, this is the relevant fact that demands our attention, not whether Minos was 
Zeus’ son and received instruction from him about creating Crete’s laws or how many 
Athenian children the Minotaur famously ate.  Suppressing piracy permitted people to 
populate the coastal regions without fear and begin to settle down, acquire wealth, and 
even build walls.  The Greeks, beginning with the Athenians, set aside their weapons.  
According to Thucydides, one of the characteristics that helped make this possible was 
that the wealthy adopted a more moderate attitude toward the people (1.6).  The 
invention, as it were, of moderation was an essential prerequisite for the establishment of 
genuine political community.  However, though moderation was indeed critical, interest 
and necessity formed the bulk of the foundation of human progress.  Indeed, law and 
order were a byproduct of conquest, not negotiation.  Thucydides is clear about the price 
that was paid for this stability: “Love of profit caused the weaker to submit to the 
domination of the strong and the more powerful, with their abundant wealth, to make the 
smaller cities subject to them” (1.8).316  The fundamental relation between the strong and 
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the weak changed form, but its essence remained the same.  By the end of the eighth 
chapter, Thucydides has already introduced us to the core elements of what will become 
Athenian imperialism: naval power, wealth (especially through tribute), and rule over the 
islands.317  It is worth noting that Thucydides here points out the benefits of imperialism 
for its subjects.  However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the archetype for 
Athenian imperialism is one of the most brutal tyrants in the history of Greece.  Nor 
should we forget that Minos’ fleet governed the seas in a manner akin to the Athenian 
navy.           
In addition to Minos, Thucydides tells us that Agamemnon, the Corinthian 
tyrants, Polycrates of Samos, and the Persian Kings Darius and Cyrus gained dominion in 
similar fashions.  For example, Thucydides asserts that: “Agamemnon, as I see it, 
assembled his force more by surpassing his contemporaries in power than by leading 
suitors bound by the oaths to Tyndareus” (1.9).  That is, the animating factor of the 
Trojan War was fear, not eros—the Trojan War had little to do with Briseis or Helen.  
Thucydides begins his History, then, by redefining what counts as important historical 
forces.  The individual or psychological truths laid out by Homer and Herodotus are 
replaced by Thucydides with patterns of human behavior.  Concerns with memorializing 
great individuals are replaced with an account of the type.  As Peter Pouncy points out, 
individual glory retreats in the face of: “large movements of power, by aggression or 
alliance…[when the locus of power] is found in states and their resources rather than in 
individuals.”318  The movement of the Archaeology goes from the earliest stages when 
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homes were unstable to the later stage when governments were; the material progress 
evident in this historical development is aligned with political unity and boosted by naval 
power. As David Grene observes: “Money, commerce, naval power, and large-scale 
centralization are the necessary steps on the road which leads from a condition of simple 
barbarism to the developed and sophisticated empire of Athens.”319  The remainder of the 
selective survey of Greece is really nothing more than crash-course on the history of sea 
power in the Aegean, anticipating Athens’ rise to dominance.  There is no discussion of 
cultural, artistic, or intellectual achievements.  These are relevant to Thucydides only 
insofar as they provide necessary conditions for the development of power.  And for 
Thucydides, power is most of all characterized by the possession of surplus wealth and 
vast territory supported by a strong fleet.  Naturally, since Thucydides measures previous 
civilizations by the standards of Athenian imperialism, they are all, to one extent or 
another, inadequate.320   
As we’ve seen, Thucydides asserts that the conflict between Athens and Sparta 
was inevitable due to the fear the rise of Athenian power generated in the Spartans.321  
Put differently, war become inescapable once Athens took imperial form.  Her drive—
most clearly reflected in her abandonment of divine and moral restraints at Melos—made 
her a threat to everyone in her orbit.  At the same time, Athenian energy is the source of 
one of her most significant inventions—freedom.  In his Funeral Oration, Pericles 
identifies the freedom bestowed on individuals by Athens as one of her defining virtues.  
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Athenians live as they please.  However, while they enjoy this freedom, Pericles claims 
that they simultaneously respect written and unwritten laws (or morality).  And they are 
as willing and able to defend Athens as citizens of cities, like Sparta, that achieve the 
same effect by subjecting their citizens to extreme discipline and secrecy.  As a result, 
Athenian “daring…[has] compelled every sea and land to become open” to them (2.41).   
The Corinthians at the Congress at Sparta make this point, but from the other side 
of the imperial lens.  In trying to incite the Spartans to war, they describe the Athenian 
character as one on unrelenting expansionism.  Athenians are decisive and love to venture 
away from home because they expect to gain something in their travels.  Athenians are 
quick to pursue victories and slow to retreat in defeat.  They put their minds and sacrifice 
their bodies without hesitation in the service of Athens.  The Corinthians sum up the 
Athenian character: “they were born to have no peace themselves and allow it to no one 
else” (1.70).  The Athenian character, then, is of an unprecedented kind: Athenian 
freedom generates an externally-directed kind of power that ultimately threatens the 
liberty of the other Greeks.  This view is corroborated by Thucydides himself in his 
discussion of the rise of Athenian imperialism over the fifty years before the 
Peloponnesian War (1.89-1.138).  What begins as a slow expansion in the Aegean as a 
defense against the Persian threat transforms into what appears to be a purposeless 
endeavor of expansion for expansion’s sake.          
The Athenians defend their expansionism and empire at the Congress at Sparta by 
giving an account of human nature and its effect on how cities behave.  According to the 
Athenians, every city with sufficient power will advance their power over weaker ones as 
a result of the universal compulsions (or motivations) of fear, honor, and self-interest 
(1.75-1.76).  The Athenians say that the most salient factor that contributed to their 
imperialism was their fear of Sparta.  As for honor and interest, these appear to be weaker 
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justifications for empire—at least if they are the “universal” compulsions the Athenians 
claim.  As the Athenians themselves point out, Sparta did not maintain leadership of the 
alliance following the Persian War.  That is, the Spartans were evidently not compelled to 
retain leadership.  It seems that perhaps the only way to make sense of the Athenian 
argument is to suppose that the stated compulsions apply only to Athenians.  But if this is 
so—given the linkage between imperialism and justice—what is the difference between 
saying that different men are differently compelled toward empire, and saying that some 
men are just and others are not?   
As they do throughout the History, the Athenians claim that their actions are in 
accord with human nature, since the strong always subject the weak.  No one with 
sufficient strength ever resorts to arguments from justice, just as the weak only employ 
arguments from justice because they have insufficient strength.  Thus, according to the 
Athenians, arguments from justice are nothing other than elaborately wrapped assertions 
of self-interest.  This is not to say that the Athenians deny the existence of justice or even 
its irrelevance.  Rather, they argue that justice only becomes relevant when both sides in 
a dispute lack sufficient power to unilaterally impose their will on the other.  This is 
qualitatively different from suggesting, for example, that might makes right.  Indeed, the 
Athenians maintain that they deserve kudos for acting more justly than their power 
requires.  If might made right, the Athenians would deserve no such praise.  It is 
important to note as well that the Athenians do not hold that their imperialism is just—
full-stop—only that no city acts with more justice than Athens.   
If the Athenians are correct, strength is a prerequisite for justice.  Only those with 
superior power can be unambiguously just, because weaker cities’ claims to justice are 
merely expressions of the self-interest of the weak.  But the Athenian account of justice is 
simultaneously an illustration of Athenian hubris.  The envoys admit that their empire is 
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not founded upon justice, but it is this very candor with respect to justice that makes the 
Athenians more just than everyone else.  Paradoxically, the observation and awareness 
that their imperialism is unmoored from any standard of justice is precisely what makes 
them attend more to issues of justice than other tyrants. Since their rule is not just, they 
rule more moderately or justly.  
Thucydides subjects the Athenian account to serious criticism in his account of 
the rise of Athenian imperialism.  He emphasizes the critical role of Themistocles, who 
convinced the Athenians to fortify the Piraeus.  Like Pericles, “he also considered the 
Piraeus more valuable than the city above it” (1.93).  By drawing this parallel with 
Pericles, who led Athens to the height of her power, Thucydides encourages us to see 
Themistocles as the progenitor of Athenian imperialism—encouraging Athens down the 
path of expansionism through naval supremacy that gave rise to both her glory and her 
demise.322  In Thucydides’ narrative, Themistocles embodies the Athenian daring and 
energy that the Corinthians both admire and rail against.  In his account of Athens’ rise, 
Thucydides demonstrates that, in spite of their appeal at Sparta that Athens was 
“compelled” to imperialism, the facts do not support their claim.  If their initial steps 
toward empire sprang from the motive of fear of Persia, their motive transformed rather 
quickly into a desire for more (pleonexia) that sprang from self-interest.  Fear played at 
best a small role in Athenian imperialism. What’s more, the Athenian claim of 
compulsion consisting of fear, honor, and interest is difficult to reconcile in the following 
sense:  If you are compelled (ananke) to do something, then in what way can it be said 
that what you are doing is either freely chosen or honorable?  The Athenians argue—
strangely, I think—that honor (time) is one of the compulsions that pushed them toward 
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imperialism, and they further claim that they have yielded to compulsion less than others.   
This is why they claim that Athens is more just than their power requires (1.76).      
To help us understand why the Athenians make these claims, let us return to 
Pericles’ Funeral Oration, which is a paean to Athenian beauty and greatness.   
Interestingly, the only time Pericles uses a form of the word “compel” (ananke) in the 
Funeral Oration is when he describes what the Athenian empire has done throughout 
Greece: “we have compelled every sea and land to become open to our daring and 
populated every region with lasting monuments of our acts of harm and good” (2.41).323  
The understanding of compulsion as requiring aggressive power politics and imperialism 
has become, at this point, a self-fulfilling prophecy, which Pericles quickly links to eros.  
In perhaps the most commented on section of the address, Pericles urges the Athenians to 
gaze upon Athens’ power, and become lovers of it.324   As we have seen, this is a similar 
understanding of eros as a physical compulsion (ananke) as the one Gorgias put forth in 
his Encomium of Helen.325  However, this Gorgian or sophistic understanding of eros and 
ananke has moral repercussions that are different from the more traditional understanding 
of eros as a kind of divine visitation.326  The word eros appears in reference to politics on 
three occasions in Thucydides’ History: Pericles’ Funeral Oration in Book II, the 
Mytilenean Debate in Book III, and the Sicilian Expedition in Book VI.  In order to see 
                                                
323 The word Pericles uses is katanankazo. 
324 As we discussed in Chapter Three, it is unclear whether Pericles is referring to the city’s power or the 
city herself. 
325 See Chapter Two for a more complete discussion. 
326 Paul Ludwig has written what I believe is the most comprehensive analysis of political eros in Greek 
literature.  Paul W. Ludwig, Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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how Thucydides understands the relationship between eros and imperialism, let us 
examine these three episodes.327   
In the Sicilian Expedition we see Athenian eros in full flower. According to 
Thucydides himself, the Athenians are “in love” with the idea of conquering the island.  
In Book IV we read (ironically to the reader of the Melian Dialogue) about an early 
Athenian hopefulness (elpis) or over-confidence of taking control of Sicily.  And in Book 
VI, Thucydides says in his own name that the decision to launch the armada was the 
result of such passions as eros (love, desire) and appetite (epithumia)—precisely the 
kinds of passion that sophrosune or moderation is supposed to hold in check (6.24).  
Sicily is an object of Athenian desire throughout the History, and the Athenians’ attempt 
to subdue the island is an archetype of their pleonexia.  As the Syracusan leader 
Hermocrates describes it, the Athenians’ attack: “out of longing for the good things in 
Sicily, which we [the various Sicilian cities] possess in common…For the Athenians to 
reach for more and lay plans in this way, one can make every allowance, and I do not 
blame those who wish to rule” (4.61).  Hermocrates’ understanding of Athenian ambition 
is perhaps a way station on the path from the desire for material goods to the desire to 
dominate others.328  Prior to the Melian Dialogue and the Sicilian Expedition, Athenian 
imperialism may have simply been a means through which to acquire material goods.    
However, by positioning the Melian Dialogue immediately before the Sicilian Expedition 
in his narrative, Thucydides invites us to consider the ideology exposed by the Melian 
                                                
327 I recognize that many commentators do not usually treat eros as an essential concept in Thucydides 
(perhaps because he doesn’t frequently use the term).  However, I think this is a mistake, given its explicit 
importance in three of the most crucial episodes in the History, as well as its implicit role in many others.  
The release of eros is what enables Athenian greatness as well as sends her to ruin.  I thank Thomas Pangle 
for drawing my attention to these three passages.  
328 We are left to wonder whether Pericles could have held the Athenians’ pleonexia in check. 
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slaughter as a prelude to the Sicilian disaster and, hence, as reflecting the lack of self-
control that finally led to the total annihilation of Athenian forces.    
By the time of the Sicilian Expedition, Athenian desire no longer is confined to 
obtaining material goods, but—as Callicles or Thrasymachus might advise—has 
expanded to encompass a desire for power for its own sake.  In his description of the 
massive size and diversity of Sicily, Thucydides remarks: “against a place of this size the 
Athenians were bent on campaigning, their eagerness for complete conquest the truest 
cause” (6.6).  Athenian leaders reflect the demos’ pleonexia in the policies they propose, 
with the result that Athens’ eros quickly overreaches her power.  In contrast to the 
Periclean insistence on collective glory through his ingenious, but unsuccessful attempt to 
harmonize the public and private, Athens’ power is now primarily a means for private 
advantage.  Indeed, Alcibiades’ desire to become one of the leaders of the Sicilian 
Expedition helps illustrate how far the Athenians have come.  Alcibiades represents the 
Athenian character taken to its logical extreme.  Thucydides says that Alcibiades desired 
to lead the expedition out of his hope (elpis) to acquire money (of which he was 
perilously short due to his profligate spending) and desire for esteem.  Alcibiades 
combines individual/material and political pleonexia in a single man.329  As Thucydides 
describes him, Alcibiades: “was above all eager to take command and hoped that this 
would enable him to conquer both Sicily and Carthage, and that by succeeding he would 
at the same time add to his personal wealth as well as prestige” (6.15).  Here Thucydides 
confirms the totality of Alcibiades’ graspingness, that Alcibiades was simply using the 
city as his instrument for wealth and glory.  Moreover, he recapitulates (in marginally 
different order) his familiar equation of—arche, pleonexia, and philotimia—in a manner 
                                                
329 The most thorough treatment of Alcibiades’ ambition that I am aware of is Forde, The Ambition to 
Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides.  ibid.; Victoria Wohl, "The Eros of 
Alcibiades," Classical Antiquity 18, no. 2 (1999). 
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recalling his account of the Corcyrean stasis.  By echoing Corcyra, Thucydides artfully 
suggests that Alcibiades’ behavior will be responsible for Athens’ stasis (or at least 
political breakdown), generated by his individual lust for money and glory.  The days of 
Pericles have long since departed.  No longer will nameless individuals give up their lives 
in a collective effort for the good of the whole city.  Instead, the kind of self-interest that 
drives Alcibiades to seek personal profit and aggrandizement on a grand scale comes to 
jeopardize Athens’ very existence—Athens herself comes to embody Alcibiadean drives.   
We should note exactly how narrow Alcibiades’ conception of self-interest really 
is.  For him, self-interest is understood as acquiring material goods and glory for oneself, 
independent of the consequences for other citizens or the city as a whole.  Instead of 
considering the city’s welfare as primary, like Pericles, Alcibiades believes that the city’s 
good is subordinate to his own.  For example, he argues—openly in the Assembly—that 
his winning display at Olympia benefited Athens, rather than himself and his family, by 
presenting the other Greeks with an example of Athenian power (6.16).  Thucydides casts 
doubt on Alcibiades’ claims, suggesting that in spite of the obvious rhetorical advantages 
such an argument might have, Alcibiades always puts himself first (6.15).  The 
consequences of his leadership are plain: he will use his public rhetoric to encourage and 
legitimize the pursuit of self-interest, even when it conflicts with the city’s interest.  
Unsurprisingly, these desires provoked distrust among the Athenians with respect to him, 
since many thought he was attempting to become the tyrant of Athens (6.15).  According 
to Thucydides, most people recognized that Alcibiades’ desires outran his means, “and to 
a great extent it was this which destroyed the Athenian city.  The masses, frightened by 
the magnitude of his license in conducting his personal life and of his aims in absolutely 
everything he did, whatever it was, developed hostility toward him as an aspiring tyrant” 
(6.15).  In a way, Alcibiades becomes a kind of Thucydidean Callicles or Thrasymachus.  
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The Athenians are alarmed precisely because Alcibiades’ excessive desire for more 
threatens their own possessions and, more importantly, their possession of the city.  He 
embodies the Athenian national character but turns his pleonexia inward against the 
Athenians themselves.330  Like Callicles and Thrasymachus, he is ambitious both to 
control the city and to acquire everything he desires.  Thucydides here connects the city 
and the individual: Athens’ external imperialism with the necessary trust and harmony to 
maintain the polis from within.  Despite Nicias’ best efforts to dissuade the Athenians 
from invading Sicily, “a passion for the expedition afflicted everyone alike” (6.24).  The 
underpinning of Athenian imperialism—outwardly directed pleonexia—depended on 
equality and fairness inside Athens for its success.  Ironically, it is the very equality and 
fairness inside the city that enables and sustains the Athenian aggressiveness against 
other Greeks.  Once the cement that had previously bound the community together 
disintegrated, Athens was on her way to becoming Corcyra.  Though it does not yet reach 
the apocalypse at Corcyra, Alcibiades moves Athens close to the brink by rejecting 
Pericles’ model of democratic leadership.   
Alcibiades reverses the democratic norms that formerly bound Athenians together 
as a political community.  In his speech before the expedition, Alcibiades ridicules the 
equality that had helped engender Athenian unity and empire: “There’s no injustice in 
being above equality if you think well of yourself…If a man will not even greet us when 
we are down on our luck, then, when things go well for us, he should be equally content 
if we look down on him” (6.16).331  If Alcibiades’ pleonectic desires have created 
mistrust among Athenians, then his public rejection of the Athenian ideal of equality only 
                                                
330 Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides: 123-26. 
331 Woodruff translation.  Lattimore renders the last passage: “so just as we are not hailed when we are 
unfortunate, let all submit to the arrogance of the successful.” 
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strengthens their mistrust and, more importantly, encourages Athenians to look after their 
own interests instead of those of a polis that is fragmenting along the lines of self-
interest.332   
Alcibiades strategy is simple but to the point: he argues that Athens’ pleonexia 
actually coincides with national security interests.  In his opinion, the Athenians cannot 
calculate “like housekeepers” how much empire they would like to have.  They must 
either continue to export conquest or else become subject to another’s dominion.  What’s 
more, Athenian security will be the most sure if Athenians try to perfect their current 
character and customs in spite of their flaws (6.18).  This is tantamount to arguing that 
Athens’ most well-known characteristic and custom, pleonexia, is the best mechanism 
through which to secure her future prosperity and security.  Rejecting pleonexia will lead 
to Athenian ruin.  Like Callicles and Thrasymachus, Alcibiades argues for expanding 
desires and acquiring the power to satisfy as many of them as possible.  Rather than 
attempt to moderate the demos’ excessive desires like Pericles, Alcibiades inflames them.  
Although Alcibiades can imitate Pericles’ rhetoric—for example, his claim that the city is 
strongest when “the lowly, the average, and the extremely gifted…are all combined”—he 
neglects Pericles’ content.  That is, for Alcibiades, pleonexia becomes nothing other than 
greed with a view to individual profit rather than a glory that attaches to both the 
individual and common good.  Thucydides describes the various motivations that animate 
the decision to attack Sicily: “the old men hoped to subdue the place they went to…the 
young men were longing to see and study a far-off country…while the great mass of 
people, including the military, expected not only to gain their wages by it for the time 
                                                
332 Note that in his debate with Alcibiades, Nicias himself encourages fragmentation by exhorting the older 
men in the Assembly to oppose the proposals of the young (6.13).  He encourages his older followers “to 
avoid sharing the fatal desire for the faraway that afflicts the young by understanding that there is very little 
success won by craving but a great deal by foresight” (6.13).  
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being, but to win such power [or domination] that their salaries would go on forever” 
(6.24).333  Equality in the Assembly has been sacrificed at the altar of greed; because of 
“this vehement desire…anyone who did not favor the expedition kept quiet out of fear 
that if he held up his hand in opposition he would be thought to harbor ill will against the 
city” (6.24).   
As is well known, the expedition was an utter disaster.  Interestingly, however, 
Thucydides suggests that the expedition could have succeeded.  In his diagnosis, its 
failure was due to “private quarrels” at the expense of the public good rather than 
“mistaking the power of those they attacked” (2.65).  Note that Thucydides puts forth this 
judgment in his eulogy to Pericles in Book II.  Put bluntly, by the time of the expedition, 
it was already too late—the seed of Athens’ demise had already blossomed. The way 
Thucydides interleaves his narrative episodes further encourages us to see this.  As we 
noted in Chapter One, Thucydides introduces the Sicilian Expedition in the very next 
sentence after the slaughter of the Melians: “During the same winter, the Athenians 
wanted to sail to Sicily again with a larger force than the one under Laches and 
Eurymedon [discussed in Book IV] and subjugate it if possible” (6.1).  Abandoning any 
pretense to justice, honor, or nobility, the Athenian Ambassadors put forth the simple, 
ruthless argument that those with power do as they wish, and they apply this view to the 
gods themselves.  That is, according to the Athenians, the gods behave as the Athenians 
do and, therefore, can also be understood as tyrants (5.105).  While the Athenians still 
insist that they are more reasonable or moderate than their power requires—their 
reasonableness or moderation is that of a tyrant (5.111).  The truth of Athenian 
imperialism is finally revealed as brutish tyranny (though the Athenians have deluded 
                                                
333 Woodruff translation, brackets mine. 
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themselves to such a degree as to be unable to see it).  The beauty that Pericles offers in 
his Funeral Oration has turned into the ugliness of tyranny and empire.  The “lovers of 
nobility with restraint, and lovers of wisdom without any softening of character” have 
faded from view (2.40).334  Periclean eros has transformed into unbridled pleonexia.335  
Pericles himself apparently recognized the folly of his erotic approach to politics after 
witnessing the dissolution of social norms during the plague.  In his final speech, he 
recognizes the reality of the Athenian imperial project, acknowledging that the empire is 
a now a like tyranny: “though it may have been thought unjust to seize, it is now unsafe 
to surrender” (2.63).336  
There is little doubt that Thucydides encourages us to see in Alcibiades the likely 
consequences of Pericles’ worldview.  Michael Vickers suggests that Thucydides intends 
the Athenian Ambassadors at Melos to represent Alcibiades “to the knowing reader.”337  
Though Alcibiades was busy competing in the chariot races in Olympia during the 
Melian slaughter, Vickers argues that Alcibiades was behind both the expedition and the 
delivered punishment, going so far as to say the attack “may even have taken place on 
account of a personal grudge on the part of Alcibiades.”338  Vickers argument is quite 
complicated, but it is worth summarizing some of his evidence.  Though Alcibiades 
leaves the scene after attacking Argos in the chapter immediately before the Melian 
Dialogue, Thucydides does not explicitly mention his departure, leaving it to the reader to 
                                                
334 Woodruff translation. 
335 Thucydides’ placement of the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the middle of the Sicilian 
Expedition is surely designed to further this point.  Overthrowing the tyranny was subordinate to 
Aristogeiton’s primary purpose—holding on to Harmodius (6.54).  As Paul Ludwig notes: “Harmonius and 
Aristogeiton harmed the city in furtherance of their own private eros when the effects of their love spilled 
over into public affairs.” Ludwig, Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory: 162.  
336 Woodruff translation. 
337 Michael Vickers, "Alcibiades and Melos: Thucydides 5.84-116," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte 
Geschichte 48, no. 3 (1999): 275. 
338 Ibid. 
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deduce this fact.  Vickers claims that Alcibiades’ “moral presence” is reflected in the 
composition of the attacking forces.  Among the make-up of forces that attacked Melos 
were “Alcibiades’ regular ‘handmaidens,’”—the Chians and Lesbians—who were 
simultaneously supplying Alcibiades with animals for his enormous sacrifice at the 
games.339  Furthermore, Alcibiades was likely present during the initial attack on Melos 
in 425 and probably considered it unfinished business.  Since the method the Athenians 
chose to adopt toward Melos was coercion, the language of the Athenian Ambassadors 
“possessed a certain Alcibiadean resonance” though their use of ananke.340  As Vickers 
puts it: 
The knowing contemporary reader will thus have spoken the words of ‘the 
Athenians’ traulizon, or pronouncing rho and lambda.  If the opening words of 
‘the Athenians’ first speech were thus lambdacized, they would quickly produce a 
disagreeable jingle: pros to plethos is the kind of expression for which Alcibiades’ 
teacher Gorgias was famous but which good Attic stylists tried to avoid.341 
Teisias, one of the generals at Melos, was close to Alcibiades and the word 
Thucydides uses to characterize the action that Teisias and his co-general Cleomedes 
were intending to carry out on the Melian territory is adikein (“to treat it with injustice,” 
5.84).  As we’ve seen, this is the word used to describe how respectable Athenians 
viewed Alcibiades’ personal conduct during the time.342  Finally, the way in which the 
                                                
339 Horses were a passion for Alcibiades (Thucydides reports that he kept a stud farm at 6.15), and the 
Olympic chariot title would naturally be a great plume in his hat.  Alcibiades infamously entered seven 
teams (by far the most ever recorded—including one that he reputedly stole) and took first, second and 
fourth places (6.16). 
340 Vickers cites Ostwald’s observation that “the whole weight of imperial ananke” is articulated in the 
Melian Dialogue. Vickers, "Alcibiades and Melos: Thucydides 5.84-116," 276. Ostwald, Ananke ̄ in 
Thucydides: 40. 
341 Vickers, "Alcibiades and Melos: Thucydides 5.84-116," 277.  Vickers also observes that the Athenian 
Ambassadors speak in an Alcibiadean manner, citing the frequency rate of initial kai’s (i.e., using kai to 
begin sentences—which was an Alcibiadean signature) as statistically identical to those of Alcibiades’ 
speeches in the History. 
342 Plutarch reports that: “Faced with all these aspects of his [Alcibiades’] behaviour, the notable men of 
Athens combined feelings of abhorrence and disgust with fear of his haughty and lawless attitude, which 
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Ambassadors say they understand why the Melians want to hold the debate in private 
rather than before the people is nearly identical to the way Thucydides describes 
Alcibiades’ deception of the Spartan delegation to Athens in 420 (5.45).  Vickers’ 
argument is consistent with Plutarch’s account of Alcibiades’ influence in the Melian 
affair, claiming that Alcibiades: 
picked a woman from among the Melian prisoners of war, installed her in his 
house, and brought up a child she bore him.  They described this as an act of 
kindness, but the problem was that he was more responsible than anyone for the 
slaughter of all the adult male inhabitants of Melos, since he had spoken out in 
support of the decree.343  
By linking Alcibiades with typical sophist philosophical ideas and practices of the 420s—
when Gorgias first came to Athens—Thucydides makes the point that these views had 
now become sufficiently well accepted that they could be made openly to the demos.             
Let us conclude by examining the third discussion of political eros in Thucydides’ 
History, put forth by the otherwise unknown orator Diodotus in the debate over the 
appropriate punishment for the Mytileneans after some of them rebelled.  It is often 
thought that Diodotus’ view is closest to that of Thucydides’ himself.344  In the debate, 
Diodotus attempts to convince the Athenians to do something for the Mytileneans that 
they will not do for the Melians: spare the innocent.  He does so by making a case for 
eros as the causal and, hence, mitigating factor that should excuse their rebellion.  
Diodotus justifies a lenient policy towards the Mytileneans by linking eros to self-
interest—the Mytileneans rebelled under the influence of a desire for freedom.   Diodotus 
claims that the combination of eros and hope (elpis) always drive humans to action—
                                                                                                                                            
struck them as tyrannical in its excessiveness.” Plutarch Alcibiades 16.2 in Plutarch, Greek Lives : A 
Selection of Nine Greek Lives: 234. 
343 Plutarch Alcibiades 16.4-5 in ibid., 235. 
344 Cornford is perhaps the best representative of this viewpoint.  Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus: 121-
26, 35. 
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independent of any constraints by laws or other fears (3.45).  As cities have greater 
objects of desire than individuals—namely freedom and control—they are even more 
subject to its spell.  Eros is a temptress that leads men to their undoing and is responsible 
for creating an inevitable conflict between the strong and the weak that under the best of 
circumstances can be managed, but never eradicated.  The Diodotean understanding of 
eros, then, is similar to Nicias’.  In warning the Athenians against the Sicilian Expedition, 
Nicias describes eros as a sickness of “yearning for what is not here” (6.13). 
While Thucydides reserves his use of eros primarily for Athenians, this does not 
mean that their Spartan combatants are any more just.  Indeed, the limitations of Spartan 
justice are apparent for all who care to look.  Again, Thucydides interleaves the examples 
of Plataea and Mytilene to make precisely this point.  Diodotus is, in fact, able to 
persuade the Athenian Assembly to spare the innocent among the Mytileneans who 
surrendered to Athens.  There will be no one capable of similarly persuading the Spartans 
at Plataea.  After a long siege, the Plataeans surrender to the Spartans.  In determining 
what punishment to administer, the Spartans apply a simple test for justice: whether the 
Spartans “had received any good service from the Plataeans in the war” (3.68).345  The 
Spartans apply this test even though Plataea was an Athenian ally, rather than—as in the 
case of Mytilene—a rebellious Spartan one. Of course, the Plataeans fail this test and the 
Spartans slaughter the men and enslave the women and children.  A more self-interested 
understanding of justice is difficult to imagine and reflects a typical Spartan brutality 
when dealing with other poleis—but a brutality that, nevertheless, is inextricably linked 
to a zealous protection and love of her own polis.  This very love highlights Thucydides’ 
questioning of the grounds of Sparta’s famous moderation.  Moderation in its traditional 
                                                
345 Woodruff translation. 
 211 
sense, that is, willful self-restraint when other avenues are available, initially seems to be 
a Spartan accomplishment (especially if Diodotus is right about human beings’ 
propensity to erotic recklessness).   Thucydides recognizes this in Book VIII, when he 
praises the Spartans and Chians as the only two peoples who have been both prosperous 
and moderate (8.24).  However, he almost immediately points out that these two cities 
had the greatest number of slaves (8.40).  Thucydides takes pains to show how brutal 
Sparta is when dealing with the Helot slaves that make the Spartan regime possible.  
Sparta’s moderation turns out to be a result of her need to control the Helots, rather than 
true virtue.  Like Athens, it seems that Sparta also uses her power to dominate the weak.  
The difference is that Sparta’s “empire” is internal.  
In the Mytilenean Debate, Thucydides draws our attention to the similarity 
between Athenian imperialism and Spartan “moderation.”  Cleon, the “most violent” man 
in Athens and Pericles’ successor, argues (contra Diodotus), that all the Mytilenean men 
of military age be put to death, whether or not they participated in the rebellion, and the 
rest of the population enslaved.  In other words, Cleon argues for precisely the same 
action taken by the Spartans at Plataea.  As with the Spartans at Plataea, Cleon defines 
justice exclusively with respect to Athenian interests, and even begins his speech by 
recognizing that the “empire is a tyranny” (3.37).   Like a Spartan thinking about his 
treatment of the Helots, Cleon believes the consequence of Athenian tyranny is that any 
misstep might mean her undoing.   The tenuousness of their condition requires cutting off 
debate and moving to swift action—even if that means ignoring considerations of justice 
in favor of what is most expedient for Athens.  The moderation of Sparta (and Cleon), 
then, is revealed to be an illusion—a result of pressure and fear rather than virtue.   
The dissolution of social norms Thucydides describes during the Corcyrean stasis 
and the plague at Athens are a consequence of specific desires woven into the fabric of 
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politics and human nature that get amplified during times of crisis.  According to 
Diodotus, these desires are primarily a function of eros.  Stasis and plague are merely 
crucibles within the ever-present human yearning for what one does not have, and in our 
inescapable mortality.  Thought of in this way, Thucydides suggests that stasis and 
plague—though fortunately rare—are not as different from ordinary life as we might 
initially suspect.  Therefore, any hopes for the greatness possible in civil society depends 
on circumscribing eros and its effects.  Recall that Thucydides identifies the transvaluing 
of euetheia or simplicity as the beginning of the moral degeneration on Corcyra (3.83).  
The corollary of this is that euetheia is the foundation of moral health.  For Thucydides, a 
healthy civil society requires the generosity of spirit engendered by a kind of guileless 
trust and a commitment to be trustworthy to others.   As he shows in the Archeology, its 
rise in Greece depended on a slow path toward material comfort and physical security.  
Without these, euetheia cannot endure, and the greatness inherent in civil society fades 
into history.   
Thucydides, then, appears to understand Athenian imperialism as a consequence 
of a politically unshackled human nature or eros that leads both to Athens’ power and 
greatness as well as to her eventual defeat.  The presentation of his narrative suggests that 
this kind of imperialism is difficult—perhaps even impossible—to be susceptible to 
moderation’s charm, because it sees moderation as utterly charmless.  While I cannot 
prove it, I agree with many commentators that Diodotus’ analysis seems largely to reflect 
Thucydides’ own.  And it is sobering.   The Athenians vote to spare the lives of many 
Mytileneans—in what is perhaps the History’s most remarkable episode—through 
Diodotus’ subtle twisting of the classic Athenian argument to support their imperialism.  
As we have seen, the Athenians typically claim that all cities with sufficient power are 
compelled to dominate others out of fear, honor, or profit.  Diodotus sets the Athenian 
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account inside an even larger understanding of human motivation—governed by hope 
and eros.  Hope and eros can be said to drive not only the Mytilenean desire for freedom, 
but also the drive or ethos of Athenian imperialism.  Thus, in Diodotus’ view, both the 
weak (Mytilene) and the strong (Athens) are governed by the irrational compulsion of 
hope and eros.  And though Diodotus successfully nudges Athenian imperial policy (the 
Athenians only execute the revolutionaries)—his success is short lived.  At Plataea, the 
putatively just Spartans show just how uncommon it is for reason and moderation to rule 
the day.  And this rareness echoes throughout the increasingly fevered behavior of the 
Athenians as the war progresses.346  There is no Diodotus on Melos.    
Thucydides subtly reveals that there is less difference between Athens and Sparta 
than initially appears.  In a similar manner, we are able to see the congruence between 
Plato and Thucydides’ teachings on Athenian imperialism.  As we’ve seen, there is more 
than simply probable cause to believe that Plato was familiar with Thucydides’ History.   
I believe that the textual and thematic references in the Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras, 
and Republic are simply too numerous and explicit to leave much doubt.  Plato’s textual 
allusions to Thucydides serve to underscore the practical implications of many of his 
philosophical positions as well as highlight the common ground between the two 
thinkers.  Both Plato and Thucydides understand the problem of imperialism as the 
overcoming of moderation by pleonexia unleashed and reinforced by the political 
implications of sophistic teachings that valorize the life of appetite and power.  And both 
Plato and Thucydides rely on moderation to control pleonexia.  I believe that the 
difference between the two thinkers is best understood as a difference in means to similar 
ends.  Their difference is not simply, as many commentators remark, one of an optimistic 
                                                
346 This is not to say that Thucydides ever suggests that the Athenians are moderate.  Indeed, they 
announce their worldview in their speech at Sparta. 
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Plato versus a pessimistic Thucydides.  Indeed, as we’ve seen, both thinkers show 
precisely how unlikely it is for the moderation and respect required to support justice to 
come into being (though both show the possibility).  Plato and Thucydides join in 
lamenting the chasm between true virtue, of which justice is a part, and the expressed 
virtue and justice of the Athenian empire.  Rather, Plato’s moderation results from 
education and participation in a regime that combines politics and philosophy to direct 
eros, whereas Thucydides’ moderation relies exclusively through stifling or displacing 
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